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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Richard William Hunter for the Doctor of Philosophy
in Social Work and Social Research presented February 10, 1999.

Title: Voices of Our Past: The Rank and File Movement in Social Work, 1931-1950

During the period of the late 1920s through the late 1940s, a most remarkable
event in the history of American social work emerged: the development of a vital
radical trade union organizing effort known as the ''rank and file movement." Born
within the growing economic crisis of the 1920s and maturing in the national
economic collapse and social upheaval heralded by the Great Depression, the rank and
file movement would attract the support and membership of thousands of professional
social workers and uncredentialed relief workers in efforts to organize social service
workers along the lines of industrial unionism. Within its relatively short life span, the
rank and file movement would grow in sufficient number and influence to challenge
both the prevailing definitions of social work as a profession - its form and identity 
and the essence of its function - its practice.
It is the thesis of this study that an understanding of the rank and file
movement is central to a modem understanding of our profession. The origin,
development and demise of the rank and file movement reflects more than the
historical curiosity of a momentary tendency in the evolution of a profession; rather, it
reveals the enduring legacy of individuals, organizations and collective intellectual
1

discourse in common struggle for the possibilities of a more just and democratic social
order. And, perhaps unlike any other profession, the domain of social work is
historically one uniquely born of this struggle, encompassing the self-imposed
imperatives and paradoxes of morality, socially purposive service and scientific
rationality.
Consequently, this study seeks to inform the terms of this enduring legacy
within the dynamic world of social work. It does so by: 1) locating the history of the
rank and file movement within the context of an evolving profession; 2) analyzing this
specific history of a profession within the context of broader social and political forces
that defined both the limits and potentials ofthat evolution; and 3) assessing the
implications of this history for social work in terms of its past, present and future.
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FOREWORD:
THE PAST AS PRESENT, THE PRESENT AS PAST
April 14, 1966
Mr. B. 1. Zukas
East Northport Junior High School
East Northport, New York
Dear Mr. Zukas:
I have been reading with interest a book entitled, Three Kids in a Cart by Allen Drury
which was secured from the East Northport Public Library. On papers 5, 6 and 7, I note
the interrogation of a witness named Bronislaus Joseph Zukas. Are you the witness to
whom reference is made? If so, and since the book is undoubtedly being widely read in the
community, there may be questions raised by the readers. At least, I would anticipate this
might occur.
In order to be prepared for such an eventuality, and if, in fact, you are the witness to
whom reference is made, I would appreciate your reaction to the case as presented in the
book, the general nature of the investigation, the outcome, and your particular role.
Sincerely,
John G. Benfer
Assistant for Curriculum
April 28, 1966
Dear Mr. Zukas:
This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your brief letter to me and your letter to Dr.
Schneider ... in which you submitted your resignation. In my letter of April 14, 1966 to you
I indicated that I wished:
a. To know if, indeed, you were the witness to whom reference was made.
b. Your reaction to the case in point as presented by the author.
c. The general nature of the investigation.
d. An explanation of your role.
At our conference of April 21 the foregoing points were discussed verbally. At the
conclusion of our conference I asked that you respond in writing to the questions raised in
my letter of April 14. This you agreed to do but I assume from your letter of April 26 that
you decided otherwise. Again, I would request that you respond in writing to the questions
I raised in the letter of April 14. I would expect such an explanation on or before May 5,
1966, if you choose to comply.
Sincerely,
John G. Benfer1
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Bronislaus Zukas' involvement in'social work's rank: and file movement was
a short but well publicized one. 2 Like many others who would form the backbone of
the movement, Zukas was a public relief worker. Trained as a teacher, Zukas
graduated from college and, in the face of the Great Depression, held out few
prospects in 1935 for obtaining employment as a teacher in New York City. Instead,
Zukas, like thousands of other unemployed white and blue-collar workers, accepted a
position as a public relief worker. Like Zukas, most of these new public relief
workers did not have the benefit of social work training or a professional degree in
social work. Rather, they were thrust into the role of caseworker by virtue of their
unemployment and the opportunity for work created by the Roosevelt
administration's funding ofpublic relief programs such as the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA).3
Zukas worked as a caseworker in the New York Home Relief Bureau, and
quickly joined the Association of Workers in Public Relief Agencies (AWPRA).
Organized initially in 1933 as the Emergency Home Relief Bureau Association,
A WPRA was one of the first, and most militant, of the early rank and file public
worker unions. Through contacts in the union, Zukas joined the Communist Party
and, like many of the communist group in the union, became a part-time labor
organizer.
Following the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
and the subsequent affiliation of most social work unions into the CIO, Zukas was
employed as a CIO organizer and was transferred to California. In California, the
2

State, County and Municipal Workers of America, CIO (SCMWA) was engaged in a
massive and largely successful effort to organize public sector workers. After
leading a campaign to organize hospital workers in Los Angeles, Zukas went to work
as a caseworker in Visalia at the Tulare County office of the State Relief
Administration (SRA). There, Zukas assumed union leadership as financial
secretary for the SCMWA local.
Tulare County, like many other areas of California, was highly dependent on
agriculture for its economic base. Over the years, a strong coalition ofproducers,
canneries and distributors had waged a bitter war with migrant workers and efforts of
the CIO to organize farm and cannery workers. Like many CIO activists and their
unions, Zukas and his SCMWA local openly assisted the organizing efforts of the
CIO's United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America
(UCAPA WA) in Tulare County and the greater Central Valley. However, the
growing statewide success of the UCAPAWA did not go unchallenged by agri
business interests and their allies in the California legislature, who charged that the
Communist Party controlled the union. 4
As alarm over the successes ofthe UCAPA W A and its alleged communist
connections increased in the state legislature, so did charges that the State Relief
Administration was riddled with communists. These allegations were directly tied to
charges that SCMWA was engaged in such subversive activities as providing relief
to striking farm workers and supporting efforts of the Communist-led organization of
the unemployed, the Workers Alliance. Citing previous conclusions of legislative
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investigative committees that " ... the SRA is being used for the development of the
Communist program," the legislature's Assembly Relief Investigating Committee,
chaired by Samuel Yorty, launched a series of investigatory hearings in 1940
throughout the state targeting the State Relief Agency and its SCMWA represented
employees. 5
On March 21 and 22, 1940, the committee held hearings in Visalia on alleged
communist infiltration of the Tulare County SRA office. As members of the Ku
Klux Klan demonstrated outside the hearings, Zukas responded to a subpoena to
appear before the committee. In a hearing packed with spectators and reporters,
Zukas sparred with investigators, refusing to answer questions about union activities
or to tum over demanded lists ofunion officers and members:
For my 'good deeds' as a CIO organizer, I was the first victim of
the witch-hunters' Yorty State Committee on Un-American
Activities here .. .! remember the yahoos gloated as they
mispronounced [my name] with the suggestion that no native born
patriot would ever bear such a foreign label. .. 6
Cited for contempt, Zukas was arrested and jailed following the conclusion of the
hearing. While Zukas' subsequent conviction for contempt was overturned on
appeal (along with convictions of 19 other witnesses who refused to cooperate with
the Yorty committee), his career as a relief worker was over. The publicity of his
trial and conviction, coupled with an informal blacklist that circulated among relief
agency administrators, effectively barred Zukas from obtaining employment in
public welfare agencies. After a ten year period of temporary jobs and self-described
" ... vegetation and near emotional breakdown," Zukas eventually returned to public
4

life, this time as a teacher in Long Island and an activist within the American
Federation of Teachers. 7
Zukas relished his renewed career as a junior high school teacher, until a
twist of fate pennanently ended his professional ambitions:
Even Allan Drury remembered [me] in his pot-boiler memoirs,
Three Kids in a Carl... Believe it or not he was a cub reporter in the
San Joaquin Valley in 1940 when the Un-Americans attacked me
and mine. This was published about 1965 and my school
employers called me in to inquire could I be the Bronislaus J.
Zukas described therein because the local Birchers were very
concerned about such a wild-eyed subversive in their midst as a
junior high school master! Of course I admitted to this notoriety
and assured them that I was resigning ... 8
With two careers now destroyed, Zukas returned to California, settling in Berkeley.
Despite his experiences with the hysteria of anti-Communism, Zukas continued his
activism into the 1980s, participating in the nuclear disannament movement, protests
against the Vietnam war and community organizing efforts among poor people in the
Bay area. Reflecting back on his time in the rank and file movement, Zukas recalls,
Because of our industrial union approach, we were able to capture
the spirit of militancy that social workers were looking for. In
California, as elsewhere, we concentrated on public and private
social worker agencies and institutions ...the union survived
because the national organization was relatively strong in
comparison because few other areas were subjected to such an
attack. The rank and file were a very mobile type accustomed to
temporary lay-offs and dismissals ... In the long run you could say
we didn't do a good job of understanding how powerful our
enemies were, or what they could do to us, but we were still right. ..
Generally, the so-called liberal M.S.W. 's were relieved to be rid of
subjective and subversive staff malcontents. The ones who headed
the relief agencies both here and in the east used to mock our puny
'mock worker' tactics and programs. Just like the AASW
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[American Association of Social Workers], they feared they too
would suffer the fate of the genuine radicals who strove to pursue
the search for truth and progress ... 9

**********
Mr. Travenner: Will you tell the committee, please, whether or not in 1954 there
was a group organized in Hartford known as the Connecticut
Volunteers for Civil Rights?
Verne Weed:

Given the nature of this hearing, that is the kind of question I want
to claim the fifth amendment.

Mr. Travenner: Well, you speak in a very general way about it.
Verne Weed:

I have done what I could for peace. That specific question I would
claim the fifth amendment on ...

Mr. Travenner: Actually, you were the local head ofthat chapter or organization,
were you not, known as the Connecticut Volunteers for Civil
Rights?
Verne Weed:

Well, I will repeat again, I did what I could for peace. In terms of
that particular question, given the kind ofhearing this is, I claim
fifth amendment privilege.

Rep. Kearney: What do you mean "the kind of hearing this is"?
Verne Weed:

You want to know my opinion? I was subpoenaed here. I was
brought here.

Rep. Kearney: That is right. You are here under subpoena.
Verne Weed:

And I consider it an undemocratic committee inquiring into the area
of opinions, ideas ...

Rep. Kearney:

I have heard that line before ...you are bordering on contempt. .. 10

Between 1945 and 1957, the U.S. House of Representative's Un-American
Activities Committee (HUAC) crisscrossed the country, holding hearings on the
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alleged infiltration of communism and the Communist Party into almost all aspects
of American life and institutions. During this period, the Committee would hold
over 230 public hearings and call some 3,000 people before them to testify. I I While
the press and public would be most enthralled by the Committee's investigation of
subversion in Hollywood and alleged Soviet spies in the federal government, the
bulk of the Committee's activities focused on the less sensational aspects of alleged
communist subversion. For every Dalton Trumbo or Alger Hiss that was called
before the Committee, hundreds of ordinary working Americans faced the juggernaut
of anti-communism aptly described by National Guardian editor Cedric Belfrage as
"The American Inquisition.,,12 Most of the witnesses subpoenaed by the Committee
did not star in the movies or hold high positions of government; rather, they led
ordinary lives and worked in ordinary jobs. They were social workers, teachers,
machinists, miners and secretaries. Some were members or former members of the
Communist Party, most were not. Many had at one time in their past belonged to
liberal or left-progressive organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Student Union, the Consumer's League, or the American Labor Party
- deemed by the Committee as Communist fronts. Many more were union members
or officers of ~ons, particularly within the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
condemned by the Committee as Communist-dominated.
For many of those called before the HUAC, it presaged public humiliation
and suspicion, community hostility and censure, termination of employment and the
ruin of chosen careers. Blacklists, both formal and informal, would follow witnesses
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and their supporters for years. For some who refused to cooperate, indictments of
contempt would lead to prison sentences or long years of expensive legal battles.
While the final toll of ruined careers and lives left in the wake of the Committee is
unknown, many social workers, such as Verne Weed, faced the Committee and
suffered from the culture of fear it helped to create.
In 1956, Verne Weed was the assistant executive supervisor of Children's
Services of Connecticut. A graduate of the New York School of Social Work, Weed
had started working with Children's Services in 1940 as a supervisor. Well
respected by her colleagues and agency administration, she had moved up the ladder
of agency leadership and was now responsible for the statewide coordination of
foster care and adoption services.
However, it was not the consistently excellent performance evaluations she
received that brought Weed to the attention of the U.S. government, but rather, her
political activities as a private citizen. A vocal proponent ofboth the union and
peace movements, Weed was well known in Connecticut progressive circles as an
activist; and that activism would become the focus of the HUAC in 1956. Named by
a cooperative HUAC witness as a member of the Communist Party and as an
organizer of Communist front organizations raising funds for the Smith Act
defendants, Weed recalls that local newspapers pilloried her as proof of how the
" ... red menace in Connecticut was infiltrating social services and preying on
vulnerable children.,,13 In the face of lurid publicity, Weed resigned from her
position, entered the doctoral program at the New York School of Social Work, and
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began preparing for her stonny appearance before the Committee in February,

Years later, Weed would recall the impact ofthe HUAC investigation on her
career and the response ofher profession:
Yes, I was a Communist with a big 'C.' I was a Communist and a
social worker, a bad combination back then. Actually, I'm not sure
which was worse! Social workers have always been associated
with progressive thinking -look at Jane Addams and how she was
red-baited after World War I - but now we were part of a global
conspiracy subsidized by Moscow. I never saw any of that gold
and I don't know what the conspiracy was supposed to be about,
unless it was for world peace and social justice. That was what we
progressive social workers fought for in our unions and our
communities - that was my crime...
I couldn't get ajob in Connecticut. It was years before I began to
recover professionally, I never did [in tenns of] income and
professional recognition. Being called a Communist and hauled
before the Committee in the middle of my doctoral studies didn't
exactly endear me to the professors or other students. Sure, some
people understood the fuller implications of what was happening to
me and thousands of others, but most were just plain scared ...The
profession? They were scared shitless - what were a few red
social workers to them? 15
Despite public attacks made upon her by HUAC, and less public attacks
made upon her by some members of the social work profession, Weed continued to
act upon her political commitment throughout the rest of her life as both an anti-war
activist and community organizer. As a member ofthe Radical Alliance of Social
Service Workers in New York City during the 1970s and early 1980s, Weed became
an important link between the Old Left and the activism of a new generation of
radical social workers.

9

**********
Somewhere a door blew shut. I came back to New York in the fall of
1941~ expecting to be as busy as ever, and there was no work ...
In the fall of 1942, there was no doubt that I was unemployed. At
first, I had thought it was the effect ofwar...When, however, a letter I
sent to the Red Cross, which was begging for qualified supervisors,
brought no reply, I realized that there might be, in the background, a
boycott of my ideas. 16
Within the course of two decades, the career of Bertha Capen Reynolds
careened from the heights ofprofessional prestige to the depths of professional
rejection and blacklists. During the 1920s and early 1930s, Reynolds was one of the
rising stars in social work. A faculty member at Smith College, Reynolds was
widely published in the professional journals of the day and a frequent speaker at
social work conferences. An early enthusiast for the integration ofpsychoanalytic
theory into social casework, Reynolds was well regarded in the inner circle of the
growing field ofpsychiatric social work. Despite her relative renown in the
psychiatric community, Reynolds' embrace ofpsychoanalytic theory subtly differed
from the approach ofothers. Unlike many of her contemporaries, who priVileged a
narrow intrapsychic orientation towards diagnosis and treatment, Reynolds struggled
to articulate a holistic form of social casework that incorporated psychoanalytic
principles within an understanding of the environmental context of individual
troubles. 17
As the extent of social and economic wreckage brought by the Great
Depression continued to expand, Reynolds' dissatisfaction with what she considered
10

the seeming disconnect between social work theory and the environmental realities
of human suffering also grew:

It is certain that a procedure called 'passivity' was in vogue in
casework... Theories justifying leaving the initiative and
responsibility to the client were carried to such amazing lengths
that in a few years revolt came, and the 'passive approach' was
changed to 'dynamic passivity,' and that was defined and applied
according to the needs of caseworkers as variously as 'passivity'
had been. IS
Reynolds' growing discontent with the profession's response to the national
economic crisis would soon lead her to embrace both the program of industrial
unionization promoted by the emerging rank and file movement in social work and
the Marxist philosophy that many in the movement espoused:
During the seven years from 1934 to the outbreak of war at the end
of 1941, I was growing slowly, but fortunately .. .in company with a
vital young generation of social workers. The simple principles
that the so-called rank-and-file workers of the Depression years
were putting into practice were not new to social work. It was only
a new thing to take them seriously...
The rethinking of our professional theory and practice may
seem ... to have had two roots: its own professional development in
a time of depression which forced new formulations under new
conditions; and the Marxist science of society which guided the
thinking of some of the leaders ofthe 'rank-and-file'
movement...Our profession could not develop otherwise than in
conformity with the laws of motion of human society in
general...Fortunately for social work, in this critical period, [came]
practitioners with Marxist vision and scientific understanding. 19
Following her introduction to the rank and file movement, Reynolds rapidly
became one of its most outspoken proponents within the profession. Reynolds
became a frequent contributor to Social Work Today, the journal of the rank and file,
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as well as serving on its editorial board and leading fundraising efforts to ease its
chronic financial troubles. Travelling throughout the country, Reynolds forcefully
supported the program of the rank and file movement, industrial unionism, civil
rights and other progressive movements and causes. As Reynolds' commitment to
revolutionary socialism deepened, she sought to more fully incorporate her
adherence to the principles of Marxism and Freudianism into a theory of social work
practice in a series of published and unpublished works. 2o
However, Reynolds' conversion to Marxism, and her public support for the
more radical wing of the rank and file movement, would rapidly engender reaction
from the profession and its liberal leadership. Increasingly, social work leaders such
as Grace Marcus, Linton Swift, and Dorothy Kahn pointedly and publicly distanced
themselves from Reynolds, attacking her adherence to radical ideology and causes.
By 1938, the deep rift between Reynolds and the mainstream profession
encompassed her work as Associate Director at the Smith College of Social Work.
Sharp conflict arose between Reynolds and Director Everett Kimball, leading to
Kimball's termination ofan experimental teaching program developed by Reynolds.
Faced with the withdrawal ofKimball's support, Reynolds resigned under pressure
from Smith. In 1958, Reynolds would reflect upon her de facto dismissal from
Smith:
I know EK [Everett Kimball] was in terror of 'union action,' and
tried to cover himself at every point, so that no one would say I
had been fired ... a movement got started among alumnae to urge
Smith to award me an honorary degree. I stopped it with this
appraisal: One of two things is true. Either I'm being fired, in
12

which case Smith would do no such thing, or I am resigning
because I disapprove of the conduct of the School, in which case I
would not accept an honor from it. 21
Reynolds' departure from Smith would mark the beginning of a long journey
that, while endearing her to the rank and file and the radical left, permanently
estranged her from the mainstream profession. As an informal blacklist within the
profession enveloped Reynolds, her career over the next three years was reduced to
one of itinerant consultation. By 1941, Reynolds' open association with the
Communist Party virtually ended any official role or recognition that remained for
her within the profession. Finding employment in social work schools or agencies
impossible to obtain, in 1943 Reynolds joined the Personnel Department of the leftled National Maritime Union (NMU). Here, in the midst of a politically progressive
union, she could more freely experiment with her new vision of a radicalized social
work. But with the end of World War II, as anti-Communist purges wracked the
NMU and other CIa unions, Reynolds once again found herself isolated and
unemployed. 22
As the repressive politics of the Cold War and McCarthyism gripped the
nation, Reynolds recognized that her career as a professional social worker was now
at an end. Retiring to her family home in Massachusetts, Reynolds remained an
activist in progressive political movements and causes and continued her writings on
the merits of social work unionization and the integration of Marxism into social
work theory. While remaining true to her radical ideology, Reynolds also
understood that, to the profession, she had become a virtual pariah: "I knew that
13

discussion groups with me have been banned because of fear. Some group
invitations I may have to refuse because I know that attending them would subject
some people to loss ofjobs, or worse.,,23 Reynolds' open association with
progressive organizations was noted with alarm not only by the profession but by
state and federal subversive activities investigators as well. Indeed, meticulous
records were kept on Reynolds' associations with alleged subversive organizations,
resulting in some forty citations by HUAC for membership in and association with
those organizations.24
Ostracized by the profession, and her loyalty under question by the
government, Reynolds essentially passed into professional obscurity. Yet in the face
of disavowal by her one time colleagues, Reynolds remained loyal to her "beloved
profession" and her vision of its role in a restructured society:
Our profession has worked where it could and, in a world often
hostile to its ideals, has sometimes suffered loss of its relatedness
to the progressive movements of the life of its time. It has not
willingly, however, accepted a role exploitive of its clients, or a
police function to keep people quite while they starve slowly...
Suppose social work will become a reaching down to individuals
on the part of a healthy society, concerned that minor adjustments
shall be well made when planning for thousands cannot be exactly
right for every single person. Can we not rejoice to be that helping
hand? If groups functioning healthily help each other along as
naturally as do parents and children, friends and neighbors, must
we be exclusive about the privilege ofhelping?25
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Notes to Foreword
1. Copies of letters provided to the author by Bronislaus Zukas, July 25, 1980.
Unless otherwise noted, information on the experiences of Mr. Zukas was
obtained in correspondence and interviews with the author (May 23, 1980; June
14, 1980; July 25, 1980; August 11, 1980; August 18, 1980; September 28, 1980;
October 14, 1980).
2. The term "rank and file movement" will be used throughout this study to denote
the social work trade union movement. The term was a self-descriptive label
coined by its leaders and intended to demonstrate the movement's emphasis on
support of and membership in the industrial vs. craft union organizing efforts of
the 1930s. See: Jacob Fisher, The rank andfile movement in social work (New
York: New York School of Social Work, 1936).
3. FERA and the WP A were two federal programs created in response to the
economic crises of the Depression. FERA, established in May, 1933, provided
federal funding matched by states to provide direct relief to the unemployed.
State and county FERA offices employed both trained social workers and
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

We social workers often delude ourselves into a beliefthat we are
important factors in the remaking ofsociety... our work is essentially
for the existing social order- not against it. We are either case
workers patching up the evils and the miseries ofthe industrial
system; or propagandists for reform legislation; educators; collectors
offacts andftgures,' or neighborhood and community workers. In all
these activities we work with and tacitly sanction the existing political
and industrial system. We do not challenge, nor do we oppose, the
underlying bases ofthat system, as do all radicals. Our work is
(Roger Baldwin, 1918)
undemocratic at heart... 1
During the period of the blte 1920s through the late 1940s, a most remarkable
event in the history of American social work emerged: the development of a vital
radical trade union organizing effort known as the "rank and file movement."2 Born
within the growing economic crisis of the 1920s and maturing in the national
economic collapse and social upheaval heralded by the Great Depression, the rank
and file movement would attract the support and membership of thousands of
professional social workers and uncredentialed relief workers in efforts to organize
social service workers along the lines of industrial unionism. Within its relatively
short life span, the rank and file movement would grow in sufficient number and
influence to challenge both the prevailing definitions of social work as a profession 
its form and identity - and the essence of its function - its practice.
Such challenges would not go unnoticed or unanswered by the profession's
mainstream leadership or, more importantly, by state and federal authorities. To
many of the profession'S leaders the rank and file movement would come to
represent the antithesis ofprofessionalism: over-identification with clients; the
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advocacy of strikes and other militant, unprofessional forms ofprotest and political
action; a seeming disdain for prevailing professional standards of education and
training; and an unnatural curiosity regarding left-wing political ideology.
For civil authorities, the movement provided further evidence of the alleged
infiltration of the Communist Party and communist ideology into the labor
movement and, perhaps most alarming, white-collar professions. Such evidence
would come to include the rank and file's early criticism of New Deal policies and
programs (as well as state and local relief administration and practice) as politically
reactionary and insufficient in scope, their seeming obedience to the shifting policies
of the Communist Party and pronouncements of the Communist Intemationae and
their unabashed willingness to embrace the potentials of foreign economic and
political theories. Equally damning, social work unions and their leadership were
too often at the forefront of political causes deemed by authorities as subversive and
too prominently represented as members and supporters of organizations labeled as
fronts for the Communist Party.
While such perceived professional and political heresies would quickly form
the obj ective basis for the eventual unraveling of the movement, these perceptions
neither accurately describe nor fully explain the history and meaning of the rank and
file movement in the profession and within the greater context of its times. Rather,
they represent, perhaps more tellingly, the paradox of historical inquiry and the
needs of both historical actors and the tellers of historical stories to provide definitive
reasons for the causes and courses of human events and social movements. Indeed,
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definitive reasons provide history and historical actors the supposed truths of both
culpability and absolution; they provide simplified and contained explanation to the
meaning of facts. In this regard, C. Wright Mills has noted that,
...we must accept the point that we must often study history in
order to get rid of it. By this I mean that what are often taken as
historical explanations would better be taken as part ofthe
statement of that which is to be explained. 4
The story of the rank and file movement in social work highlights Mills'
observation that many explanations of historical events or movements often serve to
obscure rather than illuminate both the deeper meaning of these events and their
ongoing influence upon contemporary thought and process. Indeed, contemporary
historical accounts of the rank and file movement in social work, while few in
nUlnber, have well represented this tendency to confuse historical explanation with
historical subject and to separate the past from the present. This study attempts to
bridge this rupture by more fully examining both the subject of the rank and file
movement and its ongoing meaning and place in the profession'S development than
has previously been rendered. Indeed, it is the thesis of this study that the social and
economic circumstances in which the rank and file movement arose within social
work (and the forces which led to its demise) are central to an understanding of the
profession'S emerging character and subsequent evolution. The rise and fall of the
rank and file movement did not occur just within the isolated context of social work
as a profession; it embodied expressions of broader social and political
contradictions that characterize a society in crisis and transformation. As such, the
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history of the rank and file movement is not one ofjust a particular tendency within a
particular profession in a particular time; rather, it demonstrates how the forces that
give rise to such a social movement transcend these particulars and are inextricably
woven into the greater social fabric of a nation's history. In the case of the rank and
file movement in social work, uncovering the ongoing dynamics of this history must
necessarily cross traditional boundaries of historical inquiry. For the history and
meaning of the rank and file movement in social work is not just of the field's
understanding of professionalism, its experiences in the process of professionlization
or its development of a body of expertise. The story of the rank and file also
embodies a broader history of the struggles of organized labor, the relationship
between liberal social reform movements and revolutionary movements, and the
politics of communism and anti-communism in the American experience. This
broader interpretation is, in sum, a significant element of the history that constitutes
the social basis of American social work.
On the Historical Record

The case of the rank and file movement and its place in social work history is
a curious one. Standard texts concerning social work and social welfare history
have, at worst, ignored the movement completely; at best, they have granted it a
momentary but essentially nebulous impact. For example, Clark Chambers'
Seedtime ofReform makes no direct reference to the early stirrings of the movement
in his history of the profession'S development in the period following World War I
through the early years of the New Deal. s Similarly, Chambers' Paul U. Kellogg
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and the Survey has only one passing reference to the movement devoid of
explanation or context. 6 The rank and file movement is totally ignored in June
Axinn and Herman Levine's Social welfare: A history ofthe American response to
need.7 Remarkably, even Harry Lurie, an early and influential leader of the rank and
file movement, makes no mention ofthe movement at all in his history of the Jewish
Federation Movement, A heritage affirmed. 8 Another recognized social welfare
historian, Walter Trattner, briefly mentions the rank and file movement as a group
"unhappy" with the Roosevelt administration and its New Deal policies, and he cites
its major accomplishment as " ... forging some ties between social work and organized
labor.,,9 Bruce Jansson devotes one paragraph to the movement in his text, noting its
development of unions and support of "sweeping social reforms,,,l0 and Barbara
Simon sparingly describes the movement as " ... a vociferous and determined
minority," curiously attributing its demise to the passage ofthe Social Security Act
and the lack of attention given to social work demands by the Democratic and
Republican parties. 11
Other less prominently used texts concerned with social work's development
have paid greater attention to the importance of the rank and file movement but have
fallen well short of either a balanced or comprehensive account. John Ehrenreich
devotes several pages to the movement in The Altruistic Imagination. 12 Most
significantly, Ehrenreich credits the rank and file movement with providing the
profession its "most direct challenge" to its preoccupation with the process of
professionalization. 13 Ehrenreich also credits the rank and file movement with
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unionizing a "significant" segment of the profession and pushing it " ...toward a more
critical and aggressive stance with respect to public policy issues." 14 However, not
unlike Simon, Ehrenreich confines the movement's meaning to a static period in the
profession's history, declaring that its failure to articulate a clear alternative practice
theory quickly rendered it irrelevant.
W enocur and Reisch devote a chapter to the rank and file movement in their
history, From Charity to Enterprise. IS Framing their analysis of social work's
development as a case study of how the dynamics of capitalism institutionalize
professions for the purposes of occupational control (and thus define the process of
professionalization), Wenocur and Reisch position the rank and file movement as a
" ...progressive counterforce to the profession's attempts to control the emerging
national social welfare industry.,,16 While providing students of social work history
a much needed description of the movement, Wenocur and Reisch's account suffers
both from its sketchiness and limited conclusions regarding the impact and meaning
of the movement. 17
More focused studies of the rank and file movement described below, while
few in number, have moved beyond the meager generalities of the movement's role
as expressed in standard social welfare texts. Indeed, these studies have girded their
analyses around four general (and intertwined) topics ofparticular interest to the
profession: (1) the instructive value of the rank and file movement in relation to the
process ofprofessionalization and the meaning of professionalism; (2) the place and
meaning of the movement in terms of social work's purported dualism regarding
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social reform and individual treatment; (3) the relative compatibility or
incompatibility of professionalism and union organization in social work; and (4) the
role of the Communist Party and communist ideology in leading and/or misguiding
the movement, thus hastening its destruction and subsequently marginalizing its
relevance to social work theory and practice.
Professionalism, Social Reform and Unionization

Within these four overlapping areas of inquiry, the meaning of the rank and
file movement in relation to social work's development of a professional identity, its
relation to unionization and the issues of the profession's dualism have garnered the
most attention. Indeed, the history of social work's development as a profession has
been particularly marked by its constant struggle to locate and claim its domains of
authority and practice. Since the early emergence of social work as a formal
profession, social workers and their historians have debated social work's purpose in
society in somewhat stark and dichotomous terms: is social work a profession whose
major task is to develop, refine and provide direct psycho-social services, or is it a
profession that should be dedicated to serving larger movements for social reform,
social justice and resulting social action? Throughout the profession's history, while
the language and historical contexts of the debate have changed, the tenns ofthis
bitter ideological debate have remained relatively stable. 18 In this regard, historical
examinations of the rank and file movement have both further informed and
confused this debate, reflecting the tendency of selective history to reap selective
interpretations and claims of truth.
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In a brief history and analysis of the rank and file movement, Leighninger
and Knickmeyer claim that the movement informs the profession in areas ofboth
theory and practice. 19 First, the authors argue that the brief life of the rank and file
movement and its rapid demise demonstrate that the nature and process of
professionalism is, at its base, inimical to radical ideology and fundamental social
reform. In this regard, Leighninger and Knickmeyer additionally posit that the
experiences of the rank and file movement highlight the importance of the
profession's sponsorship by conservative economic and political structures and
agencies; that is, such sponsorship privileges social control functions and allies the
profession with the interests of a ruling elite. Reflecting this dynamic within the
history of the rank and file movement, the authors assert this is a partial explanation
of social work's " ...long-standing fear that somehow professionalism and a reform or
radical ideology [cannot] exist.,,2o Finally, Leighninger and Knickmeyer claim that
the history of the rank and file movement demonstrates the need for social work
practitioners to individually and organizationally connect themselves to consumer
movements in order to effectively engage in social change efforts:
Knowledge of the rank and file experience illuminates three major
themes. The social work profession today needs to understand and
come to grips with 1) the rise of the consumer movement, 2) the
phenomenon of powerlessness shared by a nwnber of groups in our
society, and 3) the need for professional support groups in dealing
with the inequities in social welfare ... In order to do this with any
success, it will be necessary to rediscover the rank and file wisdom
of finding support for such efforts towards change in organized
social work groups and broader social movements, both within
agencies and on a nationalleve1. 21
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Alexander and Lichtenberg credit members and supporters of the rank and
file movement with advancing the profession's understanding of the link between
social reform and individual treatment. 22 In an analysis of practice related articles
("The Case Work Notebook") published in the movement'sjoumal, Social Work

Today, the authors note that the theory and practice of the rank and file movement
simultaneously advanced the profession's understanding of and commitment to: 1)
professional development and improved services to clients; 2) the legitimate need of
the profession to address broad social issues; and 3) the improvement of the working
conditions of social workers as an integral factor in providing effective service to
clients. The authors claim that the writings of rank and file practitioners, while
predominantly progressive in intent and act, contained both radical and conservative
elements. While crediting rank and file practitioners with promoting more radical
concepts of democratic authority and worker-client equality, Alexander and
Lichtenberg argue that these same practitioners continued to reflect more traditional
and conservative impulses ofprofessionalism by privileging social workers' ability
to perform social and political analysis over the same capability of those they served:
What was true for the authors of the 'Case Work Notebook' is true
of many social workers today too: they are also attached to the
status quo and yet eager to bring a new system into existence. The
ambivalence in these writings is paralleled by the ambivalence in
the field today ...!t is possible for young social workers to know and
to build upon the positive contributions from these vital
professional unionists. It is also possible that new times permit the
rectification of the omissions, compromises and false directions
that undermined their promise of achievement. 23
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Wagner echoes Alexander and Lichtenberg's critique of the rank and file's
limited influence on professional theory and practice, framing this critique as an
exemplar ofthe inherent politically constraining dynamics ofprofessionalism.
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Arguing that the historic process of professionalization within social work has
required an alliance (however uneasy) with economic and political elites in order to
obtain legitimacy as a profession, Wagner claims that the radicalism of the rank and
file movement inexorably dissipated within this process. Linking this dissipation to
both the movement's adherence to the Popular Front policy of the Communist Party
and the movement's own desires for a distinctive and professionally recognized form
of social casework, Wagner claims that the movement's vision of a "proletarianized"
social work was converted to " ... the viewpoint that good casework was good
politics. ,,25,26
Other analysts have echoed the importance of understanding the rank and file
movement in relation to social work's process of professionalization and that of
social reform. Phillips and Lehman cite the history of the rank and file movement in
their examination into the conflicts and compromises that faced the profession during
the New Deal years as the federal government increasingly supplanted private
charities as the primary sponsor of social welfare activities. 27 Contrasting the rank
and file movement's opposition to the mainstream profession's alliance with
conservative business leaders and social welfare administrators with the need for
profession's to preserve its occupational interests and markets, Phillips and Lehman
make the following observations:
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The quest for [professional] sanction and power, which ultimately
derives from a profession's connections with government,
precludes persistent and serious challenges to government
policies ...
Conflict arises for a profession-occupation which, insofar as it is a
profession, is responsible to act in the interest of clients, including
political action, and insofar as it is an occupation, needs to protect
occupational self interests, including advancement of status. 28
In a similar vein, Leighninger contrasts the social agenda of the rank and file
movement with that of the mainstream profession in her history of social work's
development. 29 Leighninger notes that with the onset ofthe Great Depression, the
profession split into two distinct trends: the radical program of the rank and file,
emphasizing unionism, public policies promoting redistribution ofwealth and a
fundamental transformation of social and economic institutions; and the more
moderate program of reform embodied with the mainstream organization of the
profession, the American Association of Social Workers (AASW). Leighninger
posits that these two trends, protest and reconstruction versus moderation and
amelioration, exemplify long and unresolved tensions framing social work's
consolidation as a profession: 1) a focus on profession-building versus public
service; 2) the proper relationship between the profession and a public welfare
system; 3) the acceptable professional boundaries ofpolitical activity; and 4) the
relative breadth that the profession's intellectual and practice base should
encompass. 30 While eschewing any definitive conclusions regarding the ultimate
implications of the rank and file's full role in the profession'S quest for identity
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within these tensions, Leighninger addresses (if somewhat obliquely) the terms of
the debate forced upon the profession in the 1930s:
Social workers had temporarily broadened their concerns and
moved toward collective political action during the 1930s...The
internal debate was affected by outside forces - agency constraints,
changing economic conditions and political climate, and shifts in
social work's influence within administration circles. Agency and
political pressures, and an image of 'true' professionals as
nonpartisan and objective, encouraged social workers to choose the
expert role over that ofpolitical activist. By the end of the decade,
the AASW had returned to the more comfortable position of a
professional group concerned with professional standards and
practice. Outside forces and internal questions about political
involvement had combined to limit social work's chances to
influence broader social planning. 31
Spano has examined the rank and file movement in terms of its contributions
toward the"... development of an alternative conceptualization of social work as a
profession based primarily on a commitment to social reform rather than
individualized treatment.,,32 Claiming that the movement's social activism was
guided by a Marxist ideology, Spano credits the rank and file with providing social
workers of the 1930s a credible challenge to psychiatric theories of adjustment.
Spano also argues that the movement's emphasis on the status of social workers as
employees temporarily legitimized the use of labor tactics and unionization among
public relief and private charity workers. Despite the apparent importance of these
contributions, Spano concludes that the movement ultimately "came and went,"
exerting little noticeable influence on the profession. 33
Olson, in an unpublished dissertation, considers the rank and file movement
in his examination of the broad relationship between social work and liberal social
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refonn causes during and immediately following World War 11.34 Olson argues that
social work's obsession with the need to obtain professional status and recognition,

coupled with its allegiance to liberal ideology, seriously vitiated its potential for
fundamental social refonn in post-war America:
Professionalism, elitism, and the growth of a social work
subculture were in part to blame. Social work was never able to
transcend its casework, individualized approach or marshal its
skills against society's larger social problems ...
Social work's own elitism, its claim to special knowledge,
moreover, made it unlikely social workers could effectively
cooperate with other 'progressive' forces in society.35
Unlike other analysts, Olson characterizes the political and trade union agenda of the
rank and file movement as neither fundamentally antagonistic to, nor radically
different from, the mainstream of the profession. Ra:ther, Olson argues that rank and
file conceptions of social action were in keeping with those of most of the profession
and that the politics of the rank and file reflected more a difference of kind with the
mainstream profession than any fundamental challenge. In fact, Olson dismisses any
meaningful variance between the rank and file movement and the mainstream of the
profession, claiming "Despite differences, however, no serious cleavages erupted
within social work in the Depression decade. What differences there were were
largely of degree.,,36
Several social work historians have examined the rank and file movement in
tenns of insights it may yield regarding the historic ambivalence that has existed
within the profession in relation to union organization. Karger notes this
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ambivalence has several sources, including perceptions that unions are
unprofessional, concern that union emphases on employee bread and butter issues
may conflict with client interests, and a perceived contradiction between professional
notions of self-sacrifice and union insistence on self-protection. 37 Karger, a strong
proponent of social work's affiliation with the labor movement, credits the rank and
file movement with legitimizing the compatibility of unionism with social work as a
profession. In a brief discussion of the movement, Karger reflects on its legacy:
Through their activities -literature, speeches, and direct action
tactics - the rank and file movement exposed large numbers of
social workers to the powerful concept of'organization' ... the
experience that social workers received in arbitrating grievances,
making demands, organizing meetings and rallies, and walking a
strike line were valuable skills that could be used in the organized
labor movement, as well as in the later civil rights and antiwar
movements ... In short, the significance of the rank-and-file
movement lay in its spadework - the breaking of fgound to allow
the seeds of social work unionization to take root. 8
Straussner and Phillips also examine the ambivalence of social work as a
profession to organized labor. 39 Arguing that the prevailing practice of the early
Charity Organization Societies, with their emphasis on efficiency, rationality, and
morally-based conceptions ofpoverty, depended on both the material and political
support ofbusiness leaders, the authors contend this ideological dependence created
an early rupture with organized labor. However, the authors further contend that
with the onset of the Great Depression, social work adopted a more focused concern
on the economic aspects of need and, consequently, a more sympathetic view of
unionization in terms of the profession's own economic security issues.
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Interestingly, Straussner and Phillips bifurcate social work unionization from the
rank and file movement. While declaring that the unionization process that occurred
among social workers in the 1930s helped to bridge the gap between the profession
and organized labor, the authors separate the rank and file movement as "another
example" of the profession's growing support for unionization. 4o
Leslie Alexander's study of the rank and file movement's organizing efforts
in the voluntary sector provides a more detailed examination of the rank and file's
legacy to the unionization debate. 41 Alexander asserts that the movement played a
significant role in prodding the professional associations of the time, particularly the
AASW, to at least grudgingly accept unionization as a professionally-sanctioned
activity. However, Alexander notes that following a period of generally favorable
response by the mainstream profession regarding unionization in the voluntary
sector, this support rapidly dissipated after 1939 as charges of communist
domination ofthe unions mounted. While noting the influence of these charges upon
the shifting attitude of the mainstream profession, Alexander claims that the
underlying basis for this turn from unionization had less to do with ideology than
with the dynamics of professionalization:

It seemed that the AASW would only tolerate the union as long as
it was weak. As soon as it became more successful in collective
bargaining and, in fact, threatened to expand the scope of
collective bargaining, the profession began to raise the question of
whether or not unions were compatible with professions. The
answer seemed a conditional yes; on the condition that the union
did not get too powerfu1.42
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To date, the most in-depth history of the rank. and file movement has come
from one of its early leaders, Jacob Fisher.43 As an editor of the movement's journal,

Social Work Today, and a social work union leader in the 1930s, Fisher's first-hand
account of the early years of the rank. and file movement and the greater profession's
development during the years of the Depression is an invaluable source to any
researcher seeking to develop a fuller history of the movement. Framing the history
of the rank. and file movement within the greater context of the internal shock and
disillusionment faced by a profession unprepared in theory or practice to respond to
the Depression, Fisher characterizes the movement as the political manifestation of
that disillusionment. In this regard, Fisher emphasizes the role of the rank and file in
providing a dissenting voice within the profession through unionization, articulating
a vision of social reform reminiscent of the ethos of an early Progressivism. While
providing a rich-first person perspective, Fisher's account still falls short of
completing the historical record. Despite his leading role in the initial development
of the rank and file movement, Fisher left the field in the late 1930s, and his history
of the movement substantively concludes at this point. And, not unlike any personal
recollection, Fisher's account suffers from both a degree of self censorship and
reification, particularly in regard to the question of communism and the rank and file
movement - an area of inquiry critical to the movement's history and discussed in
more detail below. 44 Finally, not unlike other assessments of the movement, Fisher
also relegates the meaning of the rank. and file to a static (and largely hidden) place
in the profession's history:
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It left no lasting legacy, but at least it contributed to a heightened
awareness among social workers of the need for a broad... social
welfare and social insurance system... a guaranteed minimum
income... government work and retraining programs for the
unemployed... and of the need for health insurance...
Perhaps to see these thumbprints of the future in the not fully
articulated causes supported by the Rank-and-File Movement is to
exaggerate its contemporary significance. 45

Have You Ever Been? The Communist Question
The Rank-and-File movement tried to establish 'protective
associations,' that is, unions ... These protective associations of the
Rank-and-File ...became the social-service unions of the Union of
Office and Professional Workers of America... This organization
may have contained a higher proportion of Communists than any
other existing legitimate trade union. It was able to follow the
Communist line in detail, and with relatively weak opposition from
within the union. 46
(Nathan Glazer, 1961)
...politics emerges as the decisive element in the history of the
Rank and File movement. The particular tactical stance the Rank
and Filers took toward national politics was dictated by the
Communists and their allies in the movement. This stance ... killed
the movement as a social work reform movement. And the social
worker unions themselves were destroyed... when the strong
presence of Communists resulted in debilitating factionalism,
expulsion from the labor movement, and the loss of union
contracts and recognition. 47
(John Earl Haynes, 1975)
The role of the Communist Party and communist ideology in the
development and conduct of the rank and file movement has perhaps been the most
uncomfortable and contentious of issues for the profession's historians. Indeed,
allegations of Communist Party domination of the rank and file movement have
uniformly vexed such historical accounts and may be key in understanding the
relative marginalization of the movement's history in mainstream accounts of the
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profession. These allegations (and a reluctance to examine them) may be key for the
reason that the very act of invoking the specter of communism or Communist Party
involvement in social work, whether real or alleged, creates discomfort for both
investigators and consumers of that history. In this regard, the contemporary
invocation of communism or communist influence in American political discourse
often results in seeming visceral reactions, both in civil and scholarly quarters. Anti
Communist crusades in American history, particularly as embodied in the Red Scare
following World War I, the early years of the Cold War, and the subsequent era of
McCarthyism have wrought long-term and often devastating effects upon both civic
and intellectual discourse. The immediate climates of fear and paranoia that
permeated these periods, while muted since the end of the Cold War, continue to
reverberate.
The tools ofhysteria and political repression embodied within anti
Communist movements in the United States have affected to greater or lesser extents
nearly all aspects of social institutions and political culture. Investigations into the
subversive nature of communism were pervasive in scope and content, reaching not
only into the personal lives of citizens but into the halls of academia, the arts and
sciences, labor unions and the world ofprofessions. Indeed, investigations,
blacklists, and the politics of fear they engendered victimized not only individuals
but profoundly shaped the nature, development and conduct of many professions,
including social work. In this regard, Schrecker argues that the period of
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McCarthyism had a deep impact on social work ideology and practice, most notably
a nearly wholesale abandonment of advocacy on behalf of clients:
Social workers at every level had abandoned the reform impulse
and active political engagement that had once been an important
component of their profession. As a result, when the issue of
welfare returned to the nation's agenda, social workers did not
enter the debate on behalf of their clients and counter the hostile
stereotyping of welfare recipients. The McCarthy era purges had
silenced those voices that might have raised the issues of poverty
and unemployment without blaming the victim. 48
Andrews and Reisch echo Schrecker's observations, concluding that McCarthyism
served to suppress dissenting voices in both the profession as a whole and in schools
of social work and further supplanted the profession's commitment to social justice
with an intensified focus on the development of treatment technologies:
[One] impact of McCarthyism on social work can be found in the
growing emphasis on the acquisition of expertise as the primary
goal of social work education and practice and the concomitant
omission of discussions of the ideological bases of practice ... This
apolitical legacy persisted well into the 1970s, despite the growing
ideological turmoil of the intervening period ... By ignoring the
impact of anti-communism and McCarthyism and their underlying
political and ideological messages, social work's educators
contributed to the growing dissonance between the profession's
stated goals and the conditions practitioners experienced in their
day-to-day work. 49
Maurice Isserman, an historian of American communism, has astutely noted
that " ... the history of communism in America is bitterly contested terrain. The
passions aroused by the debate over differing interpretations of that history are
seldom far removed from contemporary concerns."so Isserman's observations are
particularly salient to this study, as there is a striking absence of substantive
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examination regarding the relationship of communism to the rank and file movement
(and social work as a whole) by the profession's historians. This curious state of
historical void is even more noticeable (and perhaps understandable) in light of the
pronouncements of historiographers specializing in the American Communist
movement regarding its influence in the social work profession (as represented by
Glazer and Haynes above). Much ofthis work has reflected a particular academic
school of communist studies forged in the Cold War years of the 1950s and funded
by conservative foundations, notably the Fund for the Republic. 51 More noted for its
overt anti-Communist ideology than its methodology, this school of study has, until
only recently, generally defined public and academic perceptions of American
communism as a foreign, conspiratorial ideology and movement imposed upon and
directed from the outside. These interpretations have created an often distorted
subtext of analysis that precludes the possibility that American communists, or those
outside of the party who may have associated with an activity linked to (or supported
by) the party, were guided by any significant independence of thought, individual
wisdom or popular support. Within this school of thought, the very language of
analysis is ideological: movements and organizations are identified as "fronts," or
are "dominated" by the Communist Party rather than cooperating or agreeing with
particular aspects of the party or its program; individual indications of philosophical
agreement are evidence of one being a "fellow traveler;" and the communist
movement as a whole, including individuals and organizations even tangentially
associated with it, are "Stalinist" in character and intent. 52 It is perhaps not
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surprising, then, that the association made between communism and social work
(most particularly the rank and file movement) by outside historians has gone largely
unanswered and unexamined by the profession's own historians. In the absence of
direct evidence, one can only speculate whether the fait accompli statements of
social work's once dangerous alliance with communism made by influential scholars
dominating the field of communist studies have served to discourage such inquiry by
the profession itself. S3
Indeed, the discourse of anti-communism that dominated scholarly inquiry in
the post-war period was not seriously questioned until the 1980s, encompassing the
period in which the most in-depth examinations of the rank and file movement were
published by social work historians. Since that time, an impressive number of so
called revisionist analyses of American communism have been published, providing
more balanced studies concerning the role of American communism in the labor
movement, academics, the arts and the professions. S4 However, this re-examination
has yet to find its way in any significant form into social work. Rather, studies ofthe
rank and file movement to date have, for the most part, skirted this central issue,
concentrating inquiry on the early development ofthe movement, omitting the
critical period after in which charges of Communist Party domination beset the labor
unions representing social workers, culminating in their final destruction in the late
1940s and early 1950s.
The contentious issues surrounding the question of communist influence in
the rank and file movement are also inextricably tied to the phenomenon of
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unionization among white collar workers. During the critical period of the 1930s
and 1940s, the identification of professionals with the causes of the industrial union
movement - job security, workplace democracy and politically informed class
consciousness - drew them in unprecedented numbers into the organizations of that
movement. Social workers were no exception to this historical alliance. With the
possible exception of teachers, perhaps no profession was as prominent in the union
movement as were social workers. Particularly concentrated in unions such as the
United Public Workers of America (UPW) and the United Office and Professional
Workers of America (UOPWA) that most explicitly allied themselves with the
progressive politics of the times (e.g., civil rights and anti-fascist movements) and
which were most identified with the Communist Party, rank and file social workers
would find their leaders and their unions among the first victims of the antiCommunist backlash. In this regard, the important explication of this phenomenon
has not only been noticeably ignored by the profession's historians, but by labor
historians as well. As Steve Rosswurm notes in his research on unions expelled for
alleged communist domination by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO):
What remains on the research agenda? Virtually everything, since
we [labor historians] know so little about these [left-led]
unions ... We especially need studies of the UPW and the UOPWA,
two unions that organized large numbers ofwomen and white
collar workers ... Most labor historians of the CIO period
concentrate on the industrial proletariat. ..to the exclusion of the
majority of working people in this country...perhaps the greatest
tragedy of the expUlsions was the role they played in the CIO's
missed opportunity, produced by a conjuncture of the ideological
and the material, to organize those who performed mentallabor...55
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TOWARDS A REVISIONIST HISTORY
In examining the historical narrative of social work to date, relatively little
substantive analysis has been conducted concerning the rise and fall of the rank and
file movement and the fuller meaning and contribution of that movement to the
profession. The paucity of this analysis is striking given the dramatic social,
economic and social crises within the profession and the nation that gave rise to its
development, maturation and subsequent destruction. It is the thesis of this study
that, in fact, an understanding of the rank and file movement is central to a modem
understanding of our profession. For the existence of the movement both materially
and symbolically embodies the complex and contradictory nexus of the dynamics of
change engendered by political and social crises. The origin, development and
demise of the rank and file movement reflects more than the historical curiosity of a
momentary tendency in the evolution of a profession; rather, it reveals the enduring
legacy of individuals, organizations and collective intellectual discourse in common
struggle for the possibilities of a more just and democratic social order. And,
perhaps unlike any other profession, the domain of social work is historically one
uniquely born of this struggle, encompassing the self-imposed imperatives and
paradoxes of morality, socially purposive service and scientific rationality.
Consequently, this study seeks to inform the terms of this enduring legacy
within the dynamic world of social work. It shall attempt to do so by: 1) locating the
history of the rank and file movement within the context of an evolving profession;
2) analyzing this specific history of a profession within the context ofbroader social

41

and political forces that defined both the limits and potentials ofthat evolution; and
3) assessing the implications of this history for social work in terms of its past,
present and future.
Such an examination does not occur in the abstract - history is composed not
ofthe disembodied laws of a transcendent nature or a theoretical science but in the
material experiences and actions of human beings seeking a collective sense of social
responsibility. For both the actors of history and the narrators of history, the
meaning of these individual and collective experiences is essentially, one of
opportunity, choice and interpretation. In this respect, the observations of Bertha
Reynolds are most apropos:
Inevitably our choices are conditioned not only by the time and
location of our birth but by our position in organized society. How
we get on in the struggle for survival tends to channel our choice
of relationships to people in the same general situation. Life looks
different from the windows of a palace or the doorway of a field
laborer's shack, from one or the other side of a color line, or a
collective-bargaining table. Obvious as that seems, it is
nonetheless true that many people do no know that they stand in
any particular place in society, and so they judge their viewpoint to
be the only one possible for anybody. I believe it is indispensable
to a sound relatedness to others to know where one is to start with,
for what biases and blind spots to make allowance, and to know
that there exist other and quite different viewpoints. 56
In this regard, three primary sources of information were analyzed to
reconstruct this history of the rank and file movement: 1) primary documents,
consisting of union records and publications, books and articles published during the
period under study, personal papers retained by key participants in the movement,
and published autobiographical accounts of individuals active in the movement; 2)
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personal reminiscences of the movement obtained by the author through
correspondence and interviews with movement participants; and 3) review and
incorporation of secondary sources, including previous studies and books pertaining
to the subject and the period under examination. While all three of these methods
serve to provide a sound basis for the triangulation of data sources in order to
increase confidence in the accuracy ofrepresentation, they also share unavoidable
weaknesses.
These weaknesses are most notable in the inability to fully document the
period and movement under study. Documentary records of the rarlk and file unions
are fragmentary at best. Complete official records of the early unions of the rank and
file are non-existent. Such documentation that is available consists of fragmentary
records and publications retained by individuals or in collections of archives and
libraries. Records of the later CIO unions that represented social workers are also
fragmentary. Most of these records were purged by the AFL-CIO following the
expulsions of these unions in 1948, and only partial records of union proceedings
and publications are available in various libraries or collections of personal papers.
This author attempted to review or gather all such documents that could be
identified, supplementing these documents with related publications of the period
and personal recollections of participants in the rank and file and its unions.
Not unlike published records, the recollections of participants who were
active in the rank and file movement and its unions are also subject to their
fragmentary nature. The elusive and sometimes distorted nature of human memory
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always poses issues of accuracy. In this regard, specific statements of fact or
historical event were triangulated with other data sources to provide verification.
The actual selection ofparticipants for interviews was limited by the number of
persons still alive, in reasonable enough health to participate in interviews and who
granted permission for the author to interview and cite them. In respect to selection,
the author employed a snowball process in which persons located by the author
suggested other persons that could be interviewed. This process was continued until
all suggestions had been exhausted. Obviously, the vagaries of time, mortality and
the selection process employed also compromise representativeness. However, the
author was able to locate a surprising number of key actors in the rank and file
movement and its unions, thus providing a strong case for the inclusion of their
remembrances in this study to provide both context and substantive information.
Further detail on the methods employed in this study is located in the Appendix.
In sum, the history presented in this study, like any other, reflects the
inevitable convergence of differing choices, viewpoints and interpretations. As such,
the contradictory terms of such convergence cannot be overlooked, and this author
takes full responsibility for the ultimate choices and interpretations employed in this
narrative.
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CHAPTER 2:
BEFORE THE STORM

In 1929 there was every reason to believe that our young profession
was going to move forward to an honored place in the national life.
Professional education was no longer seriously in question, skills for
helping people in trouble had been demonstrated, new psychological
techniques contributed by another profession had begun to be sought
eagerly by hospitals and clinics, courts, and counseling agencies.
Social casework would come into its own, not solely to aid society's
misfits, but to make sure that children would grow up to be mentally
healthy and talented people would be freed to make their contribution
to the common life. We were climbing to the top ofthe world in
1929. 1
(Bertha Reynolds)
As the decade of the 1920s was coming to a close, the young profession of
social work was in the final stages of a process of fundamental transformation. The
reform ethos of the Progressive Era, best romanticized in the settlement house
movement, had been rapidly crumbling. In its place a new fascination with
psychiatric casework technique had begun to take hold. In the illusory economic
prosperity of the 1920s it is perhaps not surprising that the potentials of human
adjustment to be found in the mental world of the individual were more alluring to
social workers than the vagaries of social reform efforts or the familiar, more
routinized functions called for in charity work. Furthermore, social casework
" ... from the psychiatric point of view" seemed more in keeping with the definition
of a profession than the unscientific moral do-gooder image that had dogged social
work from its inception. 2
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By 1929, the professionalization of social work had, in the eyes of its leaders,
finally shed the do-gooder image, replacing in its stead a new representation of
rational thought, scientifically-based technique, and a more circumspect sense of
moral inspiration. The apparent triumph of professional form and function was
celebrated that year in San Francisco at the annual National Conference of Social
Work (NCSW). Porter Lee, president of the NCSW and director of the New York
School of Social Work, greeted delegates in his presidential address with the
pronouncement of this long awaited fait accompli. Social work, Lee declared, had
largely rid itself from the burdens of social reform leadership and the unscientific
zealotry that accompanied reform. According to Lee, social work had accomplished
the necessary shift from leading the cause of social reform to providing a

professional/unction, the efficient management and administration of social
programs:
In the last analysis I am not sure that the greatest service of social
work as a cause is contributed through those whose genius is to
light and hand on the torch. I am inclined to think that in the
capacity of the social worker, whatever his rank, to administer a
routine functional responsibility in the spirit of the servant in a
cause lies the explanation ofthe great service of social work. This
capacity is perhaps a higher qualification for leadership than the
ability to sway groups of men. 3
For Lee and a new generation of social workers seeking to overcome the shibboleths
of moral crusading represented by earlier social reformers, the new language of
professional social work included "efficiency," "qualified personnel," and
"measurement of results.,,4
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The new rhetoric ofthe emergent profession had, indeed, considerable
substance undergirding it. In the same year that Lee elevated function over cause,
the U.S. Census Bureau announced that in its upcoming national census, social work
would at last be listed as a professional occupation. Official government recognition
as a profession was a long-awaited sign of social work's growing power and public
legitimacy.s Indeed, while still relatively small in comparison to other professions,
the ranks of social work were growing. By mid-decade, one survey estimated that
some 25,000 women and men, primarily located in urban centers ofthe east and
midwest, were employed in paid social work. By the 1930 census, the total number
of paid social workers was estimated at over 31,000, with an additional 15,000 in
related fields of charity and correctional institutions. 6
Recognition by the Census Bureau also reflected the development within the
field of specialized training programs and the granting of advanced credentials now
becoming requisite for professional standing. From the founding in 1898 of the first
professional social work training program, the New York School of Social
Philanthropy, over 40 professional schools had been established throughout the
country. Of these, the majority had been organized after 1915 and were members of
the American Association of Schools of Social Work (AASSW). While not yet a
formal accreditation body in the modem sense, the AASSW would help spur the
professionalization of social work through its requirements that members schools be
affiliated with universities. Despite the initial lack of standardized criteria from the
AASSW regarding specific coursework and degree requirements, most schools
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placed a heavy emphasis on the development of casework technique coupled with
field experience. 7
Within the profession, a new organization, the American Association of
Social Workers (AASW), was fonned in 1921 with the pronounced intention of
establishing national standards ofprofessional training and practice. While the
profession had an embarrassment of riches in its number of specialized
organizations, the AASW was intended to be an overarching national professional
association. 8 A central focus ofthe AASW's initial organizing efforts was the
establishment of minimum membership criteria regarding experience and education.
In 1922, the AASW required a minimum of four years experience in social welfare
service and some educational training vaguely defined as indicative of success in
social work. In July 1929, the AASW adopted new standards for merrlbership to
take effect in 1933. The new standards established a heightened expectation of
professional training and experience in social work. Membership requirements now
called for a minimum of two years of college and five years of social work
experience and/or other educational and training experiences. Significantly, the new
standards clearly privileged training obtained in professional schools of social work.
The stiffened membership requirements and the emphasis on advanced training from
approved schools of social work, while bulwarking the field's evidence of
professionalism, would soon prove to be a major source ofcontention between the
mainstream profession and the bulk of uncredentialed relief workers that came to
fonn the nucleus of the rank and file movement. 9
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The hegemony of function over the cause of social refonn would further
express itself in the declarations ofthe 1929 Milford Conference.)O Established in
1923, the conference met annually, bringing together leading social workers in a
contentious process of defining social casework. The task of the conference was
critical to the consolidation of a core professional identity and definition. The
proliferation of specialized fields of practice and accompanying distinct bases of
knowledge and skills seriously threatened a unified sense of a profession and the
fruition of the AASW's attempts to forge a national, overarching professional
association. In addition, the pervasive influence of psychiatric social work technique
had heightened old rivalries and insecurities in the specialized fields - would one
form of social casework predominate? If so, would it be psychiatric casework?
Bertha Reynolds, a prominent adherent of the psychiatric viewpoint in the
1920s, recalls in her memoirs the essence of the debate:
Did psychiatric social work add just another specialty to the list?
Did it introduce further division among social workers who were
just beginning to find themselves in relation to each other? The
answers are yes and no.
Psychiatric social work did introduce a division of which I had
begun to be conscious when I joined the staff of the Smith College
School- a division which neither the School nor I considered
desirable. However, the very rapidity of the spread of 'the
psychiatric point of view' among social workers made it possible
to say by 1927 ... that even if psychiatric social work was
considered a specialty.. jt was, nevertheless, in the content of its
knowledge the common property of all fonns of good social
casework. 11
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The final report of the Milford Conference reflected the masterful
compromises necessarily made by social work's leaders to forge a common
theoretical ground and justification for the profession's unified knowledge base.
While deftly avoiding a specific definition of social casework, the report established
the existence of a generic social case work which cut across social work's practice
specialties, including psychiatric casework. The report affirmed that this generic
approach was based, although admittedly unevenly, on scientific principles befitting
a profession. As such, the differences observed within specialized fields of practice
became incidental to the common theory base and techniques of a generic social
casework used by all social workers. Perhaps most significant, the Milford
Conference report affirmed the primary function of social work in the context of
facilitating individual adjustment to the realities of the social world. The concept of
social reform as a social work function was severely circumscribed, now redefined
within the domain of the individual client's adjustment and the social worker's
abilities to use their knowledge of the environment to bring available resources to
bear upon the client's singular misery. As the conference report declared, "In .
conclusion, we find the significant movement in the decade of 1920 - 1930, to be the
emergence of a common casework field in which the individual, his adjustment and
development, is accepted as the essential problem.,,12
Social Work and the Liberal Tradition
The seeming rejection of social reform by the profession was, in essence,
much less abandonment than a measured turning of the cheek. As a whole, social
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work has always been inextricably bound within the ideological tenets of American
liberalism, and the development of the profession in the 1920s faithfully reflected
this allegiance. The notions of scientific rationality and efficiency embraced by the
profession (and its concomitant disillusionment with the primacy of social reform) in
fact mirrored the evolution of liberal thought before and just after World War I.
After all, the reform movements of the Progressive Era arose not from a rejection of
capitalism but from a zeal and idealism seeking to tame its more savage features.
The anti-monopoly and civic reform movements that characterized Progressivism
and the reform wing of social work railed against the excesses of capitalism, not its
basic nature. To the intellectual barons of liberalism, such as Herbert Croly, John
Dewey, Edmund Wilson and Malcolm Cowley, unbridled American capitalism
represented outdated and distorted characteristics of individualism and competition
that bred unnecessary class and social conflict, threatening a new emerging social
order. 13 This new order called for a capitalism reinvigorated with a more humane
and disciplined character - a character which recognized and nurtured the collective
mutuality of interest between worker and industrialist, farmer and manufacturer and
citizen and government. In sum, the tremendous changes in industry, technology,
labor-capital relations and urban life wrought by nineteenth century capitalism
required new processes of social planning and control based on efficiency, expertism
and an altruistic community of citizenship. Planned progress marked by virtue and
evolutionary optimism, not revolution or unregulated corporate monopoly, would be
the new hallmark of the twentieth century America.
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The ethos of Progressivism was a rich nutrient for the emerging discipline of
social work and deeply influenced the philosophies and practice of both the
established charity organization societies (COS) and the growing settlement house
movement. While both wings of social work shared adherence to a liberal ideology,
the expressions of their commitment would diverge in some distinctive ways - and
each would shape the character of a post-war social work. The pre-war spirit of
reform was best symbolized in the public eye by the work of the settlement houses
and the nearly canonized status of Jane Addams. Social workers, particularly those
identified with the settlement movement, were prominent leaders in the progressive
crusades for mother's pensions, child labor laws, public sanitation regulation, and
wage and hour labor reform. Unlike the more professionally distant caseworkers of
the charity societies, settlement workers appeared to be of the community they
served. Primarily based within the neighborhoods of urban poverty, settlement
workers articulated the need for not only the spiritual and cultural adjustment of the
individual to society but for institutionally based reforms which would alter
environmental contributions to individual dysfunction. But the vast majority of the
leadership in the settlement movement were not products of the communities they
served. While temporarily sharing a common geography, they were profoundly
separated from their clients by virtue of class, educational attainment and social
priVilege. As a group, the reformists within the settlement house movement sought to
ameliorate social and class conflict, and did not seek to fundamentally alter class
structure. 14
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Just as the settlement house movement expressed the outward reform
impulses of liberalism, the charity organization societies better exemplified
liberalism's inner faith in rational scientific thought and expertise in administration.
While not eschewing social reform, the leaders of the charity organizations
privileged the virtues of bureaucratic efficiency and a scientifically-based method.
For Mary Richmond, leading spokesperson of the COS movement, the ascendancy of
a distinct knowledge base and technique was critical to the development of the
profession in order to distinguish it from the unbridled passion of reformers apt to be
"...bowled over by the first labor leader, or anarchist, or socialist, or whatever he
happens to be in that neighborhood.,,15 Richmond briefly came to represent the
predominant tendency within social work seeking to focus the profession's attention
on the science of individual adjustment and the means to that adjustment: social
diagnosis via the technique of social casework.
The final dominance of theories of individual adjustment over the politics of
reform that would shape the character of the young profession in the ensuing decade
found its fruition in the aftermath of the first World War. The optimism inherent in
American liberalism was severely shaken by World War I, and the reverberations of
disillusionment that followed dampened the zeal of its reformist wing. The
Wilsonian ideals of democracy that led liberals into the war seemed irrevocably
stained in the carnage that ensued and the moral blight that characterized the
Versailles Treaty. Coupled with the reemergence of a seemingly unified corporate
monopoly and a government sponsored campaign to destroy alleged alien-inspired
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radicalism, the resulting sense of betrayal and confusion unraveled the progressive
coalition. While reform efforts would not totally collapse in the war's aftermath,
Progressivism as a potent political movement had ceased to exist. 16
The general splintering ofprogressive thought and movement was echoed in
the reformist wing of social work. The tentative connections that had been made
before the war with organized labor and the Socialist Party, always a source of
contention with the profession's financial benefactors, now seemed ill advised. As a
red scare swept the nation, reformist social workers found their patriotism and
legitimacy as public servants severely questioned. Prominent social workers such as
Jane Addams, Roger Baldwin and Vida Scudder found themselves under attack from
both within and outside the profession. Addams, Baldwin and Scudder had been
opponents of American involvement in World War I and, unlike most social
workers, continued to express their pacifist sentiments during and after the war. 17 In
addition to her pacifism, Scudder had exhibited the temerity to openly endorse the
more radical wings of labor, including the Industrial Workers of the World's 1912
textile strike in Lawrence, Kansas. Jane Addams' heresy ofpacifism was nearly
eclipsed by her denouncement ofthe Palmer Raids and outspoken support for the
rights of aliens. 18
Pacifism and suspect associations with unions, anarchists and Socialists
earned many social work reformists, particularly within the settlement house
movement, the focused attention of the press and government anti-radical
investigations. The most sensational attacks would come in New York state, where
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the legislature's Lusk Committee included the settlements in their far-flung net
investigating sedition. During a year long investigation that included social welfare
agencies, unions, foreign language associations and reform organizations, the
committee found the specter of subversion in nearly every liberal and radical
organization or cause it examined. From so-called "revolutionary" unions such as
the International Ladies' Garment Worker's Union and the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers to the "subversive propaganda" spread by the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Lusk Committee catalogued the threat of Bolshevist propaganda and
subversion. 19 Settlement houses, determined the Lusk Committee, had placed
" ... radical and revolutionary ideas on a parity with the ideals of American
Government.,,20 The reactionary tide, while most pronounced in the activities of the
Lusk Committee, was not isolated to New York. The allegedly subversive activities
of settlement workers would also come under scrutiny by the press and ambitious
politicians in Boston, Pittsburgh, Chicago and other cities. 21 Addams' Hull House,
the syrrlbolic home of the settlement movement, would gamer special attention. As
late as 1925 it would be described as a "branch of the Soviet Government" during
legislative hearings on child labor laws in Illinois. 22 The enmity of virulent anti
Communists towards Addams and the causes she espoused would remain unabated
into the 1930s. As late as 1934, Elizabeth Dilling's classic who's who of radicalism,

The Red Network, would devote nearly two full pages to Addams, considerably more
space than any of the other 1,300 individuals listed would merit - an even more
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remarkable feat given that Earl Browder, leader ofthe American Connnunist Party in
1934, was granted a mere paragraph of exposure. 23
Chastened by the malaise of liberalism and the resurgence of a conservative
political zeitgeist, ideological and practical differences between the settlements and
the COS began to dissipate in the 1920s. The ensuing consolidation of the
profession would now be based less on the ideals of reform than the more
professional, and politically safe, road of technique and individual adjustment. The
flirtations of some in the profession with reform, particularly its more radical fringe
alliances with progressive elements of labor and the political left, had temporarily
threatened to disrupt not only the canons of professionalism but a longstanding
reliance on class-conscious financial benefactors. 24 Indeed, following the war, the
more pronounced reform tendencies in the settlement houses increasingly gave way
to an emphasis on the familiar and less politically fractious activities of community
recreation and education (now the basis for a more professional field of practice
called social group work). Thus, the moral character-building business ofthe
settlement movement's class origins retained its primacy. While the spirit of social
reform would maintain a hallowed place in social work canon, cause would be
secondary to function, judiciously circumscribed and tamed in practice. 25
The ascendance of social casework over reform efforts in the wake of World
War I also heralded the transformation of social casework itself. Despite the
declarations ofthe Milford Conference that the presence of a generic casework was
more significant than any specialty of technique, the psychiatric point of view would
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largely come to characterize the profession in the 1920s. The broad strokes of a
scientifically-based casework investigation outlined in Mary Richmond's Social

Diagnosis in 1917 were being replaced in the mid-twenties by a more refined model
ofpsychiatric casework. Findings its origins in the crude pre-Freudian psychiatry of
the mental hygiene movement, this new model centered upon rapidly advancing
principles and techniques of psychiatry, particularly as embodied within the
psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud. 26
As the psychiatric model came to dominate the literature, so did it enter the
professional training schools. Seminars and courses focused on this new science of
the mind proliferated in schools of social work, and students were urged to practice
this new method in their agency placements. As one student of the time recalls,
Gone were the days when persons in need applied for assistance,
had the legitimacy of their need verified by a call to a former
employer if unemployed, or to the dispensary if too ill to work, and
confirmed by a visit to the home ... We were taught to use a detailed
case history outline: circumstances surrounding birth, early
childhood diseases, adjustment to other children, school
adjustment, and so on up through adolescence and adulthood and
into the sex life of the married adults in the family. We
encountered resistance. Clients, as we called our interviewees,
often failed to see the relevance of our questions. 27
The embrace of this new psychiatric viewpoint served a dual purpose for the
incipient profession. On the one hand, the therapeutic uses ofpsychiatry provided
for a scientifically-based method and role that differentiated the professional social
worker from the unprofessional stigma of charity workers doling out relief. The
psychiatric method relied on specialized theory and techniques far more
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sophisticated than the concrete tasks of investigation and relief giving, and hence
worthy of much higher professional status. At the same time, the ability to focus on
the inner world of the individual allowed social workers to avoid both the political
and professional dangers of environmental change efforts that lacked a coherent and
professional theory base. Psychoanalytic theory provided the avenue by which
social work could claim a distinct body of knowledge and skill, long so elusive to an
occupation almost singularly insecure in its identification as a profession. Treatment
based on a scientific understanding ofthe complexity ofthe human mind not only
offered new insights and answers for human problems, but it could demonstrate real
contributions to healthy adjustment. This decidedly scientific approach, however,
would concomitantly influence social workers to turn the focus of their attentions
from one of environmental dysfunction to that of personal maladjustment. 28
The privileging of a psychological focus over social refonn would also serve
to not only expand the profession's base of expertise but its potential clientele.
Unlike class-based social problems of poverty and inadequate housing, problems of
personality were universal, and the rise of a middle class offered social work a
particularly potent new market. Entree into the burgeoning middle class better suited
social work's claim to professional authority and status. While the skills of relief
giving were less relevant for this potential market, skills that could be employed to
shore up disorganized families and resolve intrapsychic conflict were extremely
appealing. Equally important, the funding necessary to implement (and legitimize)
this new emphasis was forthcoming from the traditional financial benefactors of
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whom social work had historically relied upon. In the case of psychiatric social
work, funding would come not only from traditional philanthropic foundations such
as the Commonwealth Fund but from government and quasi-governmental sources
as well. In this regard, both the Red Cross and the Veterans Bureau, dealing with the
mental health problems of returning veterans, provided significant training and
employment opportunities for psychiatric social workers. 29

In sum, the shift to psychiatric approaches within the field reflected the new
ideological and economic realities that faced social work in the 1920s. In turn, the
resulting inward focus of the profession best resolved threats to its survival and at the
same time seemed to assure the emergence of an unlimited market for its more
refined product. But while these abstract philosophical, political and social forces
provided the necessary conditions and means for the shift in social work towards the
psychiatric viewpoint, they do not contain a fully satisfactory explanation for this
shift. Changes in social thought reflect not merely responses of human actors to
abstract structural dynamics beyond their influence or recognition but are themselves
shaped by the experiences of human actors individually and collectively and the
meanings placed on these experiences. As one settlement worker explained:
You have to understand that it [the failure ofreform] wasn't just a
political thing. For most of us [social workers] it was our failure.
We had failed. Most of us didn't think like economists or
philosophers - I didn't anyway - we were workers. No matter
how hard we tried it didn't seem to matter. When I went to a
lecture on Freud it was like a revelation. Maybe we couldn't
change the world, but I could do something for somebody, and if
enough of us did it. .. well, I don't know, but it seemed like he had
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his finger on something and I thought maybe this was it. I mean, it
was wrong finally, but what else did we have?3o
Jacob Fisher, a leading figure in the rank and file movement, would echo this
personal crisis many social workers felt as they sought to navigate the social and
political changes of the 1920s:
The world and the profession was adrift for awhile after the war.
We were shell-shocked, and for a younger generation the old ideas
and leaders seemed irrelevant. We needed a new road and Freud
represented it. It was more than Freud, too - people were
fascinated by personality and we weren't any different. Pathology
was much more intrinsically rewarding than poverty. 31
Bertha Reynolds, a leading proponent of psychiatric social work in the 1920s,
reflects in her memoirs that the appeal psychiatric method held for social workers
was more than just a new technique for application on others. It was also a source of
apparent powerful personal transformation for the individual social worker, both as a
provider and recipient of therapy:
Counselling with students on the summer campus, 011 winter visits,
or by mail, became a rewarding third vocation. A remark of a
psychiatrist at the School.. .meant much to me. It was to the effect
that something happened when students who had problems in
learning counselled with me. They became 'like different people.'
It was a sacred trust, whatever gift I had for helping people, and
something I could not ignore, nor, in accepting it, fail to give it my
best...
No subject was more debated among psychiatric social workers in
the 1920's than the question whether a psychoanalysis was
necessary for professional success. That it was an advantage was
rather generally conceded, and for a period of years New York
City, which was almost the only place to obtain an analysis, was
overloaded with social workers whose job performance was made
unpredictable by the emotional storms they were riding in their
personal therapy ... As the emphasis in psychiatric casework was
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more and more placed upon the dynamic effect of the relationship
between workers and client; it became increasingly necessary to
consider what our own unconscious conflicts might be doing to the
people we were supposed to help.32
The vitiation of social reform activities within social work was part of- but
substantially more than - the desires of an anthropomorphized profession to obtain
elevated social status. Likewise, individual social workers were not just naive pawns
in the greater manipulations of a cabalistic funding elite or the recondite workings of
abstract economic forces. The gradual dominance of theories and techniques of
individual adjustment also, and importantly, reflected the real individual and
collective experiences of social workers - feelings of disappointment, confusion,
success and hope.

Dissenting Voices: Social Work, Socialism and the Labor Movement
Not all the voices of social work in the 1920s mirrored the profession's
general retreat from reform and its enthusiasm for a more personality-focused
technique of individual adjustment. A handful of social workers constituted a small
but vocal left wing within the profession and sought to forge close connections
between more militant wings of organized labor and elements of the Socialist and
Communist parties. Some, such as Roger Baldwin and Mary van Kleeck, were early
converts to the radical persuasion, while others, such as Grace Coyle, Eduard
Lindeman and Harry Lurie, selectively flirted with the left while staking their faith in
a core liberalism.
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Social work's early radicals found their inspiration in the populist movements
of the late 1800s, the militant organizing efforts of unions such as the ILGU and the
IWW, and the refonnist social critiques of utopian socialists and the more pragmatic
Socialist Party. But such sympathies and alliances were hardly well organized or
widespread among social workers, and rarely were acknowledged by the profession's
leadership. As the red scare began in the wake of World War I, Roger Baldwin
displeased many at the 1918 NCSW with a scathing critique that maintained social
work's "obedience" to capitalism rendered the profession's work " ... undemocratic at
heart - and the heart is its source of financial support.,,33 Baldwin's attacks on social
work and its benefactors, his support of the Russian revolution and the IWW's
anarcho-syndicalist ideals, and his imprisonment for draft resistance were far outside
the profession's mainstream.
Indeed, Baldwin's largely ignored plea at the NCSW for an alliance with the
still nascent labor movement reflected the historic tensions that existed between
labor and social work. As leaders of the Jewish Welfare Society in Philadelphia
would later tell delegates at the 1926 NCSW conference:
The fundamental differences between the objectives of trade
unions and of social agencies is that while the case worker is
interested in the individual, family, [and community] and
fonnulated a program to meet its problems, the trade-union, on the
other hand is concerned with its members at large ... Socialists, and
to some extent trade-unions, have tended to look upon social work
with suspicion and scorn, when they were not openly hostile. 34
The seeds of labor's suspicion regarding social work were sown in the early attitudes
and practices of COS leaders and their workers. Concerned with the perceived baser
70

moral impulses of the poor and working masses, many early social workers were
convinced that moral enlightenment, not the militant tactics of labor unions for better
working conditions and an eight-hour work day, were central to the improvement of
society. Many early charity societies openly opposed labor's use of strikes to
pressure employers, often denying relief to strikers and their families and pressuring
adults on relief to take the jobs of striking workers. Some societies, such as the New
York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, viewed organized labor
in the 1870s as a clearly anti-American movement closely aligned with " ...socialistic,
incendiary and revolutionary dogmas" spread by such international revolutionary
organizations as the Communist International. 35
As compared to the charity organization societies, the goals of organized
labor and radical political movements received a more sympathetic response from
the leaders of the settlement movement. The settlement movement's more
pronounced emphasis on the betterment of environmental conditions for the poor and
working class was considerably more well-disposed to the social and economic
program of labor unions than the stricter moralism of the societies. At the peak of
the Progressive movement, settlement workers often joined with labor unions in
campaigns for housing laws, wage and hour regulation, legislation to improve
factory conditions, and enactment of child labor laws. The attraction ofmany
settlement workers to the Progressive Party also nourished an alliance with labor, as
social workers became instrumental in the development of the party's 1912 social
welfare platform, which championed the establishment of the eight-hour work day,
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federal involvement in setting factory standards and the provision of workmen's
compensation and social insurance. 36 Many settlement houses opened their meeting
rooms for labor organizers, and some within the settlement nl0vement, such as
Florence Kelley and Jane Addams, were instrumental in the development of the
National Consumers League and the Women's Trade Union League. Still others,
such as Robert Hunter, Karl Borders, Vida Scudder and Ellen Starr credited their
involvement with labor unions as instrumental in their conversion to socialism. 37
Despite the alliances that did exist between unions and some of the
settlements, significant tensions between the two camps were ever apparent. While
some settlement workers, such as Borders, Scudder and Starr were decidedly partisan
in their support of unions, others were as suspicious and opposed to the union
movement as their counterparts in the charity organization societies. Still others,
such as Jane Addams, took a more circumspect view regarding unionism. Addams'
support of union goals was tempered by her concern that the elements of "class
warfare" engendered by the militant demands of unions would undermine her vision
of a class stratified but socially harmonious society.38 While sympathetic to the need
for reform to better the conditions ofworking men and women, Addams feared the
more militant and revolutionary wings ofthe labor movement, and believed
settlements were called to a mediating role between the excesses of corporations and
the political intrigues ofthe unions. Such attempts at mediation were often ill
received by unions and served·to maintain the suspicion within organized labor that
social work was, at most, a tenuous ally.39
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The generally distant relationship that existed between the mainstream of
social work and the labor movement following the demise of the progressive
movement would solidify in the increasingly conservative character of the profession
after World War I, as the profession's focus on individual adjustment began to
supplant its more sweeping social reform ideals. Despite the 'chilling effect of this
tum, a small but vocal number of social workers maintained their allegiance to the

cause of unions and a radical ideology. This left-wing of the profession, while
relatively small in number, included both prominent social workers such as Mary
Van Kleeck and Roger Baldwin, as well as a younger generation such as Harry Lurie
and Karl Borders. All had been informed by the experiences of Progressivism and
the politics of anarchism, the Socialist Party, and the emerging Communist Party.
Still others, such as Florence Kelley, Eduard Lindeman and Lillian Wald would be
inspired by the Russian revolution and subsequent trips to Russia to observe
firsthand this new national experiment in socialism. 4o While sharing a common
dissatisfaction with the destructive aspects ofAmerican capitalism, members of this
left wing in the profession represented more disparate voices of dissent than any
organized program of action or well defined ideology. With the exception of Van
Kleeck and Baldwin, few would publicly pose any serious critique of the profession
or directly challenge the profession's leadership. Rather, in the conservative climate
of the 1920s, an organized radical presence was both rare and mostly ignored by the
mainstream profession's leadership.
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Despite the apparent paucity of radical thought and action within the
profession during this period, two events in 1924 and 1926 would presage the later
emergence of an organized and left-led threat to the profession as represented in the
rank and file movement. The first challenge to the profession's political
complacency would be an intellectual assault mounted by Mary van Kleeck and
Roger Baldwin at the 1924 National Conference of Social Work. The second event,
led by workers in the Jewish Federation Societies of New York City would be less
noticed but would constitute a more far-reaching omen of events to unfold in the
next decade.
Unlike Baldwin, an avowed anarchist and supporter of radical causes, Mary
van Kleeck seemed an unlikely candidate for the mantle ofradicalleadership.41
Raised in a family dominated by her Protestant minister father, van Kleeck was an
active church member in her adolescence as well as being a member ofthe National
Society of Colonial Dames. Drawn into the reform efforts ofprogressivism through
her church activities, van Kleeck decided upon social work as a career and enrolled
in Smith College. Upon graduation in 1905, van Kleeck was employed at the
College Settlement House in the lower east side of New York City. For the next five
years, van Kleeck investigated the lives of factory girls and women, publishing
numerous monographs that were influential in eventual passage of protective laws by
the state legislature. Following completion of a well-received book investigating the
conditions of women in the bookbinding trades, van Kleeck was appointed head of
the Russell Sage Foundation's Committee on Women's Work (later renamed the
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Industrial Studies Division) and launched a series of investigations into the work
conditions of women in factories. Van Kleeck's investigations drew her close to the
ranks of organized labor and she soon became a leading proponent of workmen's
compensation, unemployment insurance, and social insurance.42
Upon her appointment to the War Labor Policies Board during World War I,
van Kleeck intensified her work with the labor movement, hosting a conference on
the rights of trade union women in 1918. Including representatives from all the
national and intemationallabor federations that admitted female members, the
conference was hailed by The New Republic for its progressive platform on the rights
and needs of women workers: "The active and organized cooperation of the
disciplined leaders of the American women's trade union movement is essential to
the effective protection of our industrial morale from the risks that inevitably attend
the unregulated incursion ofwomen into industry.,,43 But as World War I came to an
end, van Kleeck resigned from the War Policies Board to return to the Russell Sage
Foundation, urging the development of a permanent federal agency responsible for
protecting the rights ofworking women. Lobbying congressmen, van Kleeck
authored legislation that was subsequently introduced and passed in 1920,
establishing The Women's Bureau in the Department of Labor. 44
Following the war, van Kleeck sharply veered to the politicallefi. Inspired
by the Russian Revolution and now convinced of the need for national social and
economic planning, van Kleeck began a long association with the Communist Party
and the radical unions of the Party's Trade Union Educational League (TUEL).
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Joining with like-minded radicals in the profession, van Kleeck brought her
commitment to socialism before the 1924 National Conference of Social Work. 4s
Amidst the relative conservative complacency ofthe 1920s, few delegates at
the NCSW were kindly disposed to the presentations of van Kleeck and Roger
Baldwin. Reflecting on the reform platform ofthe 1912 conference that had been
incorporated into the Progressive Party campaign, van Kleeck and Baldwin
castigated social work's retreat from progressive politics and its failure to recognize
its common interests with the labor movement. Accusing social work of being
blinded by the class interests of its financial benefactors, van Kleeck argued that the
emerging movement of industrial unionism held the key to future political power and
economic change, a change van Kleeck believed would lead to worker control of
national industry and government. 46 Baldwin echoed van Kleeck, claiming that the
lessons of the Bolshevik revolution and the rapid growth of labor parties in Europe
and Mexico demonstrated a coming new world order based on the principles of
socialism. Urging social workers to join the movement to create a worker's party in
the United States, Baldwin cautioned the profession that " ...if social workers are to
be participants in the essential struggle for larger human freedom ...they can achieve
it only by identification with the cause of labor. ,,47 Despite their inflamed rhetoric,
van Kleeck and Baldwin were clearly standing outside the mainstream beliefs of
their audience. As one observer noted, " ...they seemed odd rather than dangerous.
There was polite applause, a mild rejoinder by Paul Kellogg, editor of the
Survey ...then silence.,,48
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While van Kleeck and Baldwin's admonitions to social work to recognize the
growing power of labor unions went largely unnoticed by the profession's elite, in
New York City social workers employed by the agencies of the Federation for the
Support of Jewish Philanthropic Organizations were taking the first modest steps of
turning it into an historic reality. Formal philanthropic organization within the
Jewish community of New York had first appeared in 1828, when the Shearith Israel
Congregation established the Hebrew Benevolent Society, an agency dedicated to
providing family welfare services. 49 As European Jews immigrated to the United
States in increasing numbers during the nineteenth century, meeting the needs of
these mostly poor newcomers led to a proliferation of volunteer relief organizations.
To cope with the resulting complexities and rivalries that arose in financing and
coordinating the various services provided by these charitable agencies, a centralized
federation responsible for overall fundraising was established in 1918, representing
some 92 programs in three city boroughs. so
Initially reliant upon untrained volunteers, by the mid 1920s Federation
constituent agencies were increasingly staffed by paid professionals, including social
workers. Until 1925, many ofthese trained charity workers had been students in the
School for Jewish Communal Work. While not a professional school of social work,
it offered a series of courses in social welfare, recreation, and education services.
Following the school's closure in 1922, the National Jewish Conference solicited
funds from various foundations and Jewish federations to establish the Graduate
School for Jewish Social Work in 1925. Through a cooperative agreement with the

77

New York School of Social Work, students in the program received the general
professional coursework of the New York School and specialized training in
communal work through the Graduate School for Jewish Social Work.

51

The growing professional make-up of Federation caseworkers and
supervisors quickly brought to the surface long standing tensions regarding working
conditions, caseload size and training and personnel standards. Dissatisfied with the
response of Federation administrators to their concerns, caseworkers and supervisors
formed the Association ofFederation Social Workers (AFSW) in 1926.52 Not yet a
trade union in actual form, the AFSW articulated a core series of demands giving rise
to its formation:
1) Standardization of types of requirements for social workers
employed in organizations under the Federation.
2) An adjustment of minimum salaries commensurate with
training requirements and the increased cost of living.
3) Adjustment of increases to insure retention of experienced
workers.
4) Establishment ofhealth insurance for workers.
5) Standardization of case load compatible with doing good
work in a reasonable time limit. s3
Despite the AFSW's calls for improved workplace conditions, in practice it
emphasized standards of professional practice and worked in a mostly cooperative
manner with agency administrators:
The prime importance which has grown out of the Association of
Federation Social Workers is the cooperation of trustees,
executives and staffs. With this cooperation growing stronger each
year, it is conceivable that social workers will not be ashamed to
ask for a living wage but with standardization aimed at by the
Association, will receive it without asking. 54
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While the initial organization and demands of the AFSW would not be accompanied
by the more class-conscious political militancy of unions as envisioned by van
Kleeck and Baldwin, the early AFSW would foreshadow a new era for social work
in the face of the Great Depression.

79

Notes to Chapter 2
1. Reynolds, An unchartedjourney, p. 134.
2. Quote from Ibid., p. 132. With the publication in 1930 of Virginia Robinson's A
changing psychology in social case work (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press), the psychiatric casework model seemed to have at last achieved
hegemony in social work practice theory, only to be severely tested in the wake
of the Great Depression.

In regard to the "do-gooder" stigma, Don Kirschner notes in The Paradox of
Professionalism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) that among the new
professions forming at the tum of the century, social work appeared the least
secure in its sense of profession and devoted the most time "agonizing" over this
insecurity (pp. 53-56).
3. Porter R. Lee, "Social work: Cause and function," Proceedings ofthe National
Conference ofSocial Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929) p. 20.
4. Ibid., pp. 7-20.
5. "Say 'social worker' to the census man" in The Compass (February 1930), p. 1.

6. Leighninger, Social work: Search for identity, pp. 13-16; Wenocur & Reisch,
From charity to enterprise, pp. 89-91.
7. Ibid.
8. Organizations representing specialty fields of practice included the American
Association for Organizing Family Welfare (later the Family Welfare
Association), the American Association of Medical Workers, the American
Association of Psychiatric Social Workers, the National Probation Association,
and the National Association of School Social Workers. Other national
organizations included the National Federation of Settlements, the National
Conference of Social Work, the International Migration Service, the National
Association of Travelers Aid Societies, the Child Welfare League, and the
National Committee for Mental Hygiene.
The AASW evolved out of the National Social Worker's Exchange (which had
its own origins in the Social Work Division of the Intercollegiate Bureau of
Occupations). In 1920 the Exchange appointed a steering committee to examine
the potentials of a new professional organization of national breadth, resulting in
the formation of the AASW in June of 1921. Interestingly, among the members
80

of the steering committee was Mary van Kleeck, then a prominent social worker
with the Russell Sage Foundation. van Kleeck would soon become a theoretical
leader of the rank and file movement, assailing the very organization she was
instrumental in forming. For more information on the formation of the AASW,
see Leighninger, Social work: Search/or identity, pp. 8-15; and Wenocur and
Reisch, From charity to enterprise, pp. 119-127.
9. Leighninger, Ibid., pp. 12-13; Wenocur and Reisch, Ibid., pp. 132-134.
10. American Association of Social Workers, Social casework generic and specific:
A report ofthe Milford Conference Studies in the Practice ofSocial Casework
(New York: AASW, 1929).
11. Reynolds, An unchartedjourney, p. 131.
12. AASW, Social casework generic and specific, p.11.
13. The voices of these and other liberal spokespersons, were extremely influential
within social work circles, particularly through publications such as The New
Republic and The Nation (interviews by author with Jacob Fisher, September 9,
1980 and Abram Flaxer, August 16, 1980). Olson notes in Unfinished business
that Eduard Lindeman became one of John Dewey's "most enthusiastic
supporters" (p. 9). Other influential social workers such as Paul Kellogg, editor
of the reform minded Survey, were equally influenced by the greater currents of
American liberalism (see Chambers, Paul U Kellogg and the Survey). For a
broader view of the influence of liberalism during the Progressive Era in general
and on social work in particular, see Richard Pells, Radical visions & American
dreams (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) and Simon, The empowerment
tradition in social work.
14. Wenocur and Reisch (From charity to enterprise, pp. 73-74) argue that while the
leadership of the settlement house movement reflected its upper class origins,
settlement house workers as a group began to reflect in increasing numbers
working class men and women, infusing contradictory tendencies within the
movement. According to Wenocur and Reisch, while some were drawn to
settlement work as a stable occupation and hence stressed recreational and
educational activities, others sought more radical social reform, creating tension
between the movement and its financial backers. While the authors' definition of
"radical" is vague, there is little evidence that much ofthe "radical" activities of
settlement workers significantly tested the boundaries of liberal Progressivism.

15. Mary Richmond, quoted in Mimi Carson, Settlement Folk: Social thoughts and
the American settlement movement, 1885-1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago
81

Press, 1990), p. 67. In later years, Richmond would protest the extreme denial of
environmental influences that some read into her work. While privileging the
technique side of the social work function in her writings, Richmond
acknowledged the legitimacy of social reform efforts, albeit conceptualized as
more politically conservative in nature than Addams or others farther to the left
(Trattner, From poor law to welfare state, p. 257).
16. The relationship of social work and Progressivism would reach its heights in the
formation of the Progressive Party in 1912. Social workers such as Jane
Addams, Paul Kellogg, Florence Kelley and Graham Taylor were strong
supporters of the party. The Progressive Party's presidential candidate, Theodore
Roosevelt, ran on a platform which substantially reflected recommendations on
social insurance and industrial regulation put forth previously by a committee of
reform social workers at the National Conference of Charities and Corrections.
With the defeat of the Progressive Party and its subsequent demise, most social
workers returned to the folds of Wilson's victorious Democratic Party. By the
end of the 1920s, many of the reforms achieved by the Progressive movement
had been substantially weakened. Attempts to ban child labor through the federal
Child Labor Amendment were defeated when the statute was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and waning interest in state legislatures
stalled or rolled back many reforms in housing, work place regulation, and social
insurance (see: Chambers, Seedtime o/re/orm; and Fisher, The response o/social
work to the Depression).

17. Perhaps by virtue of gender, Roger Baldwin went beyond verbal opposition to
the war. Baldwin's commitment to anarchism and pacifism would lead to his
conviction and imprisonment for violation of the federal selective service law.
There was a considerable pacifist sentiment within the profession at the onset of
U.S. involvement in the war. For example, a rump caucus at the 1917 Pittsburgh
NCSW supporting the civil rights of people opposed to the war drew over one
thousand social workers. While U.S. entry into the war substantially muted these
sentiments, a number of social workers such as Lillian Wald, Owen Lovejoy and
Paul Kellogg were prime movers behind the activities of the American Union
Against Militarism. For a retrospective analysis by Baldwin of the pacifist
positions of social workers during the World War I, see Roger Baldwin, "Social
workers and war: A comment," Social Work Today (February 1935), p. 28.
18. Karger, Social workers and labor unions, p. 7; Carson, Settlement/olk, p. 165.
The Palmer raids, named after the U.S. Attorney General whose office initiated
the raids, were a major feature of the post-war red scare. Beginning with
government attacks on members of the Industrial Workers of the World and
82

prosecution of pacifists opposed to the draft and the war, a wave of government
sponsored political repression aimed at radicals and radical organizations spread
throughout the country. Following passage of the Immigration Act of 1918,
which enabled the government to deport aliens who were members of
"subversive" organizations, the U.S. government staged a series of raids
throughout the country rounding up thousands of radicals for possible
deportation. Following the first raids of 1919, over 200 alleged radical aliens
were deported (including the anarchist Emma Goldman, a not infrequent visitor
at Hull House). These raids were followed up in 1920, targeting alien members
and leaders of the Communist Labor Party and the Communist Party. Between
8,000 - 10,000 people were rounded up, jailed and/or deported as a result of the
raids (see: Foster, History ofthe Communist Party ofthe United States, pp. 174
174; Howe & Coser, The American Communist Party, pp. 50-52, and Schrecker,
Many are the crimes, pp. 50-61).
19. William Gellhorn (Ed.), The states and subversion (Ithaca: Cornell University
. Press, 1952), pp. 232-241.
20. Quoted in Carson, Settlementfolk, p. 163
21. Gellhorn, The states and subversion, pp. 232-241.
22. "branch of Soviet Government" quoted in Carson, Settlementfolk, p. 167.
23. Elizabeth Dilling, The red network (Chicago: self-published, 1934), pp. 259-261.
24. Jacob Fisher, "Social work and liberalism," SWT, pp. 9-12.
25. For more general treatments of social work's retreat from social reform,
particularly within the settlement house movement, see: Chambers, Seedtime of
reform; Roy Lubove, The professional altruist: The emergence ofsocial work as
a career (New York: Antheum); and Judith A. Trolander, Settlement houses and
the Great Depression (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1975).
26. Trattner, From poor law to welfare state, pp. 193-214; Lubove, The professional
altruist, pp. 55-117.
27. Jacob Fisher, On vanishing ground: A memoir ofthe twenties (Fairfax, VA:
Piney Branch Press, 1979), p. 248.
28. Lubove, The professional altruist; Chambers, Seedtime ofreform, pp. 95-96.

83

29. Such "superstructure" explanations of social work's shift to a psychiatric
approach have been well represented within the literature. For example, see
Lubove, The professional altruist, pp. 55-117; Ehrenreich, The altruistic
imagination, pp. 27-77; and Wenocur & Reisch, From charity to enterprise, pp.

100-114.
30. Interview by author with Margaret Levy, September 12, 1981.
31. Interview by author with Jacob Fisher, February 12, 1981.
32. Reynolds, An uncharted journey, pp. 129, 124.
33. Roger Baldwin, Proceedings ofthe National Conference ofCharities and
Corrections, p. 397; interview by author with Herbert Aptheker, July 28, 1980.
34. J. Billikopf & B. Glassberg, "Trade unions and the family welfare agency" in
Proceedings ofthe NCSW(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp.
339-340.
35. Albert Deutsch, "American labor and social work," Science and Society, 8 (April,
1944), pp. 289-304 (quote of AICP on p. 292); Straussner & Phillips, "The
relationship between social work and labor," JSSw, pp. 105-127.
36. Chambers, Seedtime ofreform, p. 88. The Progressive Party platform was almost
directly adapted from a report to the 1912 National Conference of Charities and
Corrections by its Committee on Standards and Living Labor. The committee,
chaired by Owen Lovejoy, was composed of social workers prominent in the
settlement movement and the Progressive Party. See Deutsch, "American labor
and social work," Science and Society, pp. 297-298.
37. Trolander, Settlement houses and the Great Depression, pp. 20-21; Carson,
Settlement folk, pp. 81-82; Gerald Rothman, Philanthropists, therapists, and
activists (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing, 1985), pp. 28-29. Borders was
executive secretary of the Socialist Party's League for Industrial Democracy in
Chicago, and in the 1930s formed the Chicago Workers Committee on
Unemployment (Folsom, Impatient armies ofthe poor, pp. 341-342). Borders
was a strong proponent ofthe growing rank and file movement in social work.
38. Addams, quoted in Carson, Settlementfolk, p. 81;
39. Carson, Settlementfolk, pp. 79-82; Jane Addams, "The Settlement as a factor in
the labor movement," in Residents of Hull House (Eds.), Hull House maps and

84

papers (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1895), pp. 184-85.
40. Fisher, The response ofsocial work to the Depression, pp. 66-69; Joel Schriver,
Harry Lawrence Lurie, a rational radical: His contributions to the development
ofsocial work, 1930-1950 (unpublished dissertation, University of Iowa, 1984)
pp. 73-98; Karl Borders, "Social workers and a new social order," in Proceedings
ofthe National Conference ofSocial Work (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1933), pp. 590-607; Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and the Intellectuals (Garden
City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 100-140.
41. Indeed, in his personal remembrance of the rank and file movement, Jacob Fisher
described van Kleeck as having"...the patrician carriage and speech, the
imperious presence and the grande dame manner of the mistress of a nineteenth
century salon" (Fisher, The response ofsocial work to the Depression, p. 67).
42. Elisabeth Moore, Mary van Kleeck: A bibliographical sketch and annotated
bibliography ofher writings (unpublished thesis, Florida Atlantic University,
1986), pp. 4-33; Fisher, The response ofsocial work to the DepreSSion, p. 67-68.
43. "Women in industry," The New Republic, 17 (October 26, 1918), p. 366.
44. M. Anderson, Women at work (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1951), pp. 112-115; J. J. Kenneally, "Women and trade unions, 1870-1920: The
quandary of the reformer," Labor History, 14(1) (1973), pp. 42-55.
45. While there is no documentary evidence that van Kleeck ever joined the
Communist Party, there is ample evidence that she was closely in consultation
with the Party during the 1920s - 1940s. During the 193 Os and 1940s she was a
frequent contributor to Party publications, consistently supported Party positions,
and assisted the Party in drafting what would introduced in Congress as the 1934
Lundeen bill on unemployment insurance (Folsom, Impatient armies ofthe poor,
p.391). An alternative bill, the Wagner-Lewis bill was eventually passed in
Congress. In an interview with this author, CP chair Gus Hall confinned that van
Kleeck was an active supporter and participant during the 1920s and 1930s of the
work of both the Communist-led Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) and
its predecessor, the Trade Union Unity League (TUEL) (November 12, 1983).
The TUEL, formed in 1920, was a radical caucus of unions within the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) seeking to move the AFL toward industrial unionism.
Communist Party leaders such as William Foster (TUEL chairman) and Earl
Browder (editor of the TUEL's Labor Herald) were instrumental in the
formation and leadership of the TUEL (see William Z. Foster, American trade
unionism (New York: International Publishers, 1947); and Joseph Starobin,
85

American communism in crisis, 1943-1957, pp. 52-53). The TUEL was
disbanded in 1929 and refonnulated as the TUUL, this time as a distinct dual
union effort. Some of these early TUELtrUUL unions would later transfonn
themselves into the unions of the rank and file, including the International Union

ofBookkeepers and Stenographers, which later became the United Office and
Professional Workers of America (Harvey Levenstein, Communism,
anticommunism and the CIO (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 37).
46. Mary van Kleeck, "Sources ofpower for industrial freedom," Proceedings ofthe
National Conference ofSocial Work, Toronto, 1924 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 370-373.
47. Roger Baldwin, ''The challenge of social work to the changing control of
industry," Proceedings ofthe National Conference ofSocial Work, Toronto,
1924 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 373.
48. Fisher, The response ofsocial work to the Depression, pp. 32-33.
49. Lurie, A heritage affirmed, p. 23.
50. Ibid., pp. 78-79.
51. Ibid., pp. 102-102.
52. Interview by author with Celia Katz, May 15, 1981 (Katz was a member of the
AFSW in the late 1920s and a later rank and file activist).
53. Executive Committee of Association of Federation Workers of the Association of
Federation Workers in New York, "The history and activities of the Association
of Federation Workers in New York," The Jewish Social Service Quarterly 8
(June, 1932), p. 183.
54. Ibid., p. 184

86

CHAPTER 3:

INTO THE MAELSTROM
What is involved here is a shift ofpowerfrom ownership to work,
including the work ofthe industrial workers, the farmers, the
professional workers, the intellectual workers, the experts in scientific
management. The shift in powerfrom ownership to work is a shift in
the fundamental principle ofthe organization ofour society... Those of
us who say "Let us have evolution and not revolution "; those who say
"Don't let us go into chaos; let us just patch up the old" - those
people are really supporting the old; they are swinging their support
to the status quo... there must be no preaching ofpeace where there is
no peace. It lies with the working class, with which social workers
have the bond ofcommon goals, to transform the principle of
government and ofindustry alike from possession to creative work... 1
(Mary van Kleeck, 1934)

The relatively sudden onset of the Great Depression occurred, almost
ironically, at a time in which the masses of Americans appeared to be enjoying a
period of unprecedented economic prosperity. Certainly for American business, it
was a time of bright outlook for the future and huge profits for the present. During
the decade of the 1920s, production and profit levels continued to rise and, at least
for the middle and upper classes, hopes were high. On the surface it appeared that
free enterprise was delivering on the promise of the good life.
Under the surface of the rosy economic illusion in which the United States of
the 1920s operated, however, ominous indications of coming hardship were
establishing themselves. During the 1920s real wages fell sharply behind
productivity, with workers averaging a forty-nine hour work week and a weekly
take-home pay of around twenty-six dollars. Throughout the decade depressed farm
prices produced an unprecedented number ofbankruptcies in rural America, and
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increased mechanization in urban factories sent the unemployment rate steadily
upward. While unemployment in the 1920s had always been stubbornly high,
following the stock market crash of 1929, unemployment rates began to rise
dramatically. By the spring, unemployment was estimated at nearly three million,
and by the following spring of 1930 it would reach eight million. The crisis
continued to deepen at an unprecedented rate; in 1933 nearly one third of the
workforce, some fifteen million workers, were out of a job.2
For those poor people who had never enjoyed the prosperity of the 1920s to
begin with, to whom the day to day struggle for survival was a normalized
experience, it may have merely appeared that more would join in sharing their
misery. To the new poor, however, for the millions suddenly thrown into
unemployment and desperate poverty, their world became a chaotic, confused
nightmare. For those seeking private or public assistance, the situation in 1929 was
extremely bleak. The practice of relief-giving in the United States had historically
been viewed as primarily one for which responsibility lay with local communities or
state governments, with little federal involvement or oversight. Furthermore, those
services available to the poor and unemployed consisted of a patchwork of private
charities and publicly financed institutions, wholly inadequate to deal with the
millions now in need of assistance.

The Unemployed Respond
At first, reaction from the unemployed was muted and slow to take shape.
Many accepted the response of government and business that the crisis was
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temporary - that self reliance was the key to recovery. President Herbert Hoover
rejected calls for massive federal relief assistance, embracing the belief that relief
was primarily a local responsibility. Too little too late, Hoover provided funding for
a limited public works program in 1930, and established the President's Emergency
Committee for Employment (PECE), an advisory committee that served to
coordinate the funds and provide assistance to states and employers in developing
job investment strategies. 3 But limited federal intervention and the advice of PECE
had little effect. As the crisis deepened, the newly unemployed found themselves
immersed in a crushing poverty. Life savings were quickly used up, families were
broken apart and the very essentials of food, shelter and heat were becoming scare.
Slowly, as Piven and Cloward note, the poor came to see their situation in a new
light:
They began to define their personal hardship not just as their
own individual misfortune but as a misfortune they shared with
many of their own kind. And if so many people were in the
same trouble, then maybe it wasn't they who were to blame, but
the 'system' ... The resulting unrest of the unemployed began to
manifest itself in a spontaneous and largely unorganized
fashion. Incidents of individual and mass looting became
increasingly commonplace. Relatively spontaneous marches,
demonstrations, and even storming of relief offices occurred
throughout the country.4
In due time the unemployed began to organize their protest and resistance.
Much of this organization came with the participation and leadership of the political
left, particularly the Socialist and Communist parties. Organized groups of the
unemployed now devised militant and sometimes violent tactics to agitate for relief.
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Mass marches and rallies outside of city halls and relief offices became a common
occurrence throughout the country, sometimes reSUlting in bloody confrontations
between demonstrators and police ordered out to disperse the crowds. Groups of
unemployed workers joined together to resist attempts of authorities to evict those
who could no longer pay their rent or make mortgage payments. Riots, often the
result of attempts by authorities to suppress protest rallies and marches, erupted in
major cities throughout the country. In the face of growing disorder, political leaders
and newspapers spoke ominously of the subversive nature of the protesters and their
organizations, and of the possibilities of violent revolution. 5
On a national level, the Communists took the lead in organizing the
unemployed. Numerically a small political party beset by internal factionalism and
largely composed of non-English speaking ethnic federations, the Communist Party
quickly recognized the political potential of the crisis and the opportunity to both
spread its revolutionary program and build its membership along the lines of a long
desired Anglo-Anlerican face. In 1929, the party began organizing worker's
Unemployment Councils through its labor-based Trade Union Unity League
(TUUL), forming the National Unemployment Council (NUC), an announced mass
6
organization of the unemployed. Within a short period the NUC was indeed a mass

organization, boasting branches in over 45 states, including every major urban city in
the country. The NUC concentrated its efforts on direct action to obtain relief.
Council members joined picket lines of striking workers, planned and led mass
demonstrations for public relief, organized resistance to evictions and occupied
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offices of charity and public relief agencies. The growing strength and popular
support of the unemployed movement could be seen not only in its local actions but
in mass turnouts for their national protests. Over one million people participated in
the first nationwide demonstration against unemployment jointly called for by the
Communist Party on March 6, 1930. Over 100,000 demonstrated in Detroit, 50,000
in both Pittsburgh and Chicago and huge crowds paraded in Seattle, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Milwaukee, San Francisco and Los Angeles. In New York City, a crowd
of over 100,000 were met by 25,000 police. In the ensuing violence, hundreds of
protesters were arrested and scores injured and jailed. 7
The Socialist Party also became active in organizing the unemployed. While
the party's initial efforts centered on legislative refonn and lobbying, by 1932 they
began actively organizing the unemployed into Unemployed Worker's Committees
and Unemployed Leagues. In Chicago, Karl Borders, a settlement worker and
member of the Socialist Party, organized the Worker's Committee on
Unemployment. By 1931, Border's committee claimed a membership of 15,000.
Borders would go on to organize the Socialist Party's Federation of Unemployed
Workers Leagues, claiming a national membership of over 100,000 by 1932,
considerably more than the 40,000 estimated to belong to the NUC. 8
A bitter rivalry between the Communists and Socialists ensued over the
control and direction ofthe unemployed movement. Amidst Communist accusations
that the Socialists were social fascists and Socialist countercharges that the
Communists were totalitarians, the possibilities for one national organization seemed
91

dismal. But with the Communist Party's shift to the Popular Front strategy in the
mid-thirties, merger discussions began in 1934 and culminated in a new national
organization, the Worker's Alliance of America, now encompassing the NUC, the
Worker's League and previously unaffiliated councils. Overall, the 1936 merger
brought together a national organization of some 1,600 locals with an estimated
membership of over 600,000. The semblance of unity that marked the merger was
represented in its leadership as Socialist Party member David Lasser was named
Executive Secretary and Communist merrlber Herbert Benjamin organizational
secretary. 9

The Quandary of Organized Labor
At the onset of the Great Depression, the state of organized labor in the
United States was one of considerable weakness, both in terms of numbers and
political clout. With the virtual destruction of the revolutionary IWW in the wake of
the anti-Communist purges following World War I, the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) was the only national federation of labor unions. Established in 1886,
the AFL, unlike the IWW, had focused its efforts upon the development of craft
unions, mostly eschewing industrial workers. During the decade of the 1920s and
into the early 1930s, the AFL largely continued its practice of refusing to recognize
organizing efforts among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the bulk of the
American work force. As a consequence, the growth of the AFL first stagnated and
then declined precipitously. From a peak ofmembership in 1920, when 17% of the
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work force was unionized, AFL membership had in fact been steadily declining from
nearly five million to less than 2.5 million (or 9% of the work force) in 1930. 10
The AFL' s initial response to the deepening economic crisis was in keeping
with President Hoover's assurances that the crisis was temporary, and AFL leaders
advised their membership that an upswing would soon be forthcoming. Indeed,
fearful of federal intervention in the employment market, AFL President William
Green met with a conference of employers called by President Hoover in early 1930
and pledged the AFL would avoid any strikes during the temporary crisis in
exchange for a halt on wage cuts. Green would stand by this pledge in the summer
of 1930, even as 60 major companies imposed wage cuts on their workers. I I
Growing unrest among both employed and unemployed workers and their
efforts on a mass scale to organize would eventually modify the AFL's lack of
enthusiasm for unionization of industrial workers. But even after congressional
passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, which provided
federal sanction for the right of workers to organize unions, the AFL's response to
the ensuring wave of union organizing in the industrial sector was conditional. New
unions brought into the AFL as federal locals were deemed temporary and without
voting rights until they could be absorbed into one of the existing craft unions. As a
result, workers in factories were often split into a number of distinct craft unions,
weakening any opportunity for collective bargaining. In addition, the AFL's
discouragement of more militant organizing or bargaining tactics, such as the use of
the strike, ran counter to the sentiments of many unionizing industrial workers. I2
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The militant mood of workers and union organizers within the worsening
conditions of the economic crisis could not long tolerate the restraints of the AFL.
Proponents of a new industrial democracy movement, promoting a vertical basis of
organizing unions that included all workers in a shop or business, agitated inside and
outside of the AFL for the federation to open its ranks to the masses of industrial
workers in need of organizing. Among the first to experiment with developing a new
national federation of unions was the Communist Party's Trade Union Unity League.
Composed of relatively small unions with left-leaning or Communist leaderships, the
TUUL left the AFL in 1929, seeking to organize new unions and draw existing
unions out ofthe AFL. Eventually beset by internal criticism within the Communist
Party that the TUUL was engaging in the ideologically heretical work of dual
unionism, and unable to significantly expand its membership, the TUUL failed to
develop a new national union of industrial workers. It would remain for another
effort, embodied within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), to complete
this goal of the TUUL and provide a nationally potent organization for industrial
democracy. 13

The Crisis in Social Work
The response of the profession to the Great Depression initially resembled
that of the rest of the nation: confusion and uncertainty. Not unlike the AFL, social
work's leadership saw no immediate need for special measures or significant federal
intervention to deal with the temporary economic downturn. While increasing
applications for assistance from the unemployed were already stretching the
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resources of private charity agencies in early 1930, this upsurge in need was
expected to subside shortly. Indeed, even the more liberal Survey paid scant
attention to the stock market crash in a November 1929 issue, and the presence of
Porter Lee on Hoover's PECE committee assured the profession that the modest
public works program suggested by the committee would forestall any challenge to
the private nature of the profession's relief-giving. For as PECE had declared in its
statement of mission, its members would work to ensure that " ... a11 possible efforts
are made to provide each unemployed person with work, for work rather than charity
is not only their choice, but their right.,,14
Another measure of social work's relative confidence in the President and his
advisors could be traced to the support of Hoover's 1928 election by distinguished
leaders such as Jane Addams and Homer Folks. Even in his home state of New
York, popular governor Al Smith, Hoover's opponent in the election, failed to totally
enthrall the liberal wing of the social work establishment. While Smith enjoyed the
active support of the likes of Mary van Kleeck, Lillian Wald and William Hodson,
others were less enthusiastic in their support. Future New Dealer Joanna Colcord
conceded that there was little substantial difference between the candidates in terms
of their record on social services; likewise, Edward Devine tempered his support of
Smith by noting that Hoover was equally deserving of support among social workers.
Even Paul Kellogg, editor of Survey and a sometime socialist, admitted he admired
Hoover's cautious but socially progressive record. ls
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Despite the optimism within the profession that the Depression would prove
temporary, the economy continued to shudder and decline throughout 1930. By the
winter of 1931, Jacob Fisher recalls that there were few in the profession that did not
concede the depth and apparent long-tenn nature of the crisis:
As factories closed and the weeks piled up their dreary quotas of
the unemployed, the typical social worker rushed about in a frenzy
of activity compounded in equal parts of a recoil from any thinking
and a joyous self-immolation in a great crusade against hunger and
want. Doubt, hesitation, critical-mindedness were luxuries no one
could afford. The country was in the trenches and so were the
social workers. 16
Throughout the country, private charity organizations were swamped by unemployed
workers and their families seeking assistance. As growing numbers of applicants
stood in lines at relief agencies, sometimes stretching into the street, private charities
were overwhelmed by both the sheer magnitude of the need and by the escalating
costs required to meet that need. The economic collapse that was bankrupting
business was no more kind to the volunteer agencies; by spring of 1932 some 400
agencies in New York City alone had closed their doors. The city-funded Home
Relief Bureau, opened in 1931, was forced to turn away applicants by January of
1932 and would continue to briefly open and then close its rolls throughout the year
as emergency grants of funds were sporadically provided by Governor Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA).17
Nor did the psychiatric social workers escape the clutches of the deepening
Depression. The focus on the internal world of the client now emphasized in social
casework was suddenly incompatible with the concrete demands of relief-giving. As
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clinics closed and social workers left to supervise public relief agency personnel or
provide direct relief services, the opportunities for and seeming relevance of longer
term intensive treatment methodologies rapidly diminished. One psychiatric social
worker summed up what a growing number of social workers were now
experiencing,
The clients I was seeing didn't seek shoriJ;lg up of their ego
strength anymore, they wanted food in their family's bellies ...we
realized that the game had changed but we didn't know which way
to go. I knew that social work couldn't solve this so we started
looking at the government for answers. )8
Indeed, the profession's arena of control over relief giving was being
severely challenged. By 1931 it was clear that private charities could no longer
adequately respond to the massive character of unemployment and that the entire
system was in danger of imminent collapse. As states and cities began operating
their own relief bureaus, increasing numbers of untrained and uncredentialed relief
workers were hired to meet personnel needs that the small profession of social work
could not supply. Threatened by the profession's own inability to ameliorate poverty
within the confines of the voluntary agency, and concerned over the diminution of its
professional standards of training and practice in the public relief agencies, the
AASW moved towards support of federal responsibility for relief. As opposed to
clinical treatment issues, debate on the role of the federal government in relief
operations and the protection of professional standards in that relief dominated the
meetings of the NCSW in 1931 and 1932.)9
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Much had changed in the mood and direction of the profession since the
heady days of 1929. At that time, as Porter Lee elevated function over the cause of
refonn in social work's calling, William Hodson, executive director of the New York
City Welfare Council, had warned social workers of the pitfalls of engaging in
political activity:
...while the political support of men or parties raises problems for
the social worker in their most difficult form, open participation in
public affairs ... also presents difficulties for the obvious reason that
the social worker is not a free agent but the employee of the board
of directors of his organization. In the public mind his action may
be interpreted as having the sanction of the board, thus, by
implication, committing the board members and the organization
as a whole in a way which may be distasteful and embarrassing. 20
Even as the economic crisis deepened in 1930, NCSW President Miriam Van Waters
made no reference to it in her Presidential Address to the NCSW, instead buttressing
Porter's earlier proclamation of an objective, more politically neutral casework;
The family case worker and the psychiatric social workers are alike
in their reliance for treatment upon constructive attitudes, stressing
competence and adequacy rather than humility and dependence.
Thus the social worker is sharply differentiated from his ancestor,
the philanthropist. His attitude toward personality sets the social
worker far apart from the social reformer who adopts a program of
militant social welfare, and fights the opposition with hatred. In so
far as public opinion is aware of social work it identifies it with
reform or uplift movements. This is a mistake. There is evidence
that social workers derive from trends of thought quite distinct
from 'reformers.' Reformers have commonly a low opinion of
mankind. 21
But now in the grim times of 1932, the profession was rethinking its role and
responsibility in promoting public policy. The 1932 NCSW meeting in Philadelphia
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reflected the change in mood and tenor. As Survey correspondent Gertrude Springer
noted,

It was not a gay conference. There was no dancing in the hotels
after the evening meetings, no outbursts of community singing in
lounges and 10bbies ... All in all it was a deeply earnest Conference,
sober but not somber, determined but not despairing, purposeful
but not panicky. Not for years has a Conference in and out of
hours been so truly a forum of discussion. 22
Delegates now overwhelmingly supported the AASW's call for President Hoover to
provide federal support for public relief. The National Federation of Settlements
distributed resolutions they had adopted calling for federal intervention and the
enactment of unemployment insurance. William Hodson, unlike 1929, now exhorted
delegates that the profession, under the leadership of the AASW, must combine their
"knowledge and experience" into a program of legislative action and " ... the ever
greater burden of responsibility for public policy.,,23 At the same time, Hodson
urged social workers to recognize that the increasing number of untrained workers
being employed in relief efforts threatened a "debasing" of the profession and
required action to protect professional standards. 24
While the majority of speakers and delegates at the NCSW now
acknowledged the necessity of federal intervention, coupled with the profession's
consultation and leadership, an emerging radical wing within the profession began to
stake out a different alternative for social workers. Once again, Mary van Kleeck
would assume the role ofpolitical gadfly as she addressed the delegates. Reminding
the conference of the admonitions for national planning and an alliance with the
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labor movement that she and Roger Baldwin had made to the NCSW in 1924, van
Kleeck now urged delegates to support a fundamental restructuring of the nation:
I call attention to the fact that it is now eight years since that report
was made in Toronto and that neither in 1912 nor in 1924 was
there any reference to the idea of planning in the sense in which is
being discussed today. Since that date the experiment in planning
in Soviet Russia has emerged as a definite procedure. We must
clearly recognize that Soviet Russia is the only country in the
world which can present a demonstration of social economic
planning directed toward raising of the standards of living of all
people. I confess that I grow somewhat impatient with the efforts
made in this country to differentiate the current discussion of
planning from Russian planning. It seems to me unscientific thus
to eliminate consideration of an experiment which we should study
in order to discover not only its technique but its sources of
power. 25
Unlike the tepid response of 1924, this time van Kleeck moved the audience to loud
applause, such that one observer noted van Kleeck " ...was forced to get up and bow
before the applause died down."26 In 1932, van Kleeck's position to the left of the
mainstream was no longer as isolated as in 1924. Rather, van Kleeck was now
articulating the position of a new tendency in social work, the dissenting voices of a
self-proclaimed rank and file movement in social work.

The Rise of the Discussion Clubs and Practitioner Groups
As the profession struggled to cope with the challenges posed by the
economic crisis, many social workers searched for an individual and collective
understanding of the forces that had brought about such a massive economic collapse
and the avenues for recovery. For some, the confidence of the profession's
leadership in the established political order and the seeming obsession of the AASW
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on the more mundane issues of professional standards and membership requirements
was eerily out of touch with the sense of desperation experienced in the lives of their
clients and neighbors. Dissatisfied with the outlets of expression available through
professional channels, and seeking exposure to alternative, often radical,
explanations of and solutions for the crisis, a new forum for these mostly young
social workers emerged in New York City, the Social Workers Discussion Club. As
Jacob Fisher, an early participant and leader in the New York discussion club
explained,
Social workers in the early years of the Depression who felt
dissatisfied with the thinking of the social work establishment,
unhappy about the political and economic order, and anxious to do
something about these two evils, found that a natural first step was
a meeting to talk things over . You talked things over to find out
how many felt the way you did. When you had a like-minded
nucleus, you held a meeting to influence other social workers. In
time a following was established. 27
The New York Social Workers Discussion Club held its first meeting in the spring of
1931, with the avowed purpose ofproviding an " ... open forum for the analysis of
basic social problems and their relation to social work.,,28 Held in a rented hall, the
first meeting was billed as a debate on the causes and cures of economic depressions.
The New York club became a model for social workers in other cities and by 1932,
discussion clubs had been formed in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston. The
discussion clubs would continue to expand throughout the country, including cities
such as Baltimore, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Seattle, Los Angeles and San Francisco. 29
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For the next four years the discussion clubs did indeed serve as a forum for
debate and critical analysis as participants addressed such subjects as unemployment
relief, the role of psychiatry in social work, civil rights and the role oftrade unions in
social work. 30 The appeal of the clubs and the underlying conditions that made their
rapid expansion possible were outlined in a 1933 pamphlet published by the New
York club:
The chorus of voices calling for a new order grows louder. As
social workers with an expert knowledge of misery in all its
manifold forms, we cannot afford to remain outside the forces
shaping America to a new adjustment. We must be prepared to
contribute the full measure of our hard-won understanding ... Out of
these meetings has grown an enlargement of the social horizon, a
participation in and endorsement ofmovements of social
significance, vitalizing, after a decade of absorption in technics and
statistics. 31
While the clubs were billed as an op~ forum for discussion, not all social
workers who created and participated in the discussion clubs shared Fisher's more
benign explanation regarding their origin or purpose. Eleanor Cohen, a rank and file
social worker in Chicago, explains,
The [discussion] clubs were not a product of the [Communist]
Party, but we were instrumental in their organization and direction.
In Chicago, the Communist group in the club took the main
responsibility for their organization and direction. Of course, we
tended towards speakers that represented the views of labor, the
unemployed workers and the forces allied against social fascism.
To the best ofmy memory, the same was true in Cleveland, Los
Angeles, Seattle and most of the clubs. 32
Regardless of the dispute between Fisher and Cohen concerning the role of the
Communist Party in the development and management of the discussion clubs, the
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clubs clearly sought politically left analyses and speakers. As Fisher notes, the
young social workers attending the discussion clubs " ... found the 'Communist
thinking' expressed by the speakers a novel and refreshing experience. ,,33 But not all
the presentations apparently met the expectations of its audience. Fisher recalls one
particular meeting on the influence of social forces in literature featuring Mike Gold,
a prominent Communist writer and columnist for the New Masses and the Daily
Worker:

Contrary to the expectations of the C.P. members and sympathizers
who had organized the meeting, Gold made a less than
overwhelming impression on his social work audience. As a
speaker he was not the articulate persuasive advocate he was pen
in hand... Worse, he seemed to many of his auditors to be
patronizing them. Tired radicals and effete intellectuals, said Gold,
were becoming disillusioned with capitalism because they had
illusions to begin with. Raised eyebrows; was he talking about us?
Capitalism, Gold went on, produced cripples, insane men,
unemployed men, hungry children, and maladjusted virgins for
social workers to putter with. The social workers in the room
fidgeted; a few yawned; one young woman muttered loudly, 'What
does he think we are, clients?' Restless members of the audience
puffed furiously at their cigarettes. Some left while Gold was still
talking ... The communists may have a case, I thought, but they
would have to do better than this. 34
The discussion clubs soon moved beyond merely serving as a forum of
discussion; increasingly, they provided an organizational base for social action. In
New York City, members of the discussion club joined protests of the Harlem
Unemployment Council in the spring of 1931, participating in a march in Harlem
protesting discriminatory practices in the State Employment Service and the
inadequacy of relief services to unemployed African-Americans. The club officially
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endorsed a mass demonstration at city hall against unemployment in November of
1931 and raised funds for the first national hunger march on Washington, D.C. in

1932. The club also supported the Lundeen Bill (the Workers Unemployment and
Social Insurance Bill) and raised funds to support the Amsterdam Congress Against
War. 35
In 1934, the New York club made its first independent foray into political

action, fonning a committee to investigate relief practices within the city's
Emergency Home Relief Bureau (HRB). The committee report harshly criticized the
HRB for inadequate standards of relief, charging that relief allowances and rent
assistance funds were far below levels " ... allowing for minimum health and
decency.,,36 On May 15th , members of the committee,joined by Harry Lurie, Lillian
Robbins and John Slawson, prominent social workers in the Jewish federation
societies, met with public welfare department director, William Hodson, to present
their findings and recommendations. In a contentious meeting, the committee
demanded immediate increases in relief allowances, an abolition of residency
requirements for relief and a prohibition of evictions and foreclosures. Asked by the
committee to publicly support increased funding as well as the report's other
recommendations, Hodson demurred. While acknowledging that "The whole relief

picture is a flop" and personally agreeing with the minimum standards recommended
by the committee, Hodson rejected the committee's request that he openly support
their recommendations, reportedly telling the delegation that such a position would
" ...only get me in trouble.,,37 Following Hodson's rejection of the committee report,
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club members issued an open letter, distributing it to Hodson, employees of the
HRB, and the mayor. In the letter, the club outlined its recommendations and
version of the meeting with Hodson, condemning Hodson for his recalcitrance:
Such an attitude of fear on the part of a social worker in public
office assigns to social work the job of constantly apologizing for
pittances ... At the same time, we must condemn your
encouragement of police violence against the unemployed seeking
to gain those very standards approved by you in your statements to
the committee. 38
Similar activism marked other discussion clubs across the country. In
Philadelphia, club members joined with farmers and others to help distribute free
milk to the unemployed. Members of the Newark, New Jersey, club endorsed and
participated in strike activities of employees of the city's largest newspaper, The

Ledger. In Chicago, the largest discussion club outside of New York, club members
were active in raising funds for the legal defense of the Scottsboro Boys and labor
organizer Tom Mooney and participated in actions of the local unemployed councils.
The Chicago club was also noted for its early attention to personnel standards and
practices in relief agencies. The Chicago club actively publicized and organized
against relief agency practices of unpaid vacations, uncompensated overtime and
salary reductions imposed by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission. 39
As the discussion clubs of the emerging rank and file movement proliferated
throughout the country, another movement, less politically-conscious than the
discussion clubs, began to develop within AASW chapters during 1933. The socalled "practitioners' movement',40 represented the concerns of social workers in the
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AASW who feared the collapse of professional standards and training in public relief
agencies. Particularly concerned with salary cuts being instituted in relief agencies,
the social workers who joined practitioner groups also represented a growing rift
within the AASW between leaders of AASW chapters, usually agency executives,
and regular chapter members who were primarily employed as direct service
practitioners. Believing that AASW chapter leaders were unconcerned with
declining salaries (and in fact, often the instigators of such wage reductions within
their agencies) and discouraged the participation of practitioner members in chapter
decision-making, practitioners formed ad hoc study and discussion groups in three
AASW chapters in Chicago, New York and St. Louis. 41
While membership in practitioner groups often overlapped with the social
work discussion clubs, the agenda of the practitioner groups was considerably more
tame than that of the clubs. The first practitioner group, formed in Chicago, in fact
articulated no specific program, stating that it " ...wanted merely a medium in which
workers might be free to express themselves on any subject with interested them.,,42
To ensure this free expression, membership in the group was extended to all AASW
chapter members with the specific exclusion of chapter executives. In a similar
fashion, the New York group accused the AASW chapter of confIning itself " ... to a
small inner self-perpetuating circle of executives, which prepares the program, steers
committees, and makes all important decisions"; accordingly, the group concentrated
its efforts on providing the " ... younger worker the opportunity for leadership and
[preparation] to assume a more active role in the chapter itself.,,43 In St. Louis, the
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practitioner group was less hostile, conducting several studies and making
recommendations to the AASW chapter on issues pertaining to personnel standards
and training for social workers in the public relief agencies.

44

While the practitioner groups would never formally expand beyond these
three AASW chapters, they provided another indication beyond the discussion clubs
of the unrest that social workers were feeling within the confines of the AASW and
the growing concerns that social workers were expressing about the worsening
workplace conditions in relief agencies and private charities. Despite their limited
influence and number, the practitioner groups also served an important function for
the emerging rank and file movement: providing entree with the AASW. In this
regard, Fisher notes:
The movement's leadership recognized that within the top councils
of the AASW there were people like [Mary] van Kleeck and
[Harry] Lurie, who could influence the association to take a more
'progressive' position on relief, social insurance, and jobs for the
unemployed, and that cooperation was possible and even useful on
specific issues. The existence of the practitioner groups could
facilitate such cooperation. 45
Social Work Unions Take Root

The initial stirrings of the discussion clubs and practitioner groups
represented a growing consciousness within the profession that the conditions of the
Depression required not only social action on behalf of clients but a focused attention
on the working conditions experienced by social workers themselves. While the
practitioner groups were limited in merrlbership to AASW members, the discussion
clubs embraced the growing number of uncredentialed relief workers that
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represented a significant proportion of the staff in public relief agencies. The rapid
influx of these new, largely uncredentialed social workers was a direct result of the
New Deal programs instituted by the newly-elected President, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Within months of Roosevelt's taking office, a wide array of legislation was enacted
to restructure the economy and provide relief to a beleaguered population, including
the Civil Works Administration (CWA), the Public Works Administration (PWA),
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) the Farm Credit Act, the Railroad
Coordination Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, The Home Owners Act, and
the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). In the area of direct relief, Roosevelt also
acted quickly. On May 12, 1933 he signed into law the Federal Emergency Relief
Act (FERA), providing some five hundred million dollars for immediate use by
states for relief of the unemployed. The FERA would prove to be the major source of
direct relief in the early years of the New Deal, providing money to be distributed
among broad categories of the poor and unemployed. Its broad discretion in granting
relief would swell relief roles, so much so that by 1934 some twenty million would
be on public relief. 46
As states expanded their relief services under the terms of FERA, thousands
of caseworkers were required in order to process applications and determine need.
With only 186 students receiving an M.S.W. degree nationwide in 1933, the
profession did not contain nearly the number of social workers required to provide
services.
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Instead, relief agencies looked to the unemployed themselves, and ~any

of the new case workers were hired through the CWA and PWA public works
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programs. Among these young relief workers, the poor working conditions of relief
agencies and resentment of credentialed social workers who were often employed as
supervisors, provided a potent combination in favor of unionization. Bronislaus
Zukas, an uncredentialed relief worker with New York City's Emergency Home
Relief Bureau in the early 1930s recalls the sometimes explosive atmosphere:
We were angry. The government, big business and the AASW
were all in bed together. They kept saying everything would be
fine, that Hoover and then Roosevelt were better than living with
radicals, Communists and unions. Our offices were terrible. They
were overcrowded, smelled like toilets ... W e didn't control how
many clients we had, there was no overtime or compensation.
Sometimes I worked 12 hours a day, six days a week for about
thirty bucks a week ... The MSW's were condescending to us
'untrained' caseworkers. They acted like they were the only ones
who knew how to run things. Hell, we were the ones who had
been unemployed, we knew what it meant to be poor, not
them ... we had to build unions. 48
Despite the tensions rampant within the public relief agencies, it was in the
private volunteer agencies that social work unionization would first take hold. Like
all private charity organizations, New York's Jewish Federation Societies were
experiencing severe financial pressures in 1931 as its constituent agencies struggled
to meet the increasing needs of the Jewish community. In November 1931,
Federation officials announced an across-the-board wage cut for all employees,
including nurses, social workers, doctors, porters and clerical workers. The
Association ofFederation Social Workers (AFSW), established in 1926 to represent
social workers' concerns with professional standards and training, was forced to
rethink the cooperative arrangements it had previously held with agency
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administrators. Many of the AFSW's leadership were also members of the New
York Workers Discussion Club, and they were instrumental in moving the AFSW to
reconstitute itself as the Association of Federation Workers (AFW), now more in the
fonn of a collective bargaining union representing all classes of employees,49
The immediate hopes of the AFW to roll-back the wage cuts and win
recognition as the union ofFederation employees were quickly dashed, as Federation
officials refused to meet with them. After repeated attempts, the union
representatives were finally granted a meeting with the federation's executive
director, who promptly rejected all union demands. Unwilling to go on strike, the
AFW could do no more than publicize the plight of its members in the press and
struggle to maintain its membership through the development of ' 'worker's councils"
in the Federation's constituent agencies,50
Following a second salary cut in the fall of 1932, the AFW was more
successful. Organizing efforts to combat the cuts rapidly expanded. Following a
mass protest meeting and a petition drive among Federation employees, the board of
directors announced a 95% restoration of cuts. Buoyed by the restorations, AFW
membership rose to over 400 by September 1933, and the AFW now clearly
distinguished their interests with that of the federation board:
The higher income class, who are represented by the Boards of
private welfare agencies, set the social work program and
contribute the funds that pay our wages. By reason of this position
they collectively constitute our employer. If they do not want an
adequate social work program they should be prepared to face the
consequences. Theirs is a grave responsibility.51
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But the restorations proved short-lived. Shortly after partially restoring the cuts, the
Federation, now faced with a ruling that FERA funds could not be used by private
agencies, announced a 20% cut in 1933. Once again the AFW swung into action,
holding a mass protest meeting and this time producing a petition signed by over 700
employees. 52
Following a year of stormy and unsuccessful nego~iations, on February 7,
1934, the AFW staged the first recorded work stoppage in social work history. Five
hundred Federation employees left their workplace, gathering for a mass rally at a
local high school with hundreds of supporters representing unemployed councils and
other unions. Observers reported a spirited meeting, highlighted by the reading of a
letter of support from Mary van Kleeck and the appearance of delegations from the
Graduate School for Jewish Social Work and the New York School of Social Work.
Following the work stoppage, the Federation board rescinded all previous salary
cutS. 53
The initial, though halting success ofthe AFW in organizing social workers
was quickly, and more successfully, emulated by New York City's public relief
workers. Relief workers employed by the city's Emergency Home Relief Bureau
(HRB) held an initial organizational meeting of the Emergency Home Relief Bureau
Employees Association (HRBEA) in December 1933. While only 100 of the 5,000
workers employed by the HRB attended, a continuing series ofmass meetings were
held during the month, and by the fourth meeting over 1,000 employees had joined
the union. In January 1934, a committee from the HRBEA met with HRB
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administration seeking recognition and presenting a list of union demands. Faced
with the rapid consolidation of the union among its employees, the HRB recognized
the union and agreed to a majority of the union's key demands, including: wage
increases ranging from 14 - 80% for guards, matrons, clerical staff, bookkeepers and
relief workers; the abolition of enforced overtime; coverage by industrial
compensation insurance; provision for sick and vacation leave; and the reinstatement
of several employees previously dismissed for what the union considered unjustified
grounds. 54
The considerable victory of the HRBEA propelled it into the leadership of
now emerging social worker unions in other cities around the country. With the
subsequent transfer of the HRB into the city's welfare department in 1935, the
Association changed its name to the Association of Workers in Public Relief
Agencies (AWPRA) and began organizing the entire department. In August 1935
the A WPRA, now with nearly 5,000 members, entered into a formal collective
bargaining agreement with the city. The importance of this agreement was
prominently publicized by Social Work Today:
August 29 will be remembered as a memorable date. On that day a
collective agreement between the Home Relief Bureau of New
York and the [AWPRA] ...went into effect, the first of its kind in
social work. The Association .. .is the largest of its kind in the
country. The precedent thus established may well serve as a
powerful stimulus to demands by employee associations in other
cities for similar agreements. 55
In fact, the success of both the AFW and the A WPRA in organizing social
workers and relief workers helped to launch similar organizing efforts throughout the
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country in 1934 and 1935. In Philadelphia, over 200 employees turned out to fonn
the Association of Philadelphia County Relief Board Employees, despite resistance
from Relief Board Executive Director Dorothy Kahn, a national leader within the
AASW. Welfare workers in Detroit fonned the Association ofPublic Welfare
Workers, and in Cleveland, the Family Service Workers Association won salary
increases for caseworkers in the county's Relief Administration after threatening a
work stoppage. Similar wage increases were won by the Associated Relief Workers
of Allegheny County in Pittsburgh. Members of the Chicago discussion club fonned
the Federation of Social Service Employees within the Illinois Emergency Relief
Commission. Keeping with the club's previous interest in personnel and training
standards, the Federation established a "Committee on Standards of Work and
Working Conditions," including representatives from the city's largest social service
agencies. 56 Union organizing in the private charities also met with success,
including employees in agencies in New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Chicago,
Cincinnati, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis. All told, by the end of 1935 over
forty unions in private and public relief agencies had been established throughout the
country in over twenty cities. With the creation of the Administrative Workers'
Union of the Alameda County State Emergency Relief Administration, the rank and
file movement had now moved across the country from the east to the west coast. 57

The Birth of Social Work Today
The rising tide of unionization among social workers found a national voice
in the pages of Social Work Today, ajournal established by the New York Social
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Workers Discussion Club. 58 From its inception in 1934, Social Work Today would
be recognized as the quasi-official journal ofthe rank and file movement, reporting
not only on the progress of unionization but articulating the political and
philosophical views of the movement's leadership. In its opening editorial Social
Work Today, unlike journals such as the thoroughly mainstream Compass and the

liberal leaning Survey, clearly placed itself at odds with the social work profession:
[Social Work Today] aims to meet the need for a frank, critical
analysis ofbasic social problems and their relation to social work
not obtainable through established professional channels. Its
province will be all of social welfare. It will promote an interest in
the fundamental reorganization society must undergo to provide
security for all, and will support labor's struggle for a greater
measure of control as the basic condition for the reorganization. 59

In staking Social Work Today's claim as an alternative voice within the profession,
the editorial attempted to locate the economic and political bases for the emergence
of the rank and file movement in social work:
Under the cumulative pressure of four years of continuous contact
with the victims of our chaotic social order, some have learned to
question the traditional dogmas of the profession and to examine
critically the shibboleths of 'awareness,' 'bearing witness,' 'social
engineering,' and 'community integration.' They are painfully
aware of many things that do not submit to awareness. They
wonder who is doing the engineering and whether it is social.
They suspect that talk of community engineering is a pleasant
fiction to hide the ugliness of our class society. They are sick of
merely bearing witness.
There is a growing body which is applying in another spirit the
charge to all social workers, to know their clients and to help them
free themselves. They have heard the voice of labor speak
compellingly in its own behalf. They are coming to feel that
whatever skill and knowledge they may have can be put to most
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effective use supporting by publicity and action the organization of
labor and its fight for adequate relief and social insurance. 60
Indeed, the first issue of the journal took seriously the editorial's promise of a

"frank" analysis regarding social crises and the profession, marking its debut as a
continual thorn in the side of the mainstream profession. 61 Its lead article presented a
satirical and critical account of a recent AASW conference convened to define the
organization's position regarding federal relief policies. Taking pains to note for
readers that the conference had no apparent intention of deciding on such positions,
the article acridly described the AASW participants as " ...predominantly middleaged, predominantly women, predominantly executives. Most the talking is done by
the men. The women take notes. ,,62
Noting a contentious exchange on the fate of the Civil Works Administration
between Harry Lurie and "lean and cocksure" FERA administrator Harry Hopkins,
the article highlights Lurie's admonition to the conference that applause for Hopkins
should not be taken as support of government reliefprograms. 63 The article
concludes its account, whimsically describing the conference's adjournment:

Finis. The Committee on recommendations reports in the evening,
but why stay, people ask, it's all over. Delegates sit about in the
lobby and gossip. Shall we take the seven 0' clock train or the
eight 0' clock? The women with the bleached hair and velvet
wraps pass through to dinner. 64
Other articles of a more serious tone reported on the National Convention Against
Unemployment, a report of the Joint Committee on Unemployment's statement
before Congress in support ofmassive increases in federal relief efforts, issues of
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racism within the programs of the National Recovery Act and a brief history of
unionization efforts in social work. 65
The appearance of Social Work Today received mixed reviews from rival
professional journals. While the publication of Social Work Today was ignored in
the pages of Compass, Survey noted in its arrival in its ApriI-1934 issue:
There are undoubtedly in this troubled land many social workers
even among the 'predominantly middle-aged, predominantly
women' at whom SOCIAL WORK TODAY takes a little fling, who
'are sick of merely bearing witness.' They will find in SOCIAL
WORK TODAY a forthright expression of their impatience and of
their pressure-mindedness. 66
The other major journal in the field, Social Service Review, took a more welcoming
stance:
An active group of New York social workers are to be
congratulated in having organized for the publication of a new
professional journal. This magazine is to appear monthly and
should be an asset to a profession in which, as yet, so small a
periodical literature has been developed. The Review shares with
other social workers an appreciation for their undertaking. A new
publication in these days, calls for courage, and the New York
group has shown that courage is not lacking. 67
Through the pages of Social Work Today, the incipient rank and file
movement would develop and express its program of unionism and progressive
social change. From an initial circulation of 1,000, the journal would increase its
subscription base to nearly 5,000 by 1936 as discussion clubs and union members
sold SUbscriptions and raised funds for its operation. 68 Opening its pages to both the
left wing of the profession and the representatives of the Unemployed Councils, the
Socialist and Communist parties, and organized labor, the journal tackled a broad
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range of social and political issues and causes. In later years, the journal's critical
analysis would lead it and the social work unions it represented to be condemned by
both congressional investigators and influential members of the profession as
controlled by the Communist Party, charges that would help lay the groundwork for
the eventual destruction of the rank and file movement.

The Rank and File Organizes
With the rapid proliferation of social work unions nationwide, the presence of
numerous discussion clubs and practitioner groups, and a new journal representing
the cause of progressive social work unionism, leaders within the rank and file
movement laid plans for the development of a national organization in 1934. Rank
and file activists attending the 1934 NCSW voted to create a National Coordinating
Committee (NCC) of social work unions, charging the publishers of Social Work

Today with planning and coordination ofa meeting to form the organization. 69
Following the conference, the executive committee of the New York Social Workers
Discussion Club polled rank and file groups throughout the country seeking their
opinions on the role of such a national coordinating body, suggesting procedures for
its development and operation, and soliciting participation at a founding convention.
In December 1934 the club issued a formal call for a February 1935 conference in
Pittsburgh. In its call, the club outlined the proposed functions of the NCe:
The dissemination of information and advice on practitioner activities.
The promotion of protective organizations and discussion clubs.
The promotion of rank and file sentiment for adequate standards
for workers in public agencies.
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The promotion ofrank and file sentiment for adequate social
welfare standards.
The coordination ofpractitioner activities at National
Conferences.70
The first national convention of rank and file groups opened its three-day
meeting on February 22 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. A report from the conference's
credentials committee recorded 45 delegates representing 30 organizations.
Seventeen of the represented groups were identified as protective organizations
(unions), six as discussion clubs, four were classified as practitioner groups, and
three groups represented unemployed councils or other organizations. The total
membership represented in these 30 groups was impressive, totaling 8,810.
Delegates clearly represented the direct service orientation of the unions; 32 of the
delegates were caseworkers (19 from public agencies and 13 from private agencies),
with the rest consisting of supervisors, clerical workers, research workers and
unemployed delegates. 71
At the opening session, delegates were treated to the reading of formal
greetings from organizations that could not attend as well as the ideological leaders
of the movement. Mary van Kleeck's message congratulated the convention,
callings its efforts"...of great importance when social workers must relate
themselves to industrial workers and those in other professions in united program for
social security.,,72 Bertha Reynolds assured delegates in her message that " ... the
convention is certain to make history. It is for you who are facing the issues of this
critical time most courageously to shape the future of social work.,,73 True to his
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explicit politics, Roger Baldwin's remarks particularly stirred the delegates:
"Warmest greetings to those of you who are carrying on a vital job begun by pioneer
social workers in the class struggle. We were few those days. You are many and
may you be many more.,,74
Over the next three days, delegates laid the foundation for a new national
body, the National Coordinating Committee of Rank and File Groups in Social Work
(NCC). The NCC was conceived as a center for the exchange and coordination of
information and advise on the organization of rank and file unions, to advocate for
adequate relief standards and public works programs, and to coordinate
" ... cooperative action with organized labor in their struggles for the right to
collective bargaining, and for the defense of civil liberties. ,,75 A committee to lead
the activities of the NCC was also established consisting of Jacob Fisher as
Chairman, David Kanes of the Philadelphia County Relief Board Employees
Association as eastern regional vice-chairman, Joseph Levy of the Chicago
Federation of Social Service Employees, midwestern regional vice-chair, and
Bernard Riback, president of New York's EHRB Employees Association as
Secretary.76
Reflecting the rank and file movement's primary concerns with workplace
security and the face of public relief policies, considerable debate went into the
adoption of related reports and recommendations. In their report, "A National Social
Welfare Program," the convention decried the inadequacy of New Deal programs,
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accusing the Roosevelt administration of abandoning the needs ofthe unemployed to
satisfy the desires of business:
The social security program of the Administration proceeds upon
the basis of 'sound caution' and consideration of the 'capacity of
industry to pay,' rather than upon a true evaluation of the needs of
the workers of America. 77
The report equally, but less directly, criticized the AASW and the mainstream of the
profession for its general support of the New Deal and its remoteness from the
victims of the Depression:
Will social workers, as a large professional group, remain aloof
from ... a people's movement? The attempts they have made to
introduce proposals without the active participation of those who
have the most to gain from them, have proved to be either impotent
or deliberately misleading. The critical nature of the problem of
insecurity with which the American people is faced, will
increasingly force social workers to take sides. 78
The report concluded with a summary of the rank and file's estimation of the
fundamental nature of the economic crisis:
The underlying conflict broadly is between Labor and Capital.
Social workers should seek to understand fully the nature of this
contlict, the economic and political power that goes with the
concentrated control ofwealth, and the sometimes brutal forms
through which wealth defends itself. Unparalleled economic
power yields only to economic pressure. Labor, by force of
necessity, finds itself in the front line trenches in the struggle for
security.79
Convention delegates were equally strident in their demands for the right of
workers to engage in collective bargaining in public and private social welfare
agencies. Condemning the growing phenomenon of retrenchment in both sectors,
the convention established a program for its unions, including: open hearings for
120

workers threatened with dismissal; mandatory yearly salary increases; the principle
of equal pay for equal work; adequate housing and working conditions in agencies;
the abolition of compulsory overtime and quotas; reductions in caseloads; and
minimum standards for vacation, sick leave, and maternity leave. Finally, the
program established the primacy of unions, not professional associations, in ensuring
adequate working conditions:
The Convention recognizes as primary in importance the
employer-employee relationship between rank and file social
workers and administrative authorities and executives. Workers in
social agencies are subject to the same economic hazards as
workers in industry and commerce. This is equally true of
professional and non-professional workers in social agencies. We
therefore endorse the principle of protective or§anization as the
most effective method of attaining these ends. 8
In addition to these major reports, the convention adopted a number of

resolutions, including support of the Lundeen Bill on unemployment and social
insurance, funding ofa new Federal Works Program, and support of legislation to
allow collective bargaining in all federally-funded agencies and programs.
Condemning recent dismissals of a number of social workers involved in union
organizing, the convention called upon FERA to investigate the circumstances of
these dismissals and prevent what they considered discrimination based on union
involvement. Finally, the convention adopted a resolution opposing all forms of
racial discrimination and directed the NCC to hold all future meetings in facilities
with non-discrimination policies in regard to meetings, sleeping quarters, and dining
accommodations. ,,81
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As the Pittsburgh convention came to a close, delegates might have reflected
on the dramatic changes that had occurred in the profession in a period ofjust five
years. The relative confidence and complacency in the profession of 1929 had been
shaken to its core, its hold on the field of social welfare now under challenge
externally and internally. From the outside, a dramatic shift from private charity to
public reliefhad undennined the profession's hegemony over both relief policy and
practices. Internally, a new group of social workers had arisen to challenge
traditional conceptions of the professional social worker and of the relationship of
social workers to their employers, now successfully organizing a national
organization of nearly 9,000 members. And when rank and file delegates would
convene for their second national convention in 1936, their ranks would swell to
some 12,000. While not all the members of the affiliated organizations of the NCC
were social workers, the rank and file movement now could claim a membership
larger than that of the AASW (which did not achieve a membership of over 10,000
until 1940).82
For the leaders of the profession, they could find comfort in the close alliance
they had attained with the Roosevelt administration through the presence of Harry
Hopkins, Frances Perkins, Ewan Clague and other leading social workers in the New
Deal brain trust. While the primary responsibility ofrelief had now shifted from the
private sector to the federal government, at least the AASW had a place at the table.
But as the rank and file movement began to assert the power of both its numbers and
its critique of the profession, there were reasons for continuing concern. For those
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who read the open letter to social workers from the NCC, distributed at the 1933
NCSW and published in Social Work Today, the threat may have appeared quite real
indeed:
We appeal not only to the rank and file in this letter, but to all
social workers who value their professional integrity and who seek,
above all, to have it grounded in the welfare of the
American ...peoples. There are tasks which you cannot shirk, tasks
for all social workers inside and outside the rank and file
movement who cannot accept a program of reduction in the
standard of living of the people of... America; who stand fast
against attacks on civil liberties; against racial discrimination;
against all devices leading to fascism in America, whether open or
disguised.
There are organizations thorough which you can play an important
role, the American Association of Social Workers, state and local
conferences, the various other professional groups in the field of
social work. You can do much to align these organizations into a
common front with us against the forces of reaction and despair.
The road for unity on our common issues is very great. 83
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CHAPTER 4:
THE RANK AND FILE VS. THE PROFESSION

Professionalism: An attitude characterized by a morbid concern with
the advantages which accrue from a state ofsuspended
animation ... The term professionalism describes the unwillingness of
the old-time leadership ofthe professions to engage in any action
which might bring them in line with changes in the social setting. In
social work it includes opposition to union organization and to
(Social Work Today)
protest. l

As delegates to the 1934 National Conference of Social Work gathered for
their annual meeting in Kansas City a mixed mood filled the air. The country was
suffering through its fifth year ofthe economic depression, and any hopes that
President Roosevelt's New Deal would bring a quick end to the crisis were now
seemingly illusory. A year before, the NCSW conference in Detroit enjoyed an air
of heady optimism as Harry Hopkins, one of social work's own and an architect in
Roosevelt's recovery program, headlined the conference with the promise of better
times. Now, while proud of their representation and influence within the
administration, social workers in Kansas City were groping for a sense of direction:
The glowing enthusiasm with which they had left the Detroit
meeting a year before was cold and dead. Qualified promises
could no longer stir them. Dreams had been lost in confusion and
they saw nothing ahead but hard reality. 2
Still, the leadership of the NCSW and the AASW were loyal to the President's
recovery program, and the conference agenda was replete with presentations from
New Dealers such as Rexford Tugwell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, and one
of the members of Roosevelt's New Deal brain trust, Harry Hopkins, administrator
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of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and Aubrey Williams, assistant
administrator of FERA. Indeed, just three months earlier Roosevelt had sent
greetings to an AASW sponsored Conference on Governmental Objectives in which
he promised " ... social workers and I have the same objectives in common - social
justice for everyone.,,3 Accordingly, the conference planning committee and NCSW
President William Hodson, a close colleague of Hopkins and director of the New
York City Home Relief Bureau, had crafted the conference to buttress the
profession's partnership with the administration's New Deal. The conference,
recalled Bertha Reynolds,
... promised to be a New Deal Conference... Many social workers
felt that, with our profession represented in the cabinet by Harry
Hopkins and Frances Perkins, we had arrived and could give
leadership in welfare matters which had hitherto been denied to
us. 4
And as the conference got underway Tugwell invoked the New Deal spirit, calling
on social workers to

cont~nue

their support of the administration, even if the

expected outcomes were now more limited:
I would see you enlisted as soldiers not in a new cause but in an
old one. I would ask your loyalty not to a new faith but to an old
one which is struggling to return to a lost democracy; it is trying to
do it through a discipline of groups which opposes the
individual...The most you can do for people is to discipline the
institutions and forces which are inimical to the individual and so
to provide freedom of action. You cannot forever go on providing
subsistence for the idle at government expense. 5
But neither Tugwell, Hopkins or the conference planners were prepared for the
events of the following day.
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Once again, Mary van Kleeck would challenge the profession in a
presentation, entitled "Our Illusions Regarding Government." Interest in van Kleeck
and her presentation had been building up prior to and during the conference. In
1933, van Kleeck had startled the profession when she responded to her appointment
on the President's Advisory Council of the United States Labor Service by resigning
at its first meeting, citing her opposition to what she considered the anti-union
character of the National Recovery Administration (NRA). From her position as
chair of the subcommittee on labor policy for the American Civil Liberties Union,
van Kleeck had also recently written Roosevelt on behalf ofthe organization
expressing its opposition to the NRA. In addition to her criticism of the NRA, van
. Kleeck' s outspoken support for the rank and file movement was well know within
the profession, as was her even more controversial and frank admiration of the
Soviet Union and its national planning system. Following a visit to the Soviet Union
in 1932, van Kleeck had published glowing reports on Soviet national planning
efforts in professional journals and in the pages of Soviet Russia Today, drawing the
ire of many in the profession'S leadership.6
The backdrop ofinterest in van Kleeck's presentation was intensified the
second morning of the conference. The day before, van Kleeck had addressed a
meeting of the Urban League, and morning newspapers contained reports of her
admonition to the League that its middle-class composition could not provide
leadership to the masses of black workers. 7 As the conference session now got
underway a correspondent from Survey noted the degree of anticipation:
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Everything that happened afterward at the Conference must be
viewed in light of the psychology engendered at the meeting on
May 22 when 1500 people jammed into a hall half designed for a
third that number, blocked aisles and exits, and equally endangered
themselves in their determination to hear Miss van Kleeck discuss
Our Illusions Regarding Government. 8
van Kleeck did not disappoint the audience, focusing her remarks on what she
considered two prevailing theories regarding the form of government. van Kleeck
described the first theory as a mistaken belief that the state was a benign institution
apart from transitory conflicting interests and ultimately reflective of democratic
governance in the betterment of the public good, a theory to which van Kleeck
ascribed the misguided loyalty of most social workers and which characterized the
political agendas of the profession. Calling such beliefs an illusion, van Kleeck
argued that, in fact, a second theory of government better described the current
situation in the United States: government serves and is an instrument of the
strongest economic powers in a nation. In the case of the United States, van Kleeck
argued that the power of capital so dominated government functioning that the
primary interest of government was the protection of the interests of big business:
The basic conflict of interest between labor and capital is too clear
to need proof here. Our illusions regarding government arise out
of a refusal to recognize these conflicts. They assume that the
government is above the struggle and that if social workers can
win the government to their program they will have done their part
in establishing that elusive thing we call 'social justice.,9
As van Kleeck expounded on her thesis that the inadequacy of New Deal relief
programs represented the administration's collusion with business over the interests
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of workers, she concluded with an attack on the profession's close alliance with the
Roosevelt administration:
Social workers are accepting important positions in various
branches of government in this country. Those of you who believe
that that is the way you can best serve must look well to the
significance of mass protests which are disturbing your working
hours. Will social workers continue to bear the brunt of these
protests against politicians in alliance with the property
interests ... or will social workers rather look upon themselves as
spokesmen for these protests ... A clearer view will inevitably lead
to some refusals to take governmental positions if these demand, as
many do, that social workers ...will work as apologists for the
government of the day.
...social workers need alignment with other workers, not drawing
their inspiration from the relation of social worker to client, but
rather identifying themselves as fellow-workers ...not tempered to
the 'temper' of the administration and Congress but to the needs of
the working people, whose standards of living should be the
primary and indeed sole concern of all branches of social work. to
The audience response to van Kleeck was, according to Survey correspondent
Gertrude Springer, "electric":
The younger and more volatile rose as to a trumpet-call. The
soberest were shaken. Even the numbers who only faintly knew
what it was all about reacted in a way that can only be described as
a shot in the arm. From that moment a good part of the
Conference threw its earlier concerns to the winds and went off in
full cry behind leaders of one gospel or another. I I
Reaction from the conference organizers was swift. The following day,
Conference President William Hodson, in an act unprecedented in NCSW history,
issued a public rebuke of van Kleeck's assault upon the New Deal. Objecting to van
Kleeck's call for delegates to "repudiate" the Roosevelt administration, Hodson
made his position clear, "I, for one, am still willing to throw my lot with the present
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national administration, reserving always the right to differ and to criticize as a
friend and not as an enemy.,,12 Harry Hopkins also responded to van Kleeck's
speech, declaring "We who serve the government have no apologies to make," and,
in response to a question regarding what political strategies the profession should
engage in declared, "Before becoming very convinced of the brand of political action
to adopt we need group study and discussion.,,13
Under the leadership of van Kleeck, rank and file social workers vied for
ideological domination of the conference. Buoyed by their recent successes in
organizing unions in public relief agencies, they made their presence known in
plenary sessions and ad-hoc meetings. Following Hodson's condemnation of van
Kleeck, rank and file delegates organized a rump session attended by nearly 1,000
conference delegates voting to censure Hodson. They again turned out in force when
van Kleeck responded to Hodson in a second speech, "Common Goals of Social
Work and Labor." In a final session on the impact of the NRA, van Kleeck held the
floor alone as her two co-presenters, John Frey of the AFL and Frances Haas of the
National Labor Board failed to appear. Reiterating her opposition to the NRA, van
Kleeck warned her audience that the nature of the NRA represented a " ...corporation
controlled form of labor organization under the Fascism which has been evolving
within the framework of the New Deal.,,14
The controversies so apparent at the Kansas City NCSW served to clearly
demarcate the growing differences between the programs and philosophies of the
rank and file movement and those of the mainstream of the profession. These
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differences would constitute sharply diverging views regarding both the New Deal
and the form and function of the profession. The rank and file's emphasis on
unionization and identification with the industrial workers movement would place it
far to the left of the mainstream profession in its initial opposition to the New Deal
and its active support of left and progressive causes over the next decade. The labor
orientation of the movement would similarly challenge the traditionally professional
and politically neutral definition of social work that many in the movement saw as
representative ofthe AASW and much of the profession's leadership.

The Rank and File in the New Deal
The left progressive political analysis that informed the participants of the
early discussion clubs moved with them into the emerging rank and file movement of
the early 1930s and the unions in which they often assumed leadership. Guided by
the radical politics of the movement's mentors such as Roger Baldwin and Mary van
Kleeck, and nurtured in the close alliance of the unions with left leaning
organizations of the unemployed, a burgeoning peace movement and more radical
expressions of the civil rights movement, the initial response of the rank and file
movement to the New Deal was decidedly hostile.
Mary van Kleeck's warning to social workers at the 1934 NCSW conference
on the collusion between business and the government exemplified the general tenor
of the rank and file movement's early reactions to the programs of the New Deal.
While initially supporting federal responsibility for relief efforts, rank and file
leaders soon characterized what they considered the meager programs of the New
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Deal as evidence of a growing trend towards social fascism in the United States. The
pages of Social Work Today in 1934 and 1935 were replete with articles by the
movement's leaders warning social workers of the dangers of this creeping fascism
as represented in the NRA, military control of the Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) and the administration's reluctance to embrace the right ofworkers to
collectively bargain. IS In Social Work Today's second issue, editor Jacob Fisher
summarized the movement's position:
As big industry moves into closer alliance with the state to retain
its strangle hold upon the nation, liberalism translates its historic
belief in man as a free agent into contemporary terms and demands
the end of laissez-faire, playing into the hands ofbig industry.
Behind the call for the abundant life the slow fascization of
American economic life matures and takes hold ... We are today in a
period of declining capitalism and fascism fits the mood better.
Creature of a middle-class that espoused liberalism ... and will turn
to fascism tomorrow, social work cannot escape the fundamental
realignments that society is undergoing today. 16
Echoing Fisher, Eduard Lindeman also warned the journal's readers that the choices
before them were stark:
For our period of history the two major polarizations are
Communism on the one hand and Fascism on the other. The
Fascist pattern is dominated wherever it appears by the open
dictatorship of big industry which finds it necessary to take over
the apparatus of the state to strengthen its hold on a shaky social
and economic structure. And since Fascism represents in essence
only another phase of capitalism [unemployment] continues in all
its severity.I7
The warnings of van Kleeck, Fisher and Lindeman concerning the threat of
fascism inherent within the New Deal closely mirrored the position of the
Communist Party during its so-called "third period," raising early questions among
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some in the AASW that the movement was in the "Communist camp.,,18 Such
concerns had some merit. In fact, the origins of what would be referred to as the
social fascist theories of the early 1930s were directly traced from the Comintern's
Tenth Plenum held in Moscow in 1929. Proclaiming that the revolutionary
movement had passed through a period ofrevolutionary upsurge between 1917 
1924, followed by a second period of capitalism's temporary stabilization, the
Comintern now determined that a third period had emerged. This new period
marked the worldwide economic crisis of capitalism that would, in the Comintern' s
estimation, led to both capitalism's increasing tendency towards fascism and antiimperialist revolution among the working class. Declaring the theories of social
democracy as supported by the Socialist Party and liberal bourgeois democracy a
disguised form of fascism, the Comintern directed communist parties to prioritize
attacks on this new form of social fascism. 19
As the American Communist Party declared a period of "class against class"
in 1929, it condemned the Socialist Party and the AFL leadership as enemies of the
working class, established the TUUL to lead opposition to the AFL, and attacked
Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas as the leading "social fascist" in the
country.20 With the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, the party applied its
theory of social fascism to the New Deal, as party leader Earl Browder declared:
It is clear that that fascism already finds much of its work done in
America, and more of this is being done by Roosevelt. .. In the labor
sections of the New Deal program [are] to be seen the clearest
examples of the tendencies to fascism ... For the working class, the
Industrial Recovery Act is truly an industrial slavery act. It is one
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of the steps towards the militarization of labor. It is the forerunner
of American fascism. 21
The apparent alignment of the rank and file movement's criticisms of the
New Deal with the pronouncements of the Communist Party was more than
rhetorical. Mary van Kleeck's association with the TUUL and the presence of party
members in the rank and file unions clearly predisposed the movement towards at
least partial agreement with the Communist's political platfonn. As rank and file
activist and Communist Party member Margaret Levy recalls,
The rank and file weren't a product of the party, but certainly
many in the unions and in Social Work Today were members or
close to us. The Communist's provided the clearest explanation of
why capitalism was failing and why Roosevelt, Hopkins and all
that crew couldn't lead us out of the Depression. Tp.ose of us who
were members obviously supported the party's line, but we didn't
dominate or control the movement. You need to remember that
what we were saying wasn't considered by everyone as
unreasonable or the ravings of a group of crazies. Lots ofpeople
came to similar conclusions independent of us. 22
Indeed, the political landscape of the both the rank and file movement and the
American left during the 1930s reflected the convergence of many tendencies that
reflected to various degrees agreement with the political line of the Communist
Party. But these tendencies reflected not only the analysis of the Communist's, but
as well those of the Socialist Party and numerous other organizations that were
anarchist or Trotskyist in orientation. Nor were the Communists, Socialists or the
social work rank and file the only ones who had become disenchanted with the New
Deal by late 1933 and early 1934. Even liberal, non-Communist journals such as
The Nation, New Republic and Common Sense which had hailed the election of
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Roosevelt and the implementation of the New Deal, became increasingly critical of
Roosevelt's failures. The editors of The Nation expressed their disappointment that
the administration's attempts to kick-start industry was being done at the expense of
workers, employing little more than a strategy of"...trickle down from the top" and
achieving little fundamental change in the economic arrangements that brought about
the Depression. 23 In a similar vein, the New Republic expressed its concern with the
mixed results of the New Deal, criticizing Roosevelt for trying to mediate in the
conflict between labor and capital rather than taking the side of one or the other. 24
But unlike these liberal journals, Social Work Today was noted in particular for its
close agreement with the Communist Party's pronouncements, a fact not lost upon
the profession's leadership.25
Besides sharing a fear of creeping fascism within the programs of the New
Deal, the rank and file movement and the Communist Party were equally allied in
their calls for passage of national unemployment insurance. The legislative
centerpiece of the Communist Party was the Worker's Unemployment and Social
Insurance Bill, introduced in Congress by Minnesota Representative Ernest Lundeen
in early 1934. Drafted by the Communist Party with the assistance of Mary van
Kleeck, the "Lundeen Bill," as it was popularly referred to, was strongly supported
by the Communist Party, the National Unemployment Council, the Workers Alliance
and a broad coalition of unions and progressive organizations. 26 Reintroduced in
1935, the Lundeen Bill called for the establishment of unemployment insurance
" ... for all workers and fanners ... unemployed through no fault of their own," to be
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administered by and controlled by " ...unemployment insurance commissions directly
elected by members of worker's and farmer's organizations.,,27 The bill also
authorized the development of social insurance plans for those unable to work
because of " ... sickness, old age, maternity, industrial injury, or any other
disability.,,28

Social Work Today and rank and file social work unions lined up in support
of the Lundeen Bill in 1934 and 1935, passing resolutions calling for its passage by
Congress. To publicly demonstrate support, eleven social work unions and
discussion clubs sent delegates to the national Congress for Unemployment and
Social Insurance held in New York City in January, 1935. The Congress, called by
the NUC, attracted an audience of over 3,000, representing unemployed councils,
unions and other organizations in forty states calling for enactment of the Lundeen
bill. Among the speakers greeting delegates were Communist Party leader Earl
Browder, T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban League, Representative Ernest
Lundeen and Mary van Kleeck. 29 As the conference met to outline the demands of
the unemployed, rank and file social workers, including Jacob Fisher, were
appointed by the convention to be part of a delegation sent to meet with FERA
officials. After being informed that Harry Hopkins was ill, the delegates met with
FERA Assistant Administrator, Aubrey Williams. An article in Social Work Today
captured some of what transpired:
One by one elected spokesmen step forward to voice the demands
of their group. A representative of the Public Relief Investigators
Association of Minneapolis, sent to Washington to convey to the
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Congress and to the Administration their support of the Workers
Bill. Another relief worker from Philadelphia, who reads a set of
fifteen resolutions adopted by a caucus ofworkers in public and
private social agencies ... demanded recognition ofthe right to
organize, rank and file control ofwork projects, adequate wages, a
socially useful works program, the cessation ofthe use of force
against the unemployed, the enactment ofthe Workers Bill.
Another relief worker, this time a Negro from the Home Relief
Bureau in New York, protesting racial differentials in relief,
distribution ofjobs and wages ....
If Williams is struck with the appearance of staffmembers of relief
agencies on the delegation he doesn't show it. He is in fact a bit
impatient. He asks, are you all 'our' people? ..The hearing is over.
The delegates leave their documents, their reports and resolutions
with Williams. He piles them together, says they'll be looked
into. 3o
Following the Congress, delegates at the rank and file's first NCC conference
formally endorsed the Lundeen Bill and prioritized its passage in the work of its
constituent unions. 31
The rank and file's support of the Lundeen Bill was organizationally
channeled through activities of the Inter-Professional Association for Unemployment
Insurance (IP A), which was primarily responsible for organizing the social work and
other professional delegates who attended the Congress for Unemployment and
Social Insurance. Founded in 1934, the IPA was organized by Mary van Kleeck to
provide a base for professionals and their organizations to promote passage of the
bill. In early 1934, van Kleeck published an open letter in the Bulletin ofthe
Federation ofArchitects, Chemists, Engineers, and Technicians and Social Work
Today calling for the formation of the IPA and soliciting membership. van Kleeck
outlined the need for and purposes of the organization in the letter:
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...

The urgent need for unemployment insurance is the immediate
reason for such an organization... A Professional Workers'
Association such as is proposed would be composed of interested
individuals, employed and unemployed, whose first tasks would be

study, conference with industrial workers, and fonnulation of
programs of action in co-operation with trade unions and
organizations of the unemployed. 32
Chaired by van Kleeck, the IPA included the well known psychiatrist Frankwood E.
Williams as treasurer, Jacob Fisher as secretary and an executive committee
composed of editor and publisher Kyle Crichton, economist Joseph Gillman, Herbert
Benjamin of the National Unemployment Council, architect Percival Goodman and
dramatist Elmer Rice. The IPA quickly organized some fifteen chapters throughout
the country, and by the time of its first national conference boasted a membership of
over 1,000. Members of the IPA were prominent in congressional hearings on the
Lundeen Bill, providing testimony supporting both its constitutionality and its
economic feasibility. Following the passage of the Wagner-Lewis Act, which
contained the Roosevelt administration's program for unemployment and social
insurance, the IPA refocused its efforts to support a broad array of progressive social
and labor-related legislation by providing expert testimony before Congress by its
members. But the defeat of the Lundeen Bill had effectively stripped the IPA of its
primary tool for cross-profession organization, and it subsequently disbanded in

1937. 33
The rank and file movement's strident criticism of the New Deal and its
insistence on an unemployment insurance scheme, as outlined in the Lundeen Bill,
greatly contributed to the deepening and contentious relationship that existed
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between the movement and the AASW. Following the chaos of the 1934 NCSW, the
disagreements between the AASW and the rank and file intensified as the AASW
Committee to Outline a National Social Welfare Program met in the fall. Charged
by the AASW with developing " ... general social principles considered as basic in
planning a national social welfare program," the committee quickly splintered as it
members argued over the merits of a "maximum" program put forth by committee
chair Harry Lurie and Mary van Kleeck and a "minimum" program supported by the
majority of the committee, including AASW president Dorothy Kahn, Grace Abbott,
Ewan Clague and Linton Swift, executive director of the Family Welfare
Association. 34 The maximum program of van Kleeck and Lurie called for the
development of a national program of social insurance based on "mass need" as
opposed to individual insurance. 35 Based on the principles of the Lundeen Bill, van
Kleeck and Lurie advocated a national insurance program that would cover"... all
unemployment, whatever the cause - industrial changes, occupational accidents,
sickness, maternity, or old age.,,36 To fund the program, Lurie and van Kleeck
advocated the use of income taxes, " ... thus demanding at once a redistribution of
national income to the extent that continued unemployment requires divergence of
funds from higher incomes to compensate for loss ofwages.,,37 While calling for a
national program of public works, van Kleeck and Lurie cautioned that to date such
programs had been directed primarily towards ''unproductive tasks" by the Roosevelt
administration. 38 To remedy this they argued that a planned economy must be put in
place:
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A national social welfare program must of course face the fact that
proposals for social insurance at this time cannot hope to do more
than compensate for unemployment. They cannon constitute
'employment insurance' nor establish economic security. Security
which would eliminate the hazards of fluctuations in business
traceable to the anarchy of production under private ownership can
be established only by the substitution of social economic planning
for the ownership which by its results has proved its inability to
maintain security. 39
In contrast to the proposals of Lurie and van Kleeck, the minimum program
supported by the rest of the committee outlined a proposal resembling the prevailing
reliefprograms of the administration. Calling for a federal "Department of Public
Welfare," proponents of the minimum program recommended the government
continue through this new department to provide grants to states which would
administer and provide relief, develop standards of eligibility and require "trained
personnel" to administer relief programs. 40 The minimum program recommended
that unemployment compensation be set below actual wages on the job and that
reliefbe provided only on the basis of demonstrated need: " ... advocates ofthis view
hold that the primary responsibility for taking care of his needs shall, however,
remain with the individual and his immediate family with public responsibility to be
considered as secondary and supplementary.,,41
As Lurie drafted the report of the Committee to submit to the AASW's
Division of Government and Social Work, open dissension within the committee
erupted in a series of communications between committee members. Ewan Clague
expressed concern that the stance of Lurie and van Kleeck called for socialism, and
other supporters of the minimum program believed the report should emphasize
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public welfare programs, not systems of social insurance. Calling the maximum
program "the impossible program," AASW President Dorothy Kahn labeled Lurie's
report "biased," and after consultation with Kahn, Grace Abbott, Linton Swift and
other members of the committee, AASW Executive Secretary Walter West
responded on January 26, 1935 to Lurie's report, declaring:
there is ample evidence that this document does not represent the
considered views of your Committee...it seems to me that the
problem which your statement has raised for the Conference
management and for the chapters is one which involves a totally
different ap,groach to that which we have to consider with current
programs ...
Three days later, the Steering Committee of the Division on Government and Social
Work voted to not accept Lurie's summary of the two programs and agreed that
separate memos from the differing camps would be sent to chapters prior to a
planned conference to take up the report. However, as the conference date
approached, the steering committee reversed course, deciding to withhold
publication or distribution of the draft reports. 43
As Lurie and van Kleeck complained of censorship by the AASW, rumors of
a dispute between a left and right wing in the committee circulated among AASW
chapters prior to the March conference. On the morning that the conference got
underway, AASW officials finally agreed to the release of Lurie's report. 44 Lurie
outlined the differences between the maximum and minimum programs to
conference delegates and a debate ensued. Declaring the minimum program a
"glorified poor law," Lurie and van Kleeck defended their maximum program and
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the merits of the Lundeen Bill, while defenders of the minimum program argued its
reasoned improvements within the framework of the current relief system. 4S
Following two days of discussion, Social Work Today reported that the conference
ended in confusion as final revisions to the conference report, now supporting the
minimum program were debated and voted upon:
, We regard as a great social advance,' says the report, 'the
acceptance by the present federal administration of the principle of
governmental responsibility for economic security.' Immediately
there is objection from the floor ... The statement is amended to
convey the deep disappointment of many delegates with the
inadequacy of the proposal to meet the vital needs of the
unemployed. The resolution declaring against discrimination in
employment practices also fails to appear. Some one makes a
point of it and it goes into the Report... In discussing the
administration's program the Report stated that 'a majority' of
those present regarded it as a great social advance, whereas no
actual report had been taken and the word used at the meeting had
been "some. ,,46
Tensions between the AASW and the rank and file movement continued to
deepen as the Roosevelt administration announced plans in 1935 to reduce federal
commitments to direct relief with the tennination of FERA and the further
development ofwork relief programs in the Works Progress Administration. As the
AASW considered calling a national delegate conference to advocate for the
-continuation of direct relief, concerns mounted over the possible influence of the
rank and file on the conference, particularly in light of the Kansas City NCSW.
While rank and file unions joined protests of unemployed councils and were well
represented at the Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance, the AASW
sought a more moderate course. Internal debate over the nature and purpose of the
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conference reflected the association's fear of the rank and file, as Grace Marcus
urged the AASW to restrict the rank and file's possible influence: "I don't think that
group should be given the floor or allowed to speak so much this year.,,47
The reverberations of the 1934 NCSW conference and the first national rank
and file conference also continued to color the relationship between the mainstream
of the profession and the movement. Survey solicited and published a sharp
rejoinder to Mary van Kleeck's remarks at the conference. Entitled "Illusions
Regarding Revolution," the article warned readers of the danger's represented by van
Kleeck and the rank and file:
The greatest danger that lies ahead of us is the danger that the
American people may become confused in the fog of conservative
and radical propaganda, may mistake the location of the battle-line,
and fighting over irrelevant issues may wake up to find the New
Deal a vanished dream ...
... there is a certain danger in listening to the prophets who dream
of far-off things that you cannot do anything about. ..If you can
believe that nothing is happening now and that the real struggle is
still in the future, then you can draw aside and retreat into the
dream world where Communism makes faces at the wicked
capitalist. ..The battle is not between the New Deal and the
Communist State.48
The profession's leaders also increased their counterattack against the growing
influence of the rank and file. AASW President Dorothy Kahn decried the
movement's assaults upon the profession, declaring that "The outstanding fact of this
year in social work is the attacks on social workers and their clientele, on
professional standards from without and - I regret to say - from within.,,49 Porter
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Lee also weighed in, expressing his disagreement with social workers who entered
the political arena:
There may be social workers who are expert on taxation, on
collectivism, on constitutional law, on the proposal to make the
production and distribution of milk a public utility - but they did
not become expert in these matters as a result of their training and
experience as social workers. Unless he has had other training I do
not see how any social worker could assume the role of leader or
advocate in these legitimate fields of social action without risk
both to these programs and to the status of social work. so
Indeed, the concerns of the AASW were not without merit. Following the formation
of the rank and file's National Coordinating Committee at its 1935 conference, NCC
chair Jacob Fisher boasted of the movement's growing power, directly challenging
the continued role of the AASW as the profession's representative:
[The rank and file's] combined strength is formidable and is
growing every day. The Pittsburgh convention proved among
other things that the rank and file movement is by way of losing its
character as a minority movement. The total membership
represented by official delegates was over 8,200, which is close
enough to the 8,600 figure of the American Association of Social
Workers to suggest that within a very short space of time the new
groups may soon be able to challenge effectively the A.A.S.W.'s
claim to speak for the whole of social work. Sl
Following their successes at the 1934 NCSW, the rank and file once again
made their presence known at the 1935 NCSW in Montreal. This time the NCC
developed a program of workshop sessions, sponsored a booth for Social Work

Today (over which the NCC had assumed control following the Pittsburgh
conference), and published a daily "Rank and File Bulletin" for distribution at the
conference. 52 Despite the increasingly hostile rhetoric of the AASW, NCSW
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Conference President Katherine Lenroot (Chief of the Children's Bureau) struck a
more conciliatory tone towards the rank and file, noting their accomplishments while
omitting any reference to their union character:
One of the most significant developments of social work in the last
two years has been the 'rank and file movement,' which is well
represented at this Conference. Young people in direct daily
contact with those served by social work are developing through
practitioners' groups and discussion clubs challenging and
vigorous points of view and programs, and are emphasizing
,
association with other groups. 53
The NCC sponsored program at the conference reflected the broad array of issues
and causes espoused by the movement, including presentations on "The Negro in
Social Work," "Mental Hygiene in a Changing World," "Casework

A Realistic

Approach," and "Social Work and Fascism." Nearly 1,000 delegates attended
presentations by Mary van Kleeck and Herbert Benjamin on the relationship between
the unemployment movement and social work, where once again van Kleeck served
as the ideological spokesperson for the movement. 54 Calling on the profession to
take a more leading role in social action, van Kleeck pointedly dismissed the
profession'S alliance with the New Deal:
The time has surely come to go back to the period of some years
ago, when social workers were ready to voice their protests. I wish
that our social work journals that have so loyally supported the
present administration because of the social promises, might soon
become once again journals of protest. Social workers are a fairly
large group today, and with their allies and socially minded
supporters their influence can be widened. We must let the people
know the facts. We need a leadership ofprotest, not a willingness
to accept political promises as genuine adoption of new
principles ...we must stand in defense of the civil liberties of the
workers. 55
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The Professional as Worker
The growing gulfbetween the profession and the rank and file movement on
the proper role of social work in the arena of social action reflected more than a
philosophical disagreement on tactics. Rather, it equally represented profound
differences regarding the very conception and definition of the social worker and the
nature of professionalism. The identification of the rank and file movement with the
industrial worker's movement and its emphasis on the development of a unionized
worker identity differed sharply from the AASW's goals for professionalization. To
leaders of the rank and file movement such as Eduard Lindeman, the identification of
the social worker was inextricably linked to its realignment with the interests of the
working class:
For the American professional the crux of the matter must be
sought in the meaning and application of class-groupings. In the
past the professional has aligned himself primarily with the
privileged classes. He has thought of his profession, not as labor
on behalf of the community but rather as a badge of superiority.
His organizations have avoided a trade-union concern with the
economic welfare of their members. They have dealt largely with
the superficial aspects of so-called professional ethics and the
social amenities ...protective organizations in the field of social
work, depart sharply form the professional association in
emphasizing the identity of their interests with those of labor. 56
Through the pages of Social Work Today, the rank and file's intellectual leaders
attempted to articulate an alternative view of the professional social worker than that
supplied by the AASW. To leaders such as Mary van Kleeck, Harry Lurie and
Bertha Reynolds, the identification of social workers with the struggles of the
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working class was central to any meaningful re-conceptualization of social work
practice. For van Kleeck, social work's primary purpose and function lay in service
to the working class in both its immediate time of crisis as well as for its long term
interests:
We [social work] have the difficulty of determining our own
normal function in society, because in a kind of obverse
relationship we have more jobs when other workers have less. But
it is a short-signed view of social work to think it functions
normally only in abnormal times. On the contrary, the basic
interest, even of our own group, lies also in sustaining the cultural
and educational services of society... Toward that end political
movements are essential; and the political movement can be most
inclusive, and therefore the stron~est ifbased upon a program of
immediate needs of the majority. 7
In this regard, van Kleeck believed that the full nature of social work's professional
character and function would not emerge until the political movement of workers
assumed political and economic control of society:
There is just one test to apply to any political movement: whether
it grows out of the needs of the masses of the workers and farmers,
and to what extent it aims to meet their needs; and whether its
leadership is fully responsible to workers and farmers
themselves ... This does not mean the setting up of one group in
society as superior to another group. It assumes that the baSic
standards of living of the people must rest on the standards of
living of workers and farmers; and that the security of the people
as a whole and of the middle class can be achieved in no way
except through security for the producers. Ifprofessional workers
can come to the realization ofthis basic condition ofour own
security; and if we in the profession ofsocial work can take our
part in bringing such a movement into action, then we shall
achieve a fruitful relationship to the development ofour own
program in social work. 58 (emphasis added)
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Lurie argued that the identification of social work with the class struggle
required new fonns of social casework. To Lurie, casework could no longer be
content with the aims of individual "self-maintenance," "social adjustment," or
"personality development."s9 Seeing such activities as primarily attempts to create
"little islands of security" in the absence ofjust social order, Lurie suggested that
casework required a practice centered on a radical "new orientation and a new
structure of community life":
What is needed, in essence, is a change from a system of
production and services functioning only in response to the profit
motive to a system of collective social life in which the resources
of a community, material and cultural, are to be used by the
organized community of workers and developed for their benefit
and their benefit alone. It is infinitely larger than a problem in
social work - it is the main social problem in this period of our
history. 60
Like van Kleeck, Lurie suggested that the actual functions of social workers were
secondary to the central struggle for social justice and would in fact derive their
more specific character out of this struggle:
To have a part in the solution of the problem, therefore, means for
the individual the necessity of adding to his functions as an
employed professional worker the function of a socially conscious
worker who, in alignment with other workers, seeks for a practical
approach to these current problems. This will require
identification with a workers' movement, an organization of
individual workers of all ranks and vocations seeking through
political and economic means to place the whole of our common
life under democratic contro1. 61
Drawing upon her psychoanalytic training and attempting to integrate Marxist
theory, Bertha Reynolds argued that social casework found its function in dealing
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with "the relationship between individuals or groups and their physical or social
environment" (emphasis in original).62 In this regard, Reynolds believed that social
casework could only apply such a model in the presence of a healthy social order: "If
the social order is so sick that resources for subsistence, health, work and the
development of personality are not there, social case work can never supply them in
any adequate quantity or in any healthy way.,,63 To Reynolds, social work had not
been yet been able to develop a full sense of casework practice based on relationship
due its origins within an unhealthy society, and thus did not know " ...what its
possibilities might be in a sound social economy.,,64 Like Lurie and van Kleeck,
Reynolds' felt the only resolution to the profession's contradictions lay in its
participation in the greater struggle for human and economic rights, applying what
special skills and knowledge it had to that struggle:
With patient and determined study we shall find some principles to
guide us. Perhaps we shall find others who share these principles,
and we must not let non-essentials divide us from them, for in an
interdependent world disunion spells death...1 doubt whether it
matters much whether we say we participate as human beings or as
social workers. Our profession has made us different from what
we would have been as actors or butchers, and we can not slip it
off as a garment when we take part in vital matters. It may be that
because we are social workers we shall bring to a blind struggle a
bit more of clarity, and because we know people well we may
relate ourselves to others more constructively, even in the midst of
destructive forces. 65

Social Work and the Tactics of Labor
While the rank and file's hazy conceptions of an alternative form of social
work practice paled beside the profession's established principles of social casework,
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their application of labor tactics to the field was both more explicit and more
threatening to mainstream social workers and the AASW. As organizing efforts in
public relief agencies intensified in late 1934 and through 1935, so did the militancy
of their tactics in the face of increased resistance from agency administrators and
retractions in federal relief efforts. Tensions mounted as both public and private
agencies discharged increasing numbers of union leaders and activists for various
reasons of inefficiency and insubordination. In this regard, the case of Sidonia
Dawson would be an early incident illustrative of the severely strained relationships
that fonned between the rank and file unions and the AASW.
In October 1934 Sidonia Dawson, a supervisory aid at the New York
Emergency Home Relief Bureau, was dismissed on charges of insubordination after
she protested the use ofpolice by the HRB to breakup a demonstration by members
of the New York Unemployment Council. During the course of the police action
several protestors were injured and required medical attention. The following day
flyers protesting the police action appeared in the HRB office, attributed by the HRB
management to Dawson, head of the union's local grievance committee. Later that
day Dawson participated in a mass demonstration outside the office where she
addressed the crowd and accused the HRB of engaging in racial discrimination in
relief practices and of tolerating police brutality. After meeting with HRB
administrators, Dawson was fired as HRB officials infonned Dawson that her
",..activities both inside and outside of the precinct office during the past week have
indicated that it is no longer desirable to have you remain on the staff.,,(j6
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The EHRB Employees Association demanded the immediate reinstatement of
Dawson, publishing an open letter in the New York Post protesting the dismissal. In
the letter, the EHRB Employees Association accused the HRB of tolerating police
brutality in relief offices and Public Welfare commissioner William Hodson of
seeking to deprive HRB employees from " ... exercising their constitutionally
guaranteed civil liberties [including] free speech, press, and the right of
assemblage.,,67 Hodson responded with an accusation that " ... a small number of
left-leaning employees in the HRB" were attempting to wrest administrative control
of the HRB, and issued an order forbidding HRB staff from discussing their work or
the work of the HRB with any newspaper or broadcast media. 68 Following the
exchange, the EHRB Employees Association held a public trial, in which union
leaders accused the HRB of promulgating policies " ...that keep clients ill and
freezing in slum buildings ... [and starting] a campaign of dismissals, punitive
transfers and petty persecution of prominent members of the Association. ,,69 Union
officials also produced copies of personnel files on Dawson and other HRB
employees who had been dismissed. Dawson's file included a detailed record of her
union activities, an anonymous note that charged with her with being"...red of the
deepest red," and a memo from her supervisor to the director of the HRB stating
" ... she has been known as a red.,,7o
As publicity over the Dawson case continued, the local AASW chapter
agreed to investigate the circumstances of Dawson's firing and the working
conditions in the HRB upon the request ofthe local practitioner group. In its
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findings, the AASW report made no recommendations regarding the disposition of
Dawson's case but commented that " ... divided loyalty and mental conflict must
inevitably endanger the esprit de corps and unity of objectives between executives
and staff essential for good services to clients.,,71 While the report objected to the
use ofpolice in the HRB office and recommended the HRB improve its working
relationship with employees, the report also condemned the union for its
"revolutionary tactics" and "disruption to hasten the revolutionary order.,,72
Agreeing with union complaints that the physical condition of the HRB offices were
"miserable," the report went on to object to "disruptive" protests as a legitimate
means to resolve problems: " ... we can only state that social work and lay opinion
must be effectively mobilized to relieve these intolerable conditions.,,73 Rank and
file confidence in the AASW in the wake of its decidedly mixed findings was further
eroded by comments on the Dawson incident published in Survey. While supporting
the need for hearings before dismissal, an article describing the incident appeared to
echo the findings of the AASW committee:
We have noticed that in the case under discussion the worker
involved did not use established intra-mural procedures to state her
protest. ..but adopted instead certain provocative tactics
embarrassing to the administration ...we realize that the right of
self-expression and the form it may take are a proper concern of
administration.74
The Dawson firing was one of many dismissals that plagued union organizing
efforts. In December 1934 Bernard Riback, President of the N ew York Home Relief
Bureau Employees Association, was fired for "insubordination and inefficiency,"
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including the allegation that he over-stayed a lunch break. 75 Like the case of Sidonia
Dawson, Riback was fired after he attempted to intervene in an incident in which
police officers were struggling with unemployed demonstrators. In response,
members of the union staged a protest attended by 2,000 employees and members of
local unemployment councils. 76 In Chicago, Frank Komacker, chairman of the
Chicago Federation of Social Service Employes was fired from the Chicago
Unemployment Relief Service for alleged "slumping" in his work, and another union
leader was fired shortly thereafter on charges of distributing leaflets protesting the
firing during work hours. 77 In New Jersey, the Essex County Emergency Relief
Administration fired the president of the Newark Relief Workers Association and the
union's newsletter editor following union protests of announced budget cuts. Within
two months two more workers were fired for "insubordination in regard to budget
control" in response to orders to cut family relief budgets. Both workers, leading
members of the Newark Relief Workers Association, were accused not of disobeying
orders, but, in the words of the agency, " ... an attitude of defiance [in which] they
held a constant threat of client riots over the heads of their supervisor. They
disrupted the whole morale of the office.,,78 As firings of additional union officials
and activists continued in the Essex County office, the agency director denied any
anti-union purge, stating that given the firing of the union president " ... chances for
the organization's growth are much greater now that it could look to a more
constructive leadership.,,79 Similar dismissals of union leaders and activists for
insubordination and communist sympathies were reported in the pages of Social
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Work Today in Baltimore, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Philadelphia,
Cleveland and St. Louis. 8o Noting the dismissals of Dawson, Riback and others,

Social Work Today complained:
The discharges ... are the latest of a series of firings through which
relief officials hope to crush opposition to their destructive
policies. Further intimidation may be anticipated with the
progressive development of the crisis. The problem is not local. It
is national in scope. 81
The firings of union officers and activists and other fonns of harassment
pushed unions to intensify their use of militant tactics. In New York City, the Home
Relief Bureau Employee's Association accused the HRB administration ofa
concerted campaign to break the union by the use of arbitrary firings of union
officers, surveillance of union activities and discriminatory treatment of union
employees. The union fonned a Joint Committee of rank and file unions to
investigate their charges and submit a public report. In April, the Joint Committee
publicly released their report at a meeting attended by HRB employees and
administrative staff. The report supported the charges of the union that the HRB had
conducted a campaign of discrimination against the union and called for the
reinstatement of four union officials fired for "inefficiency and insubordination. ,,82
In addition the committee called for the end of police presence in HRB offices,
discriminatory treatment of union members in job assignments and evaluations, and
a system in which the committee alleged the HRB forced some employees to spy
upon the activities of union co-workers. 83
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The relationship between the HRB and the union, now renamed the
Association of Workers in Public Relief Agencies, continued to worsen, finally

reaching a head in October of 1935. In September the HRB announced that due to
contractions in federal relief funds some 900 employees would be discharged in
November, the first ofwhat they estimated would be a total of 3,000 layoffs. On
October 24, over half of the 15,000 employees of the Bureau staged a mass walk-out
and held a protest rally at Madison Square Garden. Under the slogan "We Need Our
Jobs, Our Jobs Need Us!," the demonstration drew an audience of over 15,000,
including HRB employees, members of local unemployment councils,
representatives of 60 unions, and members of the public. Following the walk-out
and rally, the HRB announced it would rescind all but 1,200 of the 3,000 planned
dismissals. Most of the 1,200 not re-hired were subsequently transferred in to the
work projects of the WPA. 84
The New York City unions were not the only rank and file unions to engage
in strikes and walk-outs, extending their efforts to organizing workers in WPA work
relief projects. In April, 1935, under the leadership of the local rank and file union,
over 5,000 relief workers went out on strike in Rochester, New York to protest
inadequate salaries. Other walk-outs over salary and working conditions were also
conducted in 1935 by WPA workers with the assistance of rank and file unions in
Pennsylvania, Ohio and Chicago. Organizing was more difficult in some cities such
as Kansas City, where relief administrators put a letter in paychecks of workers
advising them that "inciting discord among the employed [WP A] men" would bring
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dismissal, and infonned WPA workers that"...if you are discharged from your work,
for just cause, you cannot go back on the reliefrolls.,,8s
The use of walk-outs, strikes and other labor tactics by the rank and file in
New York and elsewhere raised concerns among leaders of the profession,
particularly within the AASW. In opposition to the AASW's attempt to develop a
professional image and program, the tactics of the rank and file were seen by some in
the AASW as threatening its emphasis on moderation and professional decorum.
While believing that social workers could appropriately organize themselves into
"efficient, coordinated groups," Ewan Clague warned social workers that the use of
labor tactics were inadvisable due to the unique relationship that existed between the
profession and the administration:
In dealing with the Government it is impossible to use the more
aggressive tactics that are used on a private employer... such action
against the Government is always interpreted as being directed
against the public as a whole. Any politician can cry 'subversive,'
'revolutionary,' 'communistic,' and easily persuade the public that
concerted action by a group of Government employees is a threat
to the general welfare. ,,86
Clague extended his opposition to the use of labor tactics to private charities as well,
arguing that " ... the worker in a private agency cannot avoid having some concern
about the prospects for raising the agency's budget in the annual community
appeal."S7 Instead, Clague urged social workers to maintain a professional demeanor
when faced with conflict and, consistent with the stance of the AASW, to at all times
ensure a maintenance ofprofessional standards.
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Joining Clague, John Fitch, a respected faculty member at the New York
School of Social Work, spoke for many in the mainstream profession who opposed
the tactics and programs of the rank and file, particularly the use of strikes:
... there is a difference between social workers and industrial
workers that makes inappropriate for the former what might be
good tactics for the latter. Social workers have a professional
responsibility that iron molders do not have. Social workers are
entitled to decent working conditions and decent
remuneration ...However, they did not enter social work solely, or
even primarily, to make a living...the strike weapon is not an
appropriate weapon for the social worker. Ordinarily, a strike
would do so much damage to the accomplishment of the higher
purposes which his work contemplates that I think it would be
better for him to change his occupation rather than jeopardize those
higher purposes. 88
Even more liberal social workers, such as Survey editor Paul Kellogg, questioned the
degree of militancy employed by the rank and file. While strongly supporting the
right of social workers to organize and engage in demonstrations, picketing, work
stoppages and strikes, Kellogg questioned the motives and ethics of the rank and file:
...when it comes to policy-making it is up to those who participate
to ask themselves what it is, collectively, they want to get through
their organization no less than how to go about it. The choices
before them range all the way from personal security in the job to
unsettling the economic order. There is a whale of a lot of
difference between tactics used to better relief and the same tactics
used to break down a relief administration as part of a general
agitation. Social workers face also the distinction between an
ordinary industrial dispute and one where social responsibilities
enter in, whether it concerns the water supply of a city, care of the
sick or the help that gets to destitute families. 89
The debate over the proper relationship of the profession with the labor
movement spilled out beyond the higher echelons of the AASW into its local
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chapters. In New York, the AASW chapter, of which Harry Lurie and John Fitch
were both members, debated the appropriateness of unionization in its chapter
meetings of 1934 and 1935. Minutes of those meetings indicated a clear split in the
membership, with one faction led by Lurie strongly advocating support of social
work unions, while the other faction, represented by Fitch, questioned the ethical and
practical consequences of union affiliation. Similar debates wracked chapters in
California, Washington, Illinois and Indiana. 9O

For a More Just Society
In addition to the rank and file's emphasis on militant forms of unionism, the
movement's involvement in progressive political causes would also strain its
relationship with the mainstream of the profession. During the 1930s the leaders and
unions of the rank and file would actively engage themselves in the anti-Fascist and
peace movements, protests of the unemployed, advocacy of the Republican cause in
the Spanish Civil War and support for the black civil rights movement. 91 Once
again, the mainstream profession's perceived extremism of these causes would raise
questions regarding the movement's relationship with the Communist Party and
directly challenge the conduct of the profession.
The movement's commitment to civil rights would directly affect the
profession in the midst of the 1935 NCSW conference in Montreal. Three black
members of the Home Relief Bureau Employees Association attending the
conference were refused accommodations by six hotels and appealed to the rank and
file's NCC for assistance. Word of the situation reached Mary van Kleeck as she
164

was making a presentation, and she interrupted her remarks to publicly condemn the
act, calling upon the conference officers to ensure that in future all NCSW meetings
be held in cities that would not discriminate against racial minorities. Conference
delegates subsequently adopted a resolution condemning racial discrimination, and a
delegation led by rank and file delegates met with the General Secretary of the
Conference to ensure accommodations for the black delegates. 92 Following the
meeting, The NCSW Executive Committee issued a statement on the incident:
The Executive Committee wishes to go on record to the Montreal
Committee on Arrangements commending them for their success
in confonning to the policy of the Conference in obtaining
accommodations for delegates of the Conference, and notes with
satisfaction the absence of undesirable experiences of
discrimination arising because of racial factors in housing and
caring for the delegates. The Executive Committee, however,
deplores the several instances of discrimination which have arisen
locally outside the responsibility or activity of the ... Committee,
which indicates attitudes of discrimination against Negro
delegates. 93
Dissatisfied with the statement, representatives of the NCC called upon the
conference leadership to take measures to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of
delegates at the 1936 conference scheduled for Washington, D.C., a city known for
extensive racial covenants in public accommodations. Rank and file delegates were
further angered when the publication of the conference proceedings included an
unprecedented footnote in the published version of Mary van Kleeck's speech, in
which she denounced the incident. Indeed, the addendum to the paper appeared
more defensive than explanatory, noting that " ... these members had arrived late
without advance registration ...Moreover, after offering to secure rooms which were
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not accepted because they were too far away and at too high a rate, the
Committee... made hotel space available.,,94
In response to the concerns of conference delegates and the NCC, the NCSW
Executive Committee agreed to examine their policies regarding non-discrimination
before the Washington, D.C. gathering. Dissatisfied with the response of the NCSW,
the NCC continued to apply pressure on the NCSW Executive Committee, and
eventually the 1936 NCSW was moved to Atlantic City as the committee could not
obtain guarantees of non-discrimination in Washington, D.C. However, racist
incidents that sparked protest at the 1935 conference were repeated in Atlantic City
after one of the hotels that had signed agreements of non-discrimination with the
NCSW refused to serve black delegates in their bar and lounge. Once again, the
NCC protested the NCSW's lack of response and demanded the NCSW vigorously
enforce its own policies. 95
NCC representatives met with Conference General Secretary Howard Knight,
who advised the NCC that it was the position of the NCSW that the guarantee of
non-discriminatory accommodations did not include bar service. Upon the demands
of the NCC, the issue was brought before the NCSW Executive Committee, which
affirmed its belief that ", ..the Conference has no responsibility beyond essentials and
would not give consideration to the use of cocktail bars. ,,96 Carrying their demands
to NCSW President Edith Abbott, the NCC called upon her to reverse the policy of
the Executive Committee and attempted to smooth the now sour relations between
the rank and file and the NCSW:
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The principle at issue is not prohibition or temperance, but equal
treatment. Mr. Knight in our discussion feared the development of
ugly situations if Negroes and whites drink together ...there are
members of the Executive Committee who misunderstood our

motives in raising this issue, and who believe that our sole purpose
is to embarrass the Conference... [The NCC] assure you of our
wholehearted desire to work sincerely and constructively with the
Conference. 97
But if the NCC expected Abbott to reverse policies and seek more cordial relations
with the rank and file, they would be disappointed in her reply:
With regard to the question you raise about the Conference making
a formal demand for equal treatment of Negroes at the bar, I
assume Mr. Knight will have told you about the official action of
the Conference. This was that we took no action regarding this
particular issue ... My reason for thinking that we should take no
action is that I believe that the business of the Conference is to
make it possible for all of our membership to have an opportunity
to attend all of our meetings ...I do not think that it is the business
of the Conference to assure any kind of recreational facilities to
any of its members. If a golf club gives privileges to men and not
to women, this seems to me a matter about which the Conference
is not concerned. If a bar admits men and excludes women, this
seems to me again a matter about which we have no concern. This
applies also to the matter of any racial lines that may be drawn in
these fields. 98
While the rank and file had mixed success with the established leaders of the
NCSW, they were more successful, and more militant, in the protection of the rights
of black relief workers and black relief recipients. This was particularly true in New
York City, where the majority of black relief workers were employed and the rarik:
and file unions were the most organized and numerous. Here, the work of the rank
and file unions in the Harlem district of New York was most prominent. As early as
1934, relief workers in the Harlem HRB established close connections with the
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Communist Party's League of Struggle for Negro Rights (LSNR), first established in
1930 to oppose lynchings. 99 By 1934, the LSNR had joined with unemployment

councils in campaigns against job discrimination in the local relief offices. The
Harlem branch of the Communist Party had concentrated on relief employees in its
organizing efforts and had successfully established several shop units in the Home
Relief Employees Association HREA), providing previous leadership in the HREA's
protests against racial discrimination in the Civil Works Administration. In April of
1934, the HREA joined with the LSNR in sponsoring a series ofpublic meetings
protesting the dismissals ofblack relief workers and discriminatory treatment of
black clients. Following several meetings with relief officials, coupled with
demonstrations in and outside ofrelief offices, the HRB reinstated several black
reliefworkers and agreed to appoint blacks to the HRB's grievance committees.

lQO

The HREA would be equally important in the LSNR's attempts to pressure a
cafeteria near a Harlem relief office to hire black countennen. As the customer base
of the cafeteria was largely composed of HRB employees, a union supported boycott
coupled with picketing and demonstrations outside the cafeteria soon led to the
cafeteria hiring several black employees. 101
In October of 1934, the HREA again protested discriminatory practices

within the HRB, including charges that the HRB unfairly denied supervisory
promotions to black relief workers and demanding the hiring of additional black
relief workers. The HREA held a mass protest rally of Harlem relief employees to
publicize their demands, only to have the HRB respond with the firing of the
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association's leader. Stung by the HRB's actions, the union mobilized community
support, including the LSNR, the International Labor Defense (the Communist
Party's legal defense organization), and local black ministers and politicians to form
a Joint Committee on Discriminatory Practices to pressure the HRB. Following
several months of demonstrations, protest meetings and marches, the HRB reinstated
the association's chainnan, promoted a number ofblack workers to supervisory
positions and increased their hiring ofblack relief workers. The campaign was so
effective that by the end of 1935, black relief workers represented the largest number
of black professionals employed by the City.102
The rank and file relief unions would also strongly protest discriminatory
practices within the WPA, CWA and the PWA in New York and throughout the
country with mixed success. In New York, the union was instrumental in organizing
campaigns within the black community to demand that black workers were provided
a proportional number ofjobs in WPA projects, with an emphasis on work training
in skilled labor. While the WPA refused to adopt a quota system, they did increase
their hiring ofblack workers generally and into skilled work in particular. A similar
campaign in Illinois, while not as extensive as the New York efforts, yielded more
modest gains. 103
Civil rights issues were also prominently featured in the pages of Social Work

Today, including reports on the struggles in Harlem, the activities of the National
Negro Congress, the needs of urban blacks and the treatment ofblacks in the
programs of the New Dea1. 102 Indeed, where rank and file unions were yet to be
169

established, the journal could do little more than expose discriminatory practices. 104
This was particularly true of Los Angeles in 1934, which Social Work Today
described in an article entitled "Jim Crow in Relief':
It is a rigid rule that a Negro case worker must not serve white
clients. The rule does not work conversely; white case workers
may and do visit Negro applicants ... There is not a single Negro
district director in the Los Angeles County Relief Administration,
and there are only three case work supervisors...LACRA divides its
files into 'black files' and 'white files. '

In a number of instances, workers on projects have united to
protest against attempts to separate them on the basis of race.
Social workers are much more backward. I do not know of a
single instance where case workers have done anything to balk
segregation or discrimination either in their own work or among
the clients of the agencies they serve. lOS
While racial discrimination in relief practice would continue throughout the 1930s,
the later development of national federations of social work unions within the CIO
would strengthen anti-racist organizing, and propel these unions into the forefront of
CIO unions most committed to anti-discrimination practices and the promotion of
black members into union leadership positions.106
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CHAPTERS:
TOWARDS A UNITED FRONT:
THE RANK AND FILE IN ITS MIDDLE YEARS

As never before, American social work today must integrate itselfin
the wide, social community. It mustfind its friends and it must isolate
its enemies... Social work is passing from social isolation to genuine
social diagnosis; now it must pass along to matured social action ... By
and large the New Deal years are coterminous with the period in
which social work has become organic in government. In these
months social work is called upon to prove whether it is capable of
sustaining and enhancing the relationship.1
(Social Work Today, 1938)

As delegates to the Second National Convention ofRank and File Groups in
Social Work gathered in Cleveland in 1936, the rapid expansion of social work
unions nationwide now posed new questions in regard to their relationship to the
broader labor movement. At the 1935 founding convention, unions and discussion
clubs affiliated with the NCC had pointedly rejected affiliation with the AFL.
Concerned with the craft nature of AFL organizing, delegates to the 1935 conference
had avoided reference to AFL affiliation in their published reports and resolutions.
Rather, in their debates, delegates expressed the fear that affiliation with the AFL
would result in the formation of weak and isolated unions separated by the AFL's
preference to develop multiple craft unions representing different classes of
employees within single agencies. 2
But following the 1935 conference, an increasing number ofthe NCC's
affiliate unions began joining the AFL, seeking to institutionalize both their
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recognition by employers and their bargaining efforts with agencies within the less
isolated context of a national federation of unions. 3 AFL affiliation also reflected the
relatively weak position of the Nee - it could provide neither the financial or
organizational resources needed by unions in their organizing struggles that were
available to them through the AFL. Indeed, the Nee's financial report presented at
the 1936 conference indicated a total income of only $488.00 during the year and a
deficit of nearly $200.00.4 Alarmed that individual union affiliations with the AFL,
in the absence of a strong national social service employee union, would weaken
rank and file efforts, the Nee opposed AFL affiliation despite its own rapidly
devolving role into one of a mere clearinghouse of information for unions. Holding
to its hopes for a national union, the Nee passed official resolutions asking unions to
use restraint when considering such affiliation and argued its case in Social Work
Today:

The problem presented by the relation of a national organization to
the A. F. of L. is not merely one of affiliation or non-affiliation. In
view of the craft character ofthe great majority of A. F. ofL.
unions the question of the circumstances under which affiliation
could be obtained is ofparamount importance ...In the judgement of
the [Nee], the advantages ofretaining the vertical union form of
organization outweigh the values accruing from individual A. F. of
L. affiliation on a craft basis ... the development of a sufficiently
large and powerful vertical union in the field of social work would
make it difficult for the A. F. of L. to refuse an application for a
charter backed by the will oftwenty or thirty thousand union
members ... [Affiliation] is conditioned entirely by the effective
launching of a national organization. 5
Despite the calls of the Nee to avoid AFL affiliation in lieu of one national
union of social service workers, a number of public relief worker unions, most
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notably workers in the Baltimore Transient Bureau, requested and were granted
charters as lodges of the AFL's American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE). By the time of the 1936 conference, the NCC's largest affiliate, New
York's Association of Workers in Public Relief Agencies, was also seriously
considering AFL affiliation, as were the Philadelphia Association of County Relief
Board Employees and the Chicago Association of Workers in Public Agencies.
Further weakening the arguments of the NCC, in December 1935 the AFGE
announced the formation ofthe American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME). Unlike its parent, the AFGE, AFSCME adopted a vertical
or industrial form of organization, opening its membership to clerical and technical
workers as well as professionals. With some 10,000 AFL members immediately
eligible for transfer into AFSCME, it appeared that the affiliation ofNCC unions
with AFSCME would thus fulfill the demands of the NCC for a large national
union. 6
Reflecting the inexorable move of rank and file unions into the AFL,
delegates at the Cleveland NCC convention affirmed affiliation with the AFL. While
delegates expressed continued support ofthe NCC for its efforts as a source of
information and coordination for organizing efforts, they uniformly endorsed AFL
affiliation. In a report of the relationship between the AFL and social work unions,
delegates enthusiastically supported affiliation, ending the report with a fictional
dialogue between two social workers on the merits ofjoining the AFL:
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Bill:
Sam:
Bill:
Sam:

Bill:

Sam:

Bill:

Sam:

Say, Sam what's this about your favoring our association
affiliating with the A. F. of L.?
I think if everyone knew the advantages we'd gain from
affiliation, we wouldn't be able to get in soon enough.
What are some of the advantages that you think we'll get?
Well, in the first place we'll be directly federated to over
3,000,000 wage and salary earners throughout the country
now organized in the A. F. of L .... This can help us in swinging
the support of the labor movement in this city to maintaining
and advancing public provisions for social services and
unemployment relief... Speaking in the interests of a large
proportion of the city's population on relief and also on behalf
of the organized workers in the community, our delegations
could have considerable weight. ..
How can we answer the arguments raised that joining the A. F.
ofL. will interfere with the desirable professional objectivity
of social workers?
There are two sides to this question of objectivity. As
professional social workers we have an obligation to maintain
and advance the standards of social welfare. We should
support those groups who are also working in this direction.
We should recognize that labor in its organized struggles to
improve wage and working standards is paralleling the efforts
of social workers to raise standards ...
Well, Sam, you can count on me to help in talking it up. I
believe you're right that we'll find new enthusiasm and new
energy by A. F. of L. affiliation. With the support of
organized workers of all types ...we should be able to advance
our movement as well as being of some real assistance to the
A. F. ofL.
Put it there, Bill! Gee, it's 6:30 and my dinner is calling.
What do you say we close shop?'

Presaging the coming dissolution of the NCC, the conference's Constitutional
Committee reversed its plan to increase the NCC's budget, instead retaining its 1935
financial allotment. Formalizing the NCC's redefined role as one of information and
coordination versus acting as a proto-union, and sensitive to charges that the NCC
might be viewed as engaging in dual unionism in opposition to the AFL, the
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convention revised its constitution to describe the NCC as a "committee," deleting its
previous description of the NCC as an "organization."s
Following the 1936 NCC convention, rank and file affiliation with the AFL's
AFSMCE accelerated. Within months, major rank and file unions made the move,
including the New York and Chicago unions, the Washington, D.C. Federation of
Social Workers, the Milwaukee County Department of Relief Workers Union, the
Minneapolis Social Workers Council, and the Association of Philadelphia County
Relief Board Employees. As the mergers continued, AFSMCE membership swelled
to over 25,000, representing some fifteen lodges of state, county and municipal
employees. By the end of 1937 there were some 21 lodges representing workers
nationwide in family social service agencies, recreation and community centers,
employment bureaus, relief agencies and settlement houses. 9 Despite its initial
reservations regarding AFL affiliation, shortly after the NCC conference, Social
Work Today acknowledged that " ... the vigorous campaign for A. F. ofL.

affiliation... has borne fruit."}O
As public reliefunions moved into the AFL, so did significant numbers of
unions representing social workers in private charity agencies. Most prominent of
these unions was the N ew York Association of F ederation Workers, which was
granted a charter in 1936 with the AFL as the renamed Social Service Employees
Union (SSEU). With an initial membership of400 members, the New York SSEU
lodge was soon joined by SSEU unions in Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles,
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and within the next year the SSEU would claim five chartered locals and several
thousand members. I I
With the rapid affiliation of the NCC's constituent unions into the AFL, the
continuing usefulness of the NCC came under question. While the NCC had not
fulfilled its goal of one national union representing both public and private workers,
the establishment of AFSCME and the SSEU appeared to be the most realistic
approximation of their hopes. Accordingly, the NCC issued a report to its members
in January 1937 recommending dissolution. Citing evidence that the emergence of
the two national AFL unions had essentially completed the goals of the NCC, the
report requested a vote on dissolution at its next membership meeting. Dissolution
was formally voted on at the annual conference, and the NCC's control of Social
Work Today was terminated, now leaving it as an independentjoumal.
Responsibility for planning programs at annual NCSW meetings was placed in a
joint committee representing rank and file unions. 12

The Second New Deal and the Popular Front
As rank and file unions gravitated towards the AFL, they faced new practical
and political challenges in the face of President Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and
the institution of his second phase of the New Deal. During Roosevelt's first term
rank and file unions and their leaders had been highly critical of New Deal programs,
criticism that had intensified with the termination ofFERA and retraction in WPA
programs. Reflecting the disenchantment of the rank and file with the New Deal,
Social Work Today published numerous articles in 1935 and 1936 outlining the
184

movement's opposition. Headlining its May 1936 issue with the banner "Quitting
the Relief Business," the journal featured articles condemning the Roosevelt
administration's failures in serving the unemployed, youth and resident aliens. 13 In
its lead article, Harry Lurie summarized the movement's major complaints:
With the wreckage of the NRA and of other attempts of the New
Deal to find a more modem method of coping with the economic
depression and salvaging the economic order, it became essential
for the federal government to revise its relief program and its relief
theories. Piece by piece, the social welfare program, much of it
still on paper or in speeches, was dismantled or forgotten. First,
Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act which
encouraged labor union organization was repealed through a
process of administrative erosion. Wage rates in the codes were
dropped to a discouraging degree. The "social security" plans
became the Wagner-Lewis bill, acknowledged even by some of its
friends as having unsound provisions and inadequate benefits. A
broad housing program for the low income classes expired without
even a blue print to mark its burial, and industrial and land
settlement programs were whittled away long before the fanciful
and unsubstantial character of the projects could be
demonstrated ... The termination ofFERA in 1935 and the
restriction of the federal program to WPA, completed the
demolition of the original unemployment relief structure. 14
As the rank and file approached the 1936 election, many in the movement
supported the Communist Party's efforts to promote a Farmer-Labor Party, including
delegates to the NCC's 1936 convention. In its 1936 national platform the NCC,
while deciding not to formally endorse support of the Farmer-Labor Party, put forth
a strong appeal for social workers to reject both the Democratic and Republican
parties:
... the growing movement for a new political party, representing the
workers, farmers and professionals, speaking in their own interests
and designated as a Farmer-Labor Party, demands a critical
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examination by social work organizations to determine how closely
our programs are identified and the power such a political grouping
would represent for the fulfillment of this program. Following such
an examination, we have an obligation to support that political party
whose aims accord with ours and which has the power to achieve
these aims. I5
Despite the calls in early 1936 by the NCC and Social Work Today for the formation
of a Farmer-Labor Party to challenge Roosevelt, the position of the movement began
to rapidly shift towards Roosevelt as the election approached. In October 1936, the
editors ofSocial Work Today now provided an assessment to its readers that the
defeat of Republican AlfLandon was of paramount importance, declaring "Slogan
number one: Fight Landon!" 16 While not directly endorsing Roosevelt, the journal's
choice was clear. Declaring that a victorious Farmer-Labor Party would not be
possible until 1940, the editors urged readers to support Farmer-Labor local, state
and congressional candidates, pointedly omitting support of its Presidential
candidate. To complete the sudden alignment ofthe movement to a critical but
supportive stance regarding Roosevelt, Social Work Today responded to his
subsequent overwhelming reelection victory with a seemingly placid and surprising
response considering its previous hostility:

In the election of 1932, the majority of American voters registered
their dissatisfaction with the Republican Party, the governmental
policies and the administration ofHerbert Hoover. Now, four
years later, an even larger majority register a more vigorous
rejection of the Republican candidates, sponsors and
platform... There is no question but that the election gave
unmistakable evidence of the desire of the majority of the
American people for liberal and progressive policies of
government, for social security provisions and for increased
governmental control over business organization. I7
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Indeed, over the next few months, the political line of Social Work Today
dramatically swung from one ofbitter opposition to Roosevelt to more critical
acceptance. In February 1936, the journal featured an article by soon-to-be editor
Frank Bancroft on the priorities facing the new Congress. Bancroft, declaring "We
elected Franklin Roosevelt and the United States Congress to tackle the problem of
unemployment head-on," outlined a program of legislative reform not far from the
President's own positions, including passage of a National Labor Relations Act,
liberalization ofthe Social Security Act, and increased benefits for the
unemployed. I8 Two months later, in an editorial entitled "We Support the
President," the editors ofSocial Work Today announced their full support of
Roosevelt's proposal to expand the Supreme Court, declaring that " ... the crushing
defeat administered reaction in the November elections makes of the President's plan
the primary issue facing the country... The place of all social workers is with the
President on this issue.,,19
More tempered support of Roosevelt would continue throughout 1937, 1938,
and 1939. By 1938, the pages ofSocial Work Today no longer called for the
dismantling of the capitalist system and its replacement with a worker's democracy
modeled after the Soviet system. Instead, the journal acknowledged defense of the
New Deal as a primary task facing the rank and file, declaring that the central issue
was " ... the people and Roosevelt versus special privilege and popular betrayal.,,2o
Urging social workers to rally behind the programs of the New Deal, Social Work
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Today, while somewhat grudging in its support, linked the New Deal's success with
that of social work's own advancement:
Imperfectly, unevenly, inadequately, the New Deal administrative
and legislative block have, since the 1936 national elections, tried
to carry forward a program of recovery and reform. By every
demagogy known to the long and dishonorable history of that
black art, anti-social forces have tried - and all too often succeeded
- to hamstring that program... Wherever... concrete unity is
achievable, it is of the most critical importance to the program of
social work. ..To the extent that we are realistic, we will that that a
unified labor movement is our greatest single ally.21
Despite the movement's growing affection towards the New Deal, its support
remained at least initially guarded, and Social Work Today continued to voice the
movement's condemnation of failures in the administration's social and economic
programs, most notably the tepid performance of the WPA, the lack of quality and
sufficient numbers of low income housing, services for migrant workers, the needs
of youth, and Roosevelt's alleged foot dragging on civil rights and anti-lynching
legislation. 22 However, by the end of 1939 the movement had put aside most of its
criticisms and now fully embraced the New Deal, declaring "The New Deal is Our
Deal":
Times have changed... The New Deal is the determination of the
American people to make democracy the organizing principle of
all of their national life ... The pre-depression days are gone. Before
us lies a new era, a new ordering of the affairs of men. SOCIAL
WORK TODAY believes that social workers want it to be more
democratic, not less. It believes that the continuation,
consolidation and extension of the New Deal is the only immediate
way to insure this result. 23
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The journal's now solid support of the New Deal was echoed within the unions
whose opinions it represented. Joining with Social Work Today, Abram Flaxer, a
former leader within AFSCME and now President ofthe CIO's State, County and
Municipal Workers of America (the largest national union of relief workers),
pronounced labor's new faith in the New Deal:
The New Deal has made government service a more adequate
service to the people, by concerning itself with social services ... A
people's government must be staffed by men and women of the
people. The people who man the job must not only be fit to
perform the job but also should be of a mind to defend the New
Deal. The strongest defender ofthe New Deal is labor. 24
(emphasis added)
The initial and sudden shift of the rank and file movement in 1936 from open
hostility to the Roosevelt administration to its gradual rapprochement and eventual
embrace of the New Deal by 1939 reflected more than a sudden maturation or
abandonment of the politically-left analysis of its leaders such as Mary van Kleeck or
Bertha Reynolds. Rather, it mirrored a strategic shift in strategy heralded with the
Communist Party's halting adoption in the period between 1935 and 1936 of its
Popular Front approach to political work, reflecting the close relationship enjoyed
between the CP and key leaders of the rank and file movement. Developed in
meetings of the Comintern's Seventh World Conference in 1935, the Popular Front
line reflected the Comintern's recognition that its campaign against social fascism
was in error. While calling the shift a response to ''new conditions" as opposed to
errors inherent in its Third Period analysis, the Popular Front recognized the
increasingly defensive position Communist party's were experiencing worldwide. 25
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As reactionary and fascist parties and governments in Germany and other European
countries increased in number and power, the Comintern reevaluated its previous
rejection of alliances with the forces ofbourgeois and social democracy, now calling
for a "united front" with its previous enemies on the left. 26
The American Communist Party's incorporation of the Popular Front strategy
was initially slow and marked by confusion. Unsure of the full intent of the
Comintern's new position, throughout late 1935 the party's leaders continued their
attacks upon Roosevelt and what the party's paper, The Daily Worker, considered the
administration's "trend to fascism. ,,27 Hoping that the formation of a Farmer-Labor
Party would provide the basis for a united front, the Communist Party requested and
received permission from the Comintern to launch the party in opposition to
Roosevelt. However, attempts by the party to gamer support from the Socialists,
labor leaders and populist political leaders such as Minnesota Governor Floyd Olson
and New York's Fiorello LaGuardia failed miserably, as the now new allies of the
Communists feared a third party would usher in a Republican victory. Following
consultation in Moscow with representatives of the Politburo in May 1936,
Communist Party leader Earl Browder returned to the United States, announcing that
full formation ofthe Farmer-Labor Party would be put on hold. hlstead, Browder
now proclaimed that defeat of the Republican Party and its reactionary allies in the
1936 election was the primary mission of the party, adopting the slogan "Defeat
Landon at all costS!,,28 And so, in a period of a few months the party's new political
line reversed from a course of unrelenting hostility to a new defense of the New
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Deal, a less critical stance regarding Roosevelt, and an emphasis on defending
democratic rights within the confines of American capitalism. 29
The Popular Front strategy would dominate the political activities of the party
throughout most of the remaining decade. Now the ranks of labor, liberal
organizations, and even the Democratic Party became the focus of party activities.
Embarking on what was now called "The Democratic Front," American Communists
sought to establish a broad coalition of liberal and progressive organizations in their
struggle against domestic and worldwide fascism. Indeed, calls for socialism were
no longer deemed necessary or even desirable; rather, working class unity in defense
of democracy became the new program of the party as it declared in its 1936
National Convention, "Communism is twentieth-century Americanism.,,30 During
the following decade, the new cooperative approach of the Communists would both
legitimize their presence in progressive political discourse and extend their influence
and prestige into the ranks of organized labor, among intellectuals, and within
progressive movements for peace and civil rightS. 31
The extent to which the Communist Party's introduction of the Popular Front
strategy directly influenced the rank and file movement's sudden tum in political line
in 1936 is, in the final analysis, unknown. However, the close alignment of the
movement through the pages of Social Work Today with the party's pronouncements
regarding the abandonment of the Farmer-Labor Party and the subsequent embrace
of the New Deal was not a matter of sheer coincidence. Influential leaders of the
rank and file such as Social Work Today editors Jacob Fisher and George Wolfe
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were party members, as were a significant number of rank and file union leaders,
including Abram Flaxer within AFSCME (later head of the CIO's SCMWA, the
State, County and Municipal Workers of America), SCMWA national organizer
Henry Wenning, and Lewis Merrill, head of the CIO's United Office and
Professional Workers of America and containing a large contingent of social work
unions. Similarly, Bertha Reynolds was a member of the party and Mary van
Kleeck, while not a member, was closely allied with the party and its top
leadership.32 While the movement's close mirroring of the party's line would later
lead to both charges and denials of communist control, based on the fragmentary
evidence perhaps Jacob Fisher most accurately characterizes the relationship enjoyed
between the party and the rank and file movement:
The rank and file were often close to the party. Many of us were
members or closely associated with its organizations. We read the
Daily Worker and were keenly interested in what they had to say.
The editorial positions of Social Work Today certainly could be
said to sometimes "mirror" the party's lines, but to say we were
"dominated" by the party would be simply incorrect. We were as a
whole an independent movement and journal, often in agreement
with the party and sometimes opposing its positions ...The party
was certainly powerful in the various public relief unions, and in
fact consolidated their control in the CIO through their assuming
leadership in key national positions, but for the most part the rank
and file members were interested in bread and butter issues and
professional standards, not the pronouncements of the party over
this thing or that. 33
Fence Mending With the ProCession
As the movement began to take a more conciliatory approach in its
relationship to the policies of the Roosevelt administration, so did it begin to move
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away from its antagonistic relationship with the AASW. In June 1936, Social Work
Today published an unprecedented editorial entitled "A Plea for Understanding,"

extending an olive branch to the profession. Noting the AASW's initiation ofa
campaign to improve the image of social work in the public eye, the editors asked,
"Before we expect understanding from a resistive public, must we not first recognize
that there is need for understanding within the ranks of the profession itselfl,,34
Declaring that the union movement shared a genuine concern with the AASW over
professional standards, the editors proclaimed the rank and file in alliance with the
AASW, while retaining a divergence in analysis:
The professional society offers a program of interpretation
attributing to ignorance and cultural prejudices the major blocks to
public acceptance of social work. The trade union cannot accept
the concept of an undifferentiated public on whom all the
deficiencies of our order are projected. It locates the difficulty in
the unwillingness of the wealthy taxpayer to support a welfare
program which is both expensive (to him) and which is a threat to
the low standard of living in the general population on which his
profits depend. 35
While outlining the differences between the two camps, Social Work Today argued
that such differences were one of emphasis and did not constitute a basis for non
cooperation. Rather, the editors argued that there was "ample room" for the
development of"legitimately separate interests" in such cooperation, concluding
"Never have standards affecting clients and staff been so threatened. The dreaded
effects of the withdrawal of public relief are upon us. Can social work afford to have
its ranks divided?,,36
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Reminiscent of the movement's shift regarding the New Deal in the wake of
the Popular Front strategy, Social Work Today continued to draw closer to the
initiatives of the mainstream profession and the AASW. Throughout 1937 the
journal increased its reporting on AASW programs, congratulating the association
chapters' increasing involvement in the political arena through lobbying and now
open support of increased federal assistance:

It is encouraging to consider that the professional organization in
our field, the American Association of Social Workers, has loaned
itself least to reactionary purposes and has attempted the most
progressive action of all similar professional bodies. The causes of
this are not far to seek; they grow directly out of the functions of
the Association as they are affected by the changing situation in
the world about us ... The necessity for engaging in some sort of
'social action' is no longer a problem ofthe Association, for it is
seen emerging directly from its purpose. 37
Now echoing the AASW's concern with the protection of professional standards,
rank and file unions took up the cause, most notably in New York City. There union
members demanded that the Public Welfare Department stiffen its requirements for
hiring of staff into the positions of supervisor by adding "high academic and
experience qualifications" combined with.a written exam to the position
requirements. 38 Faced with the support of over 50 local unions and the local AASW
chapter, the department's commissioner agreed to the proposal and a new civil
service examination procedure was implemented. Further acknowledging the
AASW's concern that uncredentialed relief workers were threatening the standards
of the profession, Social Work Today launched a new series entitled "The Case Work
Notebook" in its October 1936 issue. Citing a growing "insecurity" among relief
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workers regarding their ignorance of "professional material," the journal's editors
sought to tread a blurry line between the journal's professed dedication to wider
social problems and the need ofrelief workers for more "technical tools":
Case work as a system is slow, individualistic, and still heavy with
its infancy. That it can be effective under certain conditions in
relation to a limited number is true. But it is not intended as a
"mass method." Another aspect that we must not overlook is that
the personality troubles toward which case work is directed are
heavily precipitated today by the external state of our society... we
find ourselves facing the ivory tower of limited techniques or,
conscious of our professional responsibility, performing to the
limit of our ability the case work function ...we believe that further
development of the questions raised will help workers in clarifying
case work confusion. These and other pertinent questions will be
covered in the successive columns of Case Work Notebook. 39
Over the next four years the Case Work Notebook would address a wide range of
case work practice, theory, and technique that was increasingly well within the
confines of established approaches taught in professional schools of social work.
The monthly column featured discussions on such professionally-oriented topics as
the importance of personality in the process of diagnosis and treatment planning,
applications of Rankian psychology, the use ofrelationship in social case work, the
role and use of anxiety in treatment, and the importance of balancing identification
with client experiences and the objectivity of a professional approach. 40
The rank and file movement's increased concern with the protection of
professional standards through the negotiations of its unions and in the pages of
Social Work Today would also be accompanied by growing cooperation with the
AASW and leaders ofthe mainstream profession. Attacks on professional standards
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of training and education, prominent in the early years of the rank and file's
development, were now replaced with a call for alliance with agency administrators
to secure professional standards:
The average practitioner wants to grow professionally. Growth,
however, is seldom possible without the full cooperation of agency
executives ... formal study is necessary to acquire what is
tantamount to a anew body of knowledge. Workers can and do
take courses offered by experts in the field ... As the body of case
work knowledge expands, room develops for specialization - as in
medicine and other broad professional fields. Some workers
become particularly skilled in one area, some in another. In this
sense their development is uneven but this does not imply that one
type of skill is more valuable over another. Each workers makes
his own contribution... The executives and the workers become
integral parts of one agency and work together toward ever higher
standards. 41
Increasingly, established leaders ofthe profession became contributors to

Social Work Today as the rank and file modified their criticisms of both the
administration and the profession. Once threatened by the massive infusion of
untrained relief workers into the field, social work leaders such Karl de Schweinitz
and the University of Pittsburgh's Marion Hathway now called for the profession to
support the training needs of these workers. Noting that " ...trade unionism in the
social work of the future will tend more rather than less to be the common meeting
ground of trained and untrained personnel," Hathway called for schools of social
work to adjust their curriculum and methods of training delivery, institute early
morning and late afternoon classes to accommodate workers, and to work with
public agencies to provide leaves of absence for workers to attend schoo1. 42
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As Social Work Today increased its coverage of more mainstream social
work concerns, other members of the mainstream profession became contributors.
Building on articles introducing rank and file members to social group work, Grace
Coyle advised readers on the relationship between group work and social action,
emphasizing that social workers could create a better society through " ... orderly and
democratic methods of change. ,,43 Wayne McMillen, who became president ofthe
AASW in 1940, also became a contributor to the journal, expressing sympathetic
recognition of the reasoned role of unions in bettering working conditions for
members of the profession:
If organization is the best formula for working toward better
conditions, then the next question is "What type of organization - a
professional organization or a union?" I have been a member of a
professional organization for many years and I believe such
organizations have a very important contribution to make. But a
professional organization would obviously include only a part of
the workers in any office .. jt seems to me an interesting bit of
evidence that while you may need a vertical union for protective
purposes, you also need a professional organization for other
purposes. 44
Even former enemies of the movement such as Dorothy Kahn and Grace Marcus
were no longer an anathema to the rank and file as it moderated its assessments of
the profession. Once a target of rank and file criticism for her early resistance to
unionization and her criticism of its tactics, by 1940 Dorothy Kahn, now Assistant
Secretary of AASW, would praise rank and file unions in the pages of Social Work
Today for their opposition to cuts in relief. 45 Grace Marcus, who earlier believed the
rank and file movement was a dangerous trend within the profession spouting
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" ... economic dogmas that caricature Marxian theory," was now featured in articles
lauding the influence of Sigmund Freud and explaining changes in theories of relief
giving during the previous decade. 46 Even Virginia Robinson, who had previous~y
attacked Social Work Today and the union movement for their political extremism
and espousal of militant union tactics, now noted in 1937 that"... social workers and
rank-and-filers are nearer today in social philosophy than they were five years
ago.,,47
As the politics of the Popular Front employed by the rank and file movement
served to bring them in closer alliance with the mainstream profession, so did the
profession's increasing amenability to social action in defense of the New Deal
soften their concerns with the movement. The rank and file unions' increasing
attention to professional standards, as well as their focus on betterment of workplace
conditions were no longer manifestly antagonistic to the goals of the AASW. But
tensions between the two camps did not disappear entirely, as the mainstream of the
profession continued to be suspicious of the rank and file's more leftist positions on
foreign policy and their apparently close relationship with the Communist Party.
And as the United States inched closer to war in the late 1930s, the profession's
lingering suspicions would tum to both attack on and disavowal of the movement.

Into the CIO
As relations between the mainstream profession and the movement waxed
and waned throughout the latter half of the 1930s, the rank and file's dedication to
building a union movement took on renewed vigor. While the dissolution of the
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NCC had marked an end to the dreams of its founders for a single national union of
social service employees modeled on the more pure lines of industrial unionism,
other dissenting voices within the AFL would emerge to sweep the rank and file
movement's unions into a new and militant organization: the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO).
Just as rank and file delegates to the 1935 and 1936 NCC conventions
debated the advisability of affiliating with the craft oriented AFL, a similar and more
momentous struggle was taking place within the AFL itself. The tensions within the
AFL over the desires to retain its craft union orientation and simultaneous calls for it
to embrace industrial workers into its fold intensified in the early 1930s, finally
exploding with the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933
and its provisions guaranteeing the right of workers to form unions free of employer
influence or control. Despite fierce resistance by employers, a staggering number of
workers, primarily located in basic industry, took up the call for union organizing. In
an unprecedented display of militancy, workers throughout the country warred with
employers to achieve union recognition. In the first year of the NIRA, over 900,000
workers nationwide went on strike and the number nearly doubled in 1934. Trade
union membership soared, as nearly three quarters of a million new union members
entered the AFL, independent unions, and the Communist's TUUL. For the AFL,
which gained nearly 500,000 members in the wake of the NIRA, this new influx of
unions represented not only a significant revival of its previously shrinking
membership but new dangers to its leadership and its control over the form of these
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new unions. The growing strength of industrial worker unions within the AFL,
particularly John Lewis' United Mine Workers (UMW), as well as the International
Ladies Gannent Workers Union (ILGWU) and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America (ACWA) would lead to internal demands that the AFL abandon its craft
orientation in favor of industrial unionism. 48
Dissatisfied with the AFL leadership's resistance to industrial unions, the
UMW, ILGWU, ACWA and other industrial unions within the AFL formed the
Committee on Industrial Organization in 1935 to challenge their national leadership
and promote industrial unionism within the AFL. As the AFL leadership denounced
the CIO's formation as dual unionism, it contemplated expelling the CIO unions.
Fearful that such expulsions would split the labor movement, the AFL leadership
vacillated between expulsion and accommodation of the CIO. But events within the
CIO itself would propel the AFL to act decisively. While the AFL debated the
merits of expulsion, the CIO continued to develop an internal federation of industrial
unions. Responding to the failure of the AFL' s Amalgamated Association of Iron,
Steel, and Tin Workers to mount an organizational drive among steel workers, the
CIO organized its own Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) in 1936,
directly challenging the AFL leadership over control ofthe industrial union
nlovement. Similar organizing efforts in the rubber, auto, electrical and radio
industries would swell the ranks of the CIO in what was now a direct and open
challenge to leadership of the AFL. As attempts to maintain unity collapsed in 1937,
the AFL expelled the CIO unions. Under the leadership of the UMW's John Lewis,
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the expelled unions fonned the Congress of Industrial Organizations in November of
1938, challenging the AFL for control of the entire national labor movement.49
The fonnation of the CIO would have a catalyzing effect upon the rank and
file's AFL unions. In the summer of 1937, the CIO chartered two national unions,
the State, County, and Municipal Workers of America (SCMWA) and the United
Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA), opening these unions to the
rank and file social work unions. SCMWA sought to organize workers in all public
agencies nationwide, while the UOPWA was chartered to organize office and
professional workers in the private sector. Within a matter of months, existing social
work unions within the AFL's AFSCME moved into both SCMWA and the
UOPWA. Led by the powerful New York A WPRA union, by June of 1938 nearly
one quarter ofSCMWA's 35,000 members would represent employees in public
welfare agencies in over a dozen states. Seven locals of the SSEU, most from the
New York and Chicago locals would now comprise some 2,000 of the UOPWA's
forty five thousand members. Only a small group of several hundred mid-western
welfare workers remained within AFSCME. 50
The move from the AFL to the CIO was not an easy one. Many unions,
particularly the SSEU locals entering the UOPWA, faced new battles for employer
recognition. Locals in Chicago, Philadelphia, New York and Los Angeles all waged
protracted struggles for recognition. In June 1938 the New York City SSEU Local
19 made history when it successfully concluded the profession'S first collective
bargaining agreement with the National Council of Jewish Women. While the
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contract initially covered only some 25 employees, by the early 1940s some 50
private agencies would have contracts with UOPWA locals. The success of the
contract with the National Council of Jewish Women would be quickly followed by
a UOPWA contract with the Russell Sage Foundation. 51 SCMWA organizing within
the public sector was more rapid and initially successful than that of the UOPWA.
New SCMWA unions in New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland were able to
win salary increases, reinstatements of dismissed workers, liberalized vacation and
sick benefits, and establishment of grievance proceedings. Increasing the number of
public case workers and reducing existing caseload standards were also major goals
of the newly forming SCMWA, and between its unions in New York and Detroit
alone, over 300 new positions were established and caseload reductions were
achieved by a number of SCMWA locals. 52
Backed by the growing power and resources of the CIO, SCMWA and its
leader Abram Flaxer (formerly an official in AFSCME), and the UOPWA, directed
by Lewis Merrill, continued to organize public and private social welfare agencies
nationwide. Successful drives in Iowa, California, Minnesota, Kentucky,
Washington, Missouri, and Indiana would continue to increase the union
membership. By the end of 1939 some 36 SCMWA locals had been established
nationwide in public welfare departments and SSEU membership in the UOPWA
had increased to nearly 4,000. 53 The achievements ofSCMWA and the UOPWA
was not lost on CIO head John Lewis. Recognizing the initial success of his union's
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foray into social services, Lewis welcomed the rank and file into the CIO in a special
message to social workers published in Social Work Today:
The Committee for Industrial Organization welcomes the addition
of social workers to the ranks oforganized labor in
America... Social workers, whose daily task is to delve into the
living conditions of America's poorer families, have an unequalled
opportunity to inspect the social byproducts of our industrial
system... The responsibility of and the opportunity of social
workers are therefore two-fold. They have a responsibility to
uphold the right of democratic organization among the workers
with whom they come in daily contact, and they need the
advantages of the same free, democratic organization for
themselves. 54
Lewis' enthusiasm for social work's entry into the CIO was shared equally by the
rank and file. The CIO's emphasis on organizing industrial workers and its
insistence on the development of vertical unions seemed at last to fit the vision of the
movement's early advocates. Jacob Fisher, now president of the New York Social
Service Employees Union (UOPWA), perhaps best summed up both the relationship
of the rank and file to the CIO in 1938 and the movement's lessened political
presence in the profession:
[Social workers] hoped to find in the CIO the kind of vigorous and
imaginative leadership which they had looked for in vain in the A.
F.ofL. And they were not disappointed. The CIO took seriously
the problem of organizing social work, as it took seriously the
problem of organizing the steel industry. It spent money. It set up
offices, hired organizers, issued literature and conducted
meetings ...
It is this absorption in the important task of building a solid
smoothly running union with its feet on the ground that has made
1937-38 so different from other years. The past twelve months
saw no manifestos issued, and no general appeals to the conscience
of social work. ..The guiding principles have been and still are
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identification with labor through membership in trade unions and
cooperative action between social work and the labor movement in
the achievement oftheir common goals. The course of events this
year dictated intensive self-organization as an integral part of this
program. 55
As the decade of the 1930s was coming to a close, the rank. and file movement had
found a home in the CIO and had begun to repair the serious rift that had developed
between it and the profession. But as stonn clouds of war in Europe began to
envelop the United States, the politics ofthe Popular Front would begin to break
down and, once again, the movement would find itself at odds with the profession
and its unions under attack from both within and without.
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CHAPTER 6:
REPRESSION, RESISTANCE AND DESTRUCTION: THE FINAL YEARS

..Just a racket, a Communist controlled racket. l
As rank and file unions representing social workers in the CIO continued
their organizing efforts and slowly attempted a rapprochement with the mainstream
profession in the late 1930s, the convergence of foreign and domestic events would
soon unravel both efforts and refocus enmity upon the movement. Once again, as in
the days of the Popular Front, the movement's apparent adherence to the twists and
turns of the Communist Party's political line would come under question in the wake
of the 1939 non-aggression pact between Gennany and the Soviet Union. The
apparent closeness between the movement and the Communist Party would place the
movement at odds with the profession and evoke aggressive attacks upon rank and
file unions by state and federal officials seeking evidence they were controlled by the
party. While temporarily abated during World War II, the attacks of anti-Communist
investigators upon the rank and file unions, coupled with the acquiescence of the
mainstream profession in the face of these attacks, would eventually lead to the
destruction of both the unions and the movement as a whole.
Peace, Collective Security and the Politics of the Popular Front
Throughout the 1930s, both the rank and file movement and the mainstream
profession shared alarm over the rise of fascism in Europe. Indeed, following the
consolidation of the Nazi regime in Gennany in 1933, many Americans, including
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social workers, called for the United States to fonn an alliance of collective security
with the Soviet Union to forestall the spread of fascism. 2 Most strident in these calls
was the American Communist Party, which denounced U.S. isolationist policies and
characterized the Chamberlain government in England and the government of France
as containing fascist tendencies threatening to world democracy. In particular, the
Communist Party called upon progressive organizations and its allies in the Popular
Front to defend the Soviet Union from possible Nazi aggression through their
support of a collective security pact between Russia and the United States. 3
Calls for collective security became the centerpiece of rank and file unions'
foreign policy positions during 1937 and 1938 as reflected in both the speeches of its
leaders and in resolutions passed by the SCMWA and UOPWA locals and the
national CIO.4 While support of calls for collective security was generally favorably
reported on in mainstream social work journals such as the Compass and Survey,

Social Work Today most vigorously argued the case for a collective security pact.
Condemning the policy of neutrality pursued by the Roosevelt administration, the
journal's editors took up the cause of alliance with the Soviet Union in November,
1937, declaring that, "There is an inherent weakness in the democratic-pacifist
reaction to the choices with which nations are faced this day. Soviet Russia has been
calling attention to this weakness at every opportunity."s The journal's editors called
upon the Roosevelt administration to repeal the Neutrality Act, which prevented the
purchase of war materials by Spain and China, and supported a boycott of Japanese
products. Invoking the spirit of internationalism, one contributor to the journal
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exhorted social workers to ally with clients, unions and peace organizations to
protect freedom and the "provision of bread and security,,6:
The links in the collective striving for bread-peace are
international. The Spanish loyalists are at the barricades for us all.
We respond to the International Brigade and with the North
American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy. Worker
elements in the present Chinese struggle think of the Japanese
worker-soldiers, not mainly as enemies, but potential allies. This
has far-stretching implications. When social workers face war,
they face in fact an epochal situation, pregnant with a new life. 7
By early 1938, Social Work Today's demands for collective security
intensified amidst Communist Party denunciations of reactionary elements in the
governments of England and France. In an editorial in its April, 1938 edition, Social

Work Today's editors warned its readers that " .. .international anarchy and world
fascism" was at hand in the absence of U.S. support of collective security.8
Declaring that social workers wanted peace, the editors urged its readers to demand
that the U.S. government actively support anti-fascist struggles in Europe and Asia:
We are all too well aware of the treasonous cynicism of the
English fascist, Chamberlain; of the indecisiveness of the French
Popular Front foreign policy; of our own vacillation between
international statesmanship and isolationism. But today is not the
time for people with a social conscience, with devotion to a
democratic and peaceful world, to sigh and bite their nails ... There
is a remedy. There is one remedy. That remedy is collective
security... SOCIAL WORK TODAY calls upon every one of its readers
to become an active and determined worker for peace and
democracy through collective security. It is the most important
task confronting the world today.9 (emphasis in the original)
The journal's calls for collective security were also accompanied by warnings that
cooperation alone might not prevent world war. In this regard, the journal's editors
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supported a "positive peace policy" of containment that, if resisted by fascist
governments, included a call for American military response: "If war-makers
respond to this peace action with war, they must be defeated with war."tO
While the mainstream of the profession generally shared Social Work

Today's calls for collective security, the position of the journal and that of the rank
and file unions regarding the appeasement policies of the British and French
governments, and their outspoken admiration of the Soviet Union, were less popular.
In contrast to Social Work Today's support of preparations for war, many leaders of
the profession and its mainstream journals viewed the origins and solutions of the
international crisis as primarily economic in ternls, believing that ensuring freedom
of trade among democratic countries would contain the spread of fascism. Both Paul
Kellogg, editor of Survey, and John Gavit, editor of Survey Graphic, supported this
more moderate stance. Kellogg and Gavit, while supporting the concept of
collective security, believed that the assurance of free trade among democratic
countries and the concomitant restriction of trade with fascist governments could
avert a world-wide conflict. 11 Likewise, the National Federation of Settlements and
local chapters of AASW supported changes in the Neutrality Act to allow the sale of
arms of Spain and China, as well as condemning trade with Gennany and Japan. t2
Solomon Lowenstein, president of the 1939 NCSW, also represented the views of
many in the mainstream ofthe profession who opposed U.S. intervention in the war
in Europe. Lowenstein eschewed support of either collective security or isolationist
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policies but agreed with Kellogg and Gavit that properly applied trade policies could
avert war. 13
Of greater importance, perhaps, than the differences over the meaning of
collective security between the rank and file movement and the profession, was the
movenlent's unabashed support ofthe Soviet Union. Here, clear differences between
the mainstream of the profession and the rank and file manifested themselves.
Throughout the late 1930s, many of the mainstream profession'S leadership
increasingly saw no significant distinction between what they considered the
totalitarianism of both fascism and communism, a comparison strongly disputed by

Social Work Today and many leaders ofrank and file unions within the UOPWA and
SCMWA.14 While such differences rarely surfaced publicly, the apparent sympathies
of the movement towards Soviet-style communism would later estrange it from the
mainstream profession and divide the movement itself in the wake ofthe Nazi-Soviet
pact of non-aggression.
Despite the growing differences between the rank and file and the profession
on the matter of collective security, both found common ground in the case of the
Spanish Civil War. In 1936, pro-fascist elements ofthe Spanish military under the
command of general Francisco Franco revolted against the leadership of the newly
elected leftist government. From the onset of the civil war until the defeat of the
government in 1939, the cause of the Spanish loyalist government received the
sympathetic support of U.S. liberals and progressive organizations. The Communist
Party would soon become the focal organization rallying support for the loyalists,
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holding up the civil war as an example of the betrayal ofwestern democracies
through their policies of neutrality. The party was instrumental in organizing
numerous organizations to support the loyalist cause, including the Spanish Aid
Committee, the American Friends of Spanish Democracy and the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade, one of several volunteer units of Americans organized by the Communist
Party that fought on the loyalist side in Spain. IS
The cause of the Spanish loyalists temporarily united both the rank and file
and the liberal wing of the mainstream profession. Social work radicals and union
leaders, such as Mary van Kleeck, Roger Baldwin, Lewis Merrill and Abram Flaxer,
as well as liberal social workers such as Paul Kellogg and Grace Coyle, joined a long
list of academics, artists, writers and union officials in an open letter to President
Roosevelt supporting the lifting of the U.S. embargo against selling arms to Spain. I6
Rank and file unions and AASW chapters alike supported the formation of the Social
Workers Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, a subsidiary organization of the
American Friends of Spanish Democracy. Once again, rarlk and file social workers
such as van Kleeck, Bertha Reynolds, Jacob Fisher and Joseph Levy, as well as
liberals such as Paul Kellogg, Gordon Hamilton, Owen Lovejoy and Lillian Wald,
joined ranks as members of the committee's Executive Board. 17 Throughout the
course of the civil war, the Committee would raise funds for medical supplies, the
construction of hospitals, and the care of refugees. In addition to fund raising,
several delegations of social workers led by Committee member Constance Kyle

215

made trips to Spain to identify needs and hold fund-raising meetings in the United
States upon their return. 18
For some social workers in the rank and file movement, mere financial or
moral support ofthe loyalist cause would not suffice. In June, 1937, a small notice
in Social Work Today announced:
In Memoriam
Julius Rosenthal
Social worker, active trade unionist in the Association of Workers
in Public Relief Agencies, friend of SOCIAL WORK TODAY,
volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion with the Loyalist
forces in Spain: killed while fighting Fascism that Democracy
might live - April, 193719
While the number of social workers who fought and died in the civil war are
unknown, Julias Rosenthal was the first so recorded, symbolizing in his death the
depth of commitment the rank and file placed in defeating fascism. 2o

From Collective Security to "The Yanks Are Not Coming"
The calls of Social Work Today and the rank and file unions of the SCMWA
and UOPWA for the United States to shed its neutrality continued unabated through
the summer of 1939.21 As Franco was poised to claim victory in the civil war in
Spain, Social Work Today lamented the collapse of the loyalist forces, attributing its
defeat to the failures of the western democracies:
[Spain is] a victim, like Austria and Czechoslovakia, to the
connivance of the pro-fascist heads of the British and French
governments with the deadly enemies of democracy. In this
betrayal the United States has played its part by a 'neutrality'
which denied the S~anish government its right to purchase the
means of defense ... 2
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But events in August 1939 would suddenly and dramatically alter the movement's
strident calls for an end to U.S. neutrality. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the
Soviet Union announced the signing of a non-aggression pact between the two
countries, sending shock-waves of disbelief throughout the left-progressive
community in the United States and much of the world.
In the United States, the Communist Party was caught equally unawares by
the announcement of the pact's signing. Prior rumors of such an impending pact had
been met with scorn by the party, prompting party leader Earl Browder to compare
the chances of such an agreement as less likely than his election to the office of
President. 23 Now, the party was in disarray as it sought to both understand the
reasons for the pact and explain this sudden change in Russian policy to its members
and its allies within the Popular Front. In early September, the party's Political
Commission met to decide on a course of action. Within less than a month, from the
signing of the pact to the conclusion of the Commission's deliberations, the party's
vigorous campaign for collective security was replaced with a new call: "Keep
America out of the Imperialist War!,,24 Reversing course, the party now declared
that the war in Europe was imperialist in origin and should be opposed by the
American people:
The war that has broken out in Europe is the Second Imperialist
War. The ruling capitalist and landlord classes of all the
belligerent countries are equally guilty for this war.
This war, therefore, cannot be supported by the workers. It is not a
war against fascism, not a war to protect small nations from
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aggression, not a war that workers can or should support. It is a
war between rival imperialisms for world domination. The
workers must be against this war. 25
The sudden shift ofthe Communist Party from demands for collective security to a
call for isolationist policies was accompanied by new attacks by the party upon the
Roosevelt administration and previous allies in the Popular Front that refused to
agree with the party's new line. 26 The impact of this sudden policy reversal by the
party devastated much of the respect and prestige it had earned during the earlier
years of the Popular Front. Over the course of the next two years, membership in the
party would decline dramatically, as would the membership of many Popular Front
organizations closely associated with the Communist Party. Indeed, the party's
premiere ally, the American League for Peace and Democracy, with an estimated
membership of 20,000 in August of 1939, lost over 1,000 members per month until
its disbanding in 1940. Other organizations close to the party suffered similar losses,
including the American Student Union, the League of American Writers, The League
for Peace and Democracy and American Friends of the Soviet Union. 27
While much of the liberal community within and outside of social work
recoiled with distaste in reaction to the Communist Party's reversal ofpolitical line
in the weeks following the signing ofthe non-aggression pact, the unions represented
by the SCMWA and UOPWA, as well as Social Work Today, quickly revised their
own line, now declaring that the war in Europe was purely inspired by the imperialist
policies of the western democratic governments. 28 In its first issue following the
announcement of the non-aggression pact, Social Work Today published a special
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editorial, entitled "The War and the New Deal.,,29 Dropping their previous calls for
collective security, the editors now declared that the programs of the New Deal could
only be defended by a policy of peace and neutrality:
The answer to us is clear. The basic things which America can
offer the world today are a strong prosperous, democratic social
organization and a foreign policy consistent with it. ..The New Deal
march toward social progress must be intensified. Unification
there must be, yes, but it must be unification around satisfied need.
The other kind of 'unification' - clinging to the status quo, a status
of social injustice - leads straight towards mass discontent, toward
disillusionment with democracy, toward war as a panacea. 30
To defend this "march" of the New Deal, Social Work Today now advised its readers
that social workers must make America " ...a force for peace" and " ...prevent our
being dragged into a war ofwhich we want no part... ,,31
Refining its switch in position from one of collective security to one of strict
neutrality, in January, 1940, Social Work Today drew up a statement of principles,
"Meeting Social Need: A Peace Program.,,32 Declaring that it was time for social
workers ", ..to speak out for the maintenance and extension of social progress" and
"point out the dangers of war propaganda," Social Work Today's editors articulated a
program calling for the protection of social gains at home through a resistance to
war. 33 The Peace Program statement detailed seven principles for peace and
continued social progress: 1) the protection and expansion of basic social welfare
program; 2) the prevention of diversion of social welfare funds to the military; 3)
resistance of the administration of social and civil services by the military; 4) the
public redistribution of government profits obtained through the sale of arms to
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foreign governments; 5) the protection of civil rights and the continued rights of
unions to collective bargaining; 6) the commitment of the profession to the
maintenance ofpeace; and 7) an intensified alliance between the profession and
community organizations in support of peace and the protection of democratic
rights. 34 Tapping the anti-war sentiment widely prevalent in the field, the principles
were endorsed by over 75 national and local leaders in the profession, including
leaders of the UOPWA and SCMWA unions and rank and file supporters such as
Mary van Kleeck, Harry Lurie and Bertha Reynolds. In addition to the movement's
expected supporters, leaders in the mainstream ofthe profession, including Dorothy
Kahn, Gordon Hanlilton, Paul Kellogg and Karl de Schweinitz, also endorsed the
statement of principles. 35
While the support of Social Work Today's Peace Program by many in the
mainstream of social work reflected a genuine opposition to American entry into the
war within the whole of the profession, many of the statement's signatories
questioned the journal's seemingly mirrored stances of the Communist Party,
particularly the journal's condemnation of England as a main instigator of imperialist
war and its opposition to U.S. aid to the British government. 36 To buttress the
journal's position, Mary van Kleeck attempted to explain to readers the reasoning
behind the non-aggression pact and make the case for understanding war in Europe
as a fundamental expression of imperialism. Arguing that the non-aggression pact
was necessary in the face of the Soviet Union's inability to rely on the League of
Nations and the Chamberlain government to ensure a pact of collective security
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against Germany, van Kleeck maintained that the German-Soviet pact had
effectively blunted further imperialist ambitions of the British and French. For
American social workers, van Kleeck argued that " ... our position in the world crisis
must therefore be one of constructive neutrality, independent ~fthe conflicts which
do not concern us, but demanding that they be subordinated to the human interests
implied in all our work.,,37
Trade unions representing social workers in the CIO also took uP. the banner
of non-intervention, joining with the anti-war sentiments of CIO chief John Lewis,
whose fear of U.S. intervention led him to briefly consider the launching of a third
party to oppose Roosevelt in the 1940 elections. As the CIO passed resolutions
against U.S. intervention at its national convention, Lewis made labor's case for non
intervention:
Involvement or intervention in the European war is repugnant to
every healthy-minded American. The American electorate is
anxious to demonstrate this fact in the political election of 1940.
The major political party that permits war, or potential war
profiteers, or professional politicians with an aggressive military
complex, to dominate or write its platform will find itself
hopelessly beaten by the votes of an outraged electorate in
November. 38
National conventions of both the SCMWA and UOPWA passed resolutions
opposing intervention and, condemning what the unions considered a rising tide of
war hysteria fanned by the Roosevelt administration, called on its members to defend
social welfare programs from possible conversion into programs for military
preparedness. 39 But unlike the CIO's Lewis, leaders of the SCMWA and the
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UOPWA enthusiastically embraced the Communist's "The Yanks Are Not Coming"
slogan, fonning hundreds of local union "The Yanks Are Not Coming" and "Peace"
committees during early 1940, including over 70 such committees in New York City
alone. 40 The Joint Committee of Trade Unions in Social Work (JCTU), a coalition
of SCMWA and UOPWA unions, carried the movement's peace message to the
1940 NCSW conference held in Grand Rapids, Michigan. There, members of the
JCTU obtained over 1,000 signatures from delegates in support of Social Work

Today's Peace Program statement and sponsored sessions warning social workers of
the dangers of U.S. involvement in the war in Europe. 41
Throughout 1940 and early 1941, the pages of Social Work Today
increasingly emphasized the need for social workers to support U.S. neutrality.
Reversing its earlier support of the New Deal during the days ofthe Popular Front,
the journal renewed its criticisms of Roosevelt and the inadequacies of the New
Deal. Editorials and articles condemned reductions in the WPA and the
militarization of the CCC and other federal work projects as the journal's editor,
Frank Bancroft, warned of an increasing deflection of social welfare programs into
war preparedness programs:
It is my finn conviction that rational understanding of what is
happening around and to the social services, and determined action
on the basis of such understanding, are the primary needs of all of
us in social work at the this moment. Federal social services,
deflected from their proper objective of dealing constructively with
pennanent social programs, are being integrated into the national
defense program. This is being done as an organic part of a
governmental policy supported by the worst enemies of these
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programs, of substituting a war economy for the consumers'
economy toward which ...the New Deal was directed. 42
Bancroft went on to clearly articulate the journal's main thesis, reminiscent of its
charges of New Deal social fascism in the early 1930s: "True American patriotism
today lies ...in the determination that America will be the first great power to deal
successfully with its domestic fascism in time to prevent war... fascism cannot be
fought by fascism, but must be fought by its opposites -liberty and security.,,43
Despite the anti-war sentiments expressed by delegates to the 1940 NCSW
and the AASW's delegate assembly, as U.S. entry into the war seemed increasingly
likely, by late 1940 many in the mainstream of social work, unlike Social Work
Today and the CIO trade unions representing social workers, moderated their
previous pacifism and moved to support war preparations. In September 1940, the
New York State chapter ?f the AASW formed a Committee on the Social Aspects of
Defense, and the national AASW Committee on Government and Social Work also
began deliberations on the role of the profession during times of war. Noting these
developments with alarm, Social Work Today warned that the AASW " ...might act as
convenient messengers from the military to the civil and social side of American life,
rather than as professionally skilled ambassadors from the people ... ,,44
While significant numbers ofthe AASW and its leadership continued to
prepare for the possibilities ofU.S. entry into the war, Social Work Today intensified
its calls for neutrality and defense of domestic social welfare programs. In its final
issue before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Social Work

223

Today made a special appeal to social workers attending the 1941 NCSW, presenting
what it called a "People's Program in 1941":
Today social workers find themselves in serious conflict because
of the severity of the impact of the present war program upon the
people's program of democratic social advancement. It is
increasingly difficult for them to face resolutely the fact that the
war program is not the people's program....
The American people have the wit and the courage to organize
themselves for peace more effectively than they have been
organized for war... Today, in a dozen ways, they are organizing for
themselves a life of peace, freedom and security.4S
As word of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union reached the American Communist
Party on June 22, 1941, yet an?ther shift in its foreign policy line would soon be
forthcoming for both the party and the rank and file movement. On June 28, the
party's National Committee silently abandoned its previous characterization of the
war in Europe as an imperialist war, now calling upon the American government to
support military efforts to defeat fascism. 46 Once again, the editorial line of Social

Work Today would reflect this sudden shift from neutrality to war preparation. In its
first issue published after the Nazi invasion, Albert Deutsch explained the new set of
circumstances facing progressive social workers and their unions:
One simple, inescapable fact pounds upon our social thinking
today: we're in a war. It's no longer a war of words, but an
honest-to-goodness shooting war, a war between two mutually
incompatible worlds - democracy and fascism ... Social workers, as
such, have as large a stake in victory as nay other single group in
the population, for fascism is the annihilation of social work ...
This is no phony war... We've watched a monster follow its
destructive path for eight years ... We must kill it or be killed ... This
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is a good time to be a social worker - for those who can take it.
Let's gO.47
Trade unions representing social workers also altered their political line
following the German invasion. Delegates to the 1941 SCMWA Second Biennial
Convention endorsed the Roosevelt administration's provision of aid to the Soviet
Union and Britain. Addressing the convention, SCMWA president Abram Flaxer,
who months previous had condemned U.S. war preparations, now pledged its
membership would support the government's preparations"... for all out aid to the
war efforts of those nations now engaged in the war to wipe out the menace of
Hitlerism.,,48 With the Japanese bombing ofPearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the
shift of the rank and file unions and their voice, Social Work Today, was complete.
Declaring in its January, 1942 issue that"...the job of our field ofwork a major
instrument in Victory," the journal now identified its "essential task" as

" ...articulating the most progressive and imaginative social and professional thinking
of our field around social mobilization. ,,49 Like Social Work Today, the SCMWA
and UOPWA also pledged the full support of its member unions in the war effort and
joined the CIO national leadership in backing a no-strike policy for the duration of
the conflict. 5o Beset by financial debt and its staffnow drawn away by the war, the
February, 1942 issue of Social Work Today would be its last, its final article perhaps
appropriately authored by Bertha Reynolds:
We know there will be blood, sweat and tears. We know there will
be new heights of heroic devotion. We know that the united will
of the people will not lose. We know that grim realities like guns
and tanks and airplanes will make possible - or fail to make
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possible - the intangibles like human brotherhood really lived out,
creative achievement, peaceful work, love and worship. We are
resolved that the battle of production, grim as it is, shall not fail,
and the clash of arms shall not cease until the world is safe from
pestilent terror and free men can shape their destiny. 51 .

Red Scares, War, and a Cold War: The Demise of the Rank and File Movement
As the tortured twisting of foreign and domestic policy lines continued
throughout 1940 and 1941 in the pages of Social Work Today and in the resolutions
of CIO unions most closely linked to the Communist Party, particularly the SCMWA
and UOPWA, both the journal and the unions soon came under attack for alleged
communist domination by elements within the profession, conservative forces within
the CIO, and state and federal subversive investigation committees. While the rank
and file trade unions and Social Work Today briefly seemed to be assuming a
leadership role in their promotion ofthe Peace Program, supported by so many at the
1940 NCSW, by 1941, charges of communist domination of the journal and trade
unions representing social workers began to surface within the profession. Most
prominent in these attacks was the Social Work Trade Unionists for Britain and
Democracy committee, headed by John Fitch. Accusing the rank and file unions of
being dominated by Communists, the committee distributed mimeographed papers to
leaders of the profession and delegates to the 1941 NCSW elaborating on their
accusations. 52 Tracing the evolving political line of Social Work Today through
October of 1940, the committee charged the journal in its first paper with
consistently being in accord with the Communist Party:
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The above [analysis] of Social Work Today editorial policy speaks
for itself. In both domestic and foreign affairs the journal has
consistently taken a stand which parallels the C.P. line, has
employed the same arguments, and has, therefore, shown that its
present isolationist concern cannot be regarded as a logical result
of intellectual conviction. 53
A second mimeographed attack on Social Work Today was distributed by the
committee in June of 1941. Tracing the journal's continuing shifts in foreign and
domestic policy, the paper reasserted its claim that the journal and officials of the
SCMWA and UOPWA were aligned with the Communist Party, taking pains to list
the names of no less than 46 individuals who were staff or sponsors of the journal. 54
The committee continued its attack at the 1941 NCSW conference, distributing a
flyer accusing the SCMWA and UOPWA of being tools of propagandists opposed to
enemies of totalitarianism. The increasing agreement ofmany within the profession
that the rank and file unions were suspect was, indeed, indicated by some 80
signatures of support on the flyer, many of whom had signed the Peace Program
statement of a year ago. 55
The growing tendency within the mainstream of the profession to associate
the rank and file unions with the purported totalitarian politics of the Communist
Party reflected a growing consensus within the whole of the American liberal
community during 1939 and 1940 that both communism and fascisnl were equally
dangerous threats to democracy. Following the Communist Party's reversal of its
political line after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, liberal-left
pUblications such as The Nation and the New RepUblic now condemned the party and

227

its supporters as untrustworthy and subservient to the interests of the Soviet Union. 56
As a growing consensus of anti-Communism developed among liberals, many
liberal-left organizations began adopting so-called "CommuNazi" policies during
1939 and 1940, denying membership to and expelling suspected members of the
Communist Party and fascist organizations. s7 Reflecting the rising tide of liberal
anti-Communism, Survey Graphic published several articles equating the dangers of
communism with fascism, including an appeal by Archibald MacLeish for liberals to
reject the Communist Party's policy of anti-fascism and instead " ... adopt the policy
of aggressive pro-democratic action... "s8 Even Harry Lurie, a formerly stalwart ally
of the rank and file unions, began to turn away from the movement's defense of the
Soviet Union and its perceived allegiance to the Communist Party. Stung by the
Moscow trials and the Nazi-Soviet pact, Lurie rejected association with the
Communist Party and criticized Social Work Today editor Frank Bancroft for the
magazine's " ...tendencies in the administration of the magazine that are inclined to
be dogmatic and inflexible in character," and warned Bancroft that " ...should SWT
become increasingly orthodox and rigid in its point of view, I believe that I, for one,
would begin to lose interest in it since I don't believe in the finality of truths and
revelations... ,,59 The extent of disenchantment of some within the rank and file
movement regarding its Communist members was further dramatized by the
rejection of Communist association by Roger Baldwin. Once one of the movement's
most strident and radical intellectual leaders, by 1940, Baldwin now considered
Communism as equal a danger as fascism. Baldwin, Executive Director of the
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•
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), joined with liberal anti-Communist
Executive Board members in 1940 to expel board member Elizabeth Gurley Brown,

an open Communist and member of the party's National Committee. Brown's
eventual expulsion was strongly opposed by ACLU board member Mary van Kleeck,
who resigned from the board and subsequently broke off relations with Baldwin, just
as Baldwin severed his ties with the rank and file movement. 60
While allegations of Communist domination of the rank and file unions
increased during 1940 and 1941 within the profession, rank and file alarm over such
accusations was quickly superceded by the formation in the early 1940s of state and
federal subversive activities committees investigating Communist subversion in
labor unions and other organizations throughout the country.61 As fears of
Communism began to share an equal footing with the dangers of fascism, in 1939 the
Roosevelt administration began to take steps against the Communist Party,
conducting numerous investigations into the activities of the party and arresting party
leader Earl Browder on charges of passport violations. 62 In Congress, anti
Communist legislators passed the Alien Registration Act, popularly referred to as the
Smith Act, requiring the registration of all non-citizens with the government and
providing for the deportation of aliens shown to be members of revolutionary
political organizations. Included in the provisions of the Smith Act was a sedition
clause, establishing the act of teaching or advocating the overthrow the government
as a federal crime. Under the provisions ofthis new sedition law, mere membership
in an organization promoting such acts was sufficient for conviction. Adding to the
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provisions of the Smith Act, the 1940 Congress also passed the Voorhis Registration
Act, required all organizations "subject to foreign control" to register with the
Department of Justice. 63 Even prior to the passage of the Smith Act and the Voorhis
Registration Act, Congress had authorized the creation ofthe House Un-American
Activities Committee in 1938. Under the leadership of Martin Dies, an ardent
opponent of the New Deal and staunch anti-Communist, HUAC was empowered to
investigate communist and fascist influence in suspected organizations as well as
allegations of such infiltration in government agencies. 64
As the HUAC launched a series of investigations into fascist and communist
subversion in the late 1930s and early 1940s, so-called Little Dies committees were
similarly authorized by several state legislatures. While the HUAC had concentrated
its investigations on communist subversion in New Deal projects such as the Federal
Writers Project, the Federal Theatre, and the CCC, as well as organizations such as
the Farmer-Labor Party and the ACLU, many of the state-initiated subversive
activities committees focused on public relief unions in their investigations of
communist sUbversion. 6s The most ambitious of these Little Dies committees would
surface in California, where the Assembly Relief Investigating Committee, under the
chairmanship of Samuel Yorty, was authorized by the legislature to investigate
alleged communist infiltration into the State's Relief Administration (SRA).66
Declaring that the SCMWA, the union representing relief workers, was under the
control of the Communist Party, the committee held a series of investigatory
hearings throughout California in 1940. In the wake of the investigations, numerous
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SCMWA members were arrested on charges of contempt by the committee, and a
wholesale purge of SCMWA members in the SRA began. In Alameda, over 30
workers were dismissed, including the entire executive board of the local union, and
18 employees of the Stockton SRA office arrested for defying the investigating

committee were subsequently dismissed. SRA offices in Los Angeles, Visalia, and
San Francisco witnessed similar dismissals of union leaders and members, severely
weakening SCMWA. 67 The committee's attacks on SCMWA were accompanied by
similar attacks on unions and their members within private agencies. In Los
Angeles, members of the SSEU local ofthe UOPWA were dismissed on charges of
inefficiency and subversion by the Jewish Social Service Bureau, and the union
battled to maintain its right to collectively bargain on behalf of its members.
Members of the UOPWA were also accused of being communists by the Yorty
committee and its successor, the Tenney Committee, in San Francisco, Los Angeles,
and San Diego as the SSEU locals struggled to maintain their membership.68
The investigations of SCMWA and UOPWA in California were replicated in
various degrees by subversive activities committees in other states. In Pennsylvania,
over 50 employees of the Philadelphia County Board ofPublic Assistance, including
the entire executive board of the local SCMWA, were fired over charges of
association with the Communist Party and violations of the Hatch Act (prohibiting
political activity by government employees) following hearings of the Dies
Committee into communist influence in Philadelphia. 69 In addition to investigating
the SCMWA, the Dies committee focused its attention on Social Work Today and its
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National Committee of Cooperators, a fundraising group that included Bertha
Reynolds, Mary van Kleeck, Abram Flaxer, Lewis Merrill and others. After hearing
testimony on the journal, the committee declared the journ~l a "Communist Front"
publication and added its supporters to its lists of communist sympathizers. 70 In
Newark, New Jersey, local leaders ofthe SCMWA were accused by the local relief
agency of being communists and summarily dismissed without hearings, almost
breaking the union. 71 Similar investigations in Michigan, Texas, Illinois, and
Maryland also targeted the SCMWA and UOPWA, resulting in dismissals of union
leaders and activists for alleged communist subversion, seriously undermining union
gains made over the previous years.72
As unions representing rank and file social workers reeled under the assaults
of government investigations, they came under equal attack by anti-Communist
elements within the CIO. While the presence of Communist Party union organizers
in the initial organization of the CIO had been tolerated and even solicited by CIO
president John Lewis, Lewis' toleration was based on a recognition of party
organizational skills as opposed to any agreement with the party's politics. 73 During
the late 1930s, an uneasy alliance between Lewis and the Communist Party was
maintained, primarily due to Lewis' opposition to Roosevelt, who Lewis feared was
leading the nation into a world war. Lewis' opposition to Roosevelt, and his hands
off attitude towards communists in the CIO, engendered resistance from more
conservative CIO union leaders, coalescing behind the leadership of Sidney Hillman,
president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. An ardent supporter of Roosevelt
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and openly anti-Communist, Hillman accused Lewis of harboring communists in the
labor movement and called for the expulsion of communist and left-led unions and
their supporters, including the SCMWA and UOPWA. Lewis, fearful that Hillman
was in alliance with Roosevelt to take over the labor movement, rebuffed Hillman's
charges and refused to take action against union leaders who were open Communist
Party members or suspected of party affiliation. 74
As the conflict between the Hillman forces and Lewis broke into open
warfare in 1939, the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact further
spurred anti-Communist sentiment within the CIO. Much to Lewis' chagrin, the
United Auto Workers (UAW), led by Walter Reuther, passed resolutions at its 1940
convention supporting Roosevelt, condemning the totalitarianism of both Germany
and the Soviet Union and barring members who were affiliated with subversive
organizations from holding offices in the union. 7s The pro-Roosevelt and anti
Communist stance of the UAW, one of the largest CIO unions, was a direct
challenge to Lewis and an ominous portent of his future ability to maintain control of
the CIO. As most ofthe CIO unions, including those led by open members ofthe
Communist Party, announced their support for Roosevelt in the 1940 election
campaign, Lewis announced his endorsement of Republican candidate Wendell
Wilkie, further eroding his standing within the CIO. At the 1941 CIO c~nvention,
Lewis announced his intention to step down, nominating Phillip Murray to replace
him. In a frontal assault against Lewis, unions under the leadership of Hillman
introduced a resolution to bar Communists and fascists from holding union offices.
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While the resolution was defeated as a result of last minute negotiations by Lewis,
the convention passed a compromise resolution condemning fascist and Communist

ideology as having "...no place in this great modem labor movement.,,76 Fearful of a
draft-Lewis movement at the convention, the Hillman forces threw their support
behind Murray, who assumed leadership ofthe CIO, thus temporarily averting anti
Communist purges.
With the outbreak of World War II, attacks on communism in the CIO
generally subsided as the unions declared a no-strike pledge for the duration of the
war and directed most of their activities'to support of the war effort. 77 Like the other
CIO unions, both the SCMWA and UOPWA generally adhered to the no-strike
pledge. During the war, the public relief and welfare unions slowly gained
membership, although such gains were hampered by frequent layoffs due to dramatic
drops in relief rolls and intensive staff turnover within relief agencies as many male
workers joined the military. As the unions refrained from their previous militant
insistence on improved salaries and benefits for the duration ofthe war, real wages
for public relief workers dramatically declined between 1941 and 1944, not returning
to pre-war levels until 1945. 78
Partially as a result of the declining political militancy of the unions during
the war, a muting of anti-Communism, and a shared priority on serving the war
effort, rank and file unions and the AASW grew closer during the war years. Unions
representing social workers worked closely with the AASW during the war on war
fund drives, community chest fund-raising, and preparations for social welfare
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programming in the post-war period. As relations between the rank and file unions
and the professional organization wanned, the CIO sponsored a series of formal
meetings in 1945 between their social work unions and the AASW to chart out
common cooperation, culminating in the formation of a joint AASW-CIO Civil
Service Association Information Exchange. 79 Relationships between the unions and
the AASW would continue to strengthen in the immediate post-war period, such that
in 1946, the AASW, while not fully endorsing social workers' engagement in
collective bargaining, included a set ofprinciples regarding collective bargaining and
approval ofthe right of social workers to join unions in its policies on personnel
practices. While the mainstream ofthe profession now recognized trade union
merrlbership as not necessarily being in conflict with professional identity, the
AASW continued to view labor activities as a primarily non-social work function. 80
With the end of World War II, the SCMWA, UOPWA, and other CIO unions
quickly returned to their more militant tactics of the pre-war period as they sought to
rebuild their membership and restore salary levels and benefits that had either
stagnated or fallen during the war. In the wake ofthe war's end, a wave of strikes
swept the nation throughout 1945 and 1946 as employers and unions battled over
union demands for increased benefits and wages and employer attempts to maintain
the lower benefit levels they had enjoyed during the war. 81 Like other CIO unions,
the SCMWA and UOPWA aggressively sought increased benefits for its members
and pursued contracts for collective bargaining with additional public and private
social welfare agencies. In 1946, the SCWMA merged with the CIO's United
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Federal Workers of America, a union of federal employees, to form the United
Public Workers of America (UPWA). As SCMWA president Abram Flaxer
assumed leadership ofthe UPWA, the new union now consisted of between 60,000
and 70,000 members, including an estimated 8,000-10,000 public reliefworkers. 82
The newly-fonned UPWA engaged in walk-outs and strikes in numerous cities, most
notably New York, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, as part of highly
successful efforts to win imprOVed wages and benefits for its members. 83 Also
seeking to improve their position, the UOPWA accepted into its union the Federation
of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Teachers, increasing its membership to over
45,000 under its new president, James Durkin. While social work membership

remained relatively small in the UOPWA, perhaps 5-6,000 total members in 30
locals nationwide, SSEU locals also joined in the CIO strike wave in New York,
Chicago and Los Angeles and were largely successful in regaining benefits lost
during the war.84
Unions representing rank and file social workers emerged from World War
II with a growing membership and a renewed association with the mainstream of the
profession. Successful campaigns to revive stagnating membership during the war
and new collective bargaining contracts in public and private agencies had been won
during 1945 and 1946. And while the demise of Social Work Today had deprived
the movement of a central voice, the progressive politics espoused in its pages
continued to be voiced in union newsletters and the joint councils of social work
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unions that had fonned prior to and during the war. As one social work trade union
leader of the time recalled,
Most of us [social workers in unions] were giddy at the end of the
war. Giddy about peace and giddy about the future of the union.
We had survived the red-hunters before the war and had overcome
people like [John] Fitch and his reactionary group of social
workers. The question of communism was irrelevant to us for the
most part. Sure, many like [Abram] Flaxer, [Elizabeth] Nelson and
[James] Durkin were members of the party, but that wasn't an
issue. They served the interests of the rank and file, not the party.
It was the cold warriors who puffed up the communist stuff, they
destroyed our unions, not the communists. 85
Despite the successes of the unions representing social workers in the
immediate post-war period, a rising tide of anti-Communist sentiment in Congress
and the nation as a whole, would revive itself in the new era of the Cold War.
Finding its origins in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, in which President Truman
announced that American foreign policy would challenge Communist aggression
wherever it was deemed to threaten freedom and democracy, the politics of the Cold
War would come to dominate both foreign and domestic policy during the late 1940s
and 1950s. 86 As the perceived threat of communist aggression outside the borders of
the United States was converted into an equal fear of internal communist subversion,
once again the specter of communist subversion would envelop the unions in a
ruthless witch hunt from both within and outside of the labor movement.
Within the CIO, the revival of anticommunist forces signaled the beginning
of a bitter struggle within the leadership of the CIO over the communist question.
Struggles between anticommunist and communist and left-led groupings wracked the
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United Automobile Workers, the United Electrical Workers, and the National
Maritime Union. In October of 1946, 34 CIO unions formed the CIO Committee for
Renovative Trade Unions, with the expressed purpose of ousting what they
considered communist-controlled unions. s7 At the CIO's 1946 national convention
unions in the committee put forth a resolution calling on the CIO to reject policies
" ...emanating from totalitarianism, dictatorships and foreign ideologies such as
Communism and Fascism.,,88 CIO president Phil Murray, seeking to avoid a fatal
split in the union, appointed a six-person committee to draft a compromise
resolution. Included on the committee were Abram Flaxer of the UPWA, Mike
Quill, the open Communist leader of the Transport Workers Union, and Ben Gold,
president of the Fur and Leather Workers of America, also an open member of the
Communist Party. Faced with pressure by Murray to adopt a compromise that would
avoid expUlsions, Flaxer and the others on the committee reluctantly adopted an
alternative resolution subsequently passed by the convention stating that convention
delegates " ...resent and reject efforts of the Communist Party or other political
parties and their adherents to interfere in the affairs of the CIO.,,89 But the hopes of
Flaxer and other union leaders accused of heading communist-dominated unions that
the compromise resolution would avoid purges were quickly dashed. Following the
national convention, local and state CIO conventions in New York, Michigan, Los
Angeles, Washington and other areas adopted similar anticommunist resolutions,
ousting suspected communists from leadership positions in the state and local union
joint councils. 90 Seeking to avoid internal dissension, UOPWA president Lewis
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Merrill ordered his union members and officers to avoid identification with the
Communist Party, threatening disciplinary action against those who failed to do so.
Following his announcement, Merrill resigned from his position as a contributing
editor to the New Masses magazine as well as resigning from the board of directors
of the Jefferson School, long associated with the Communist party.91 Despite
Merrill's attempts to distance the union from charges of communism, the UOPWA,
as well as the UPWA, battled attempts of other anti-Communist CIO unions to raid
their membership, as well as raids by the AFL's American Federation of
Government Employees. 92
Beset by internal conflict within the CIO, the unions representing social
workers faced new threats from the Truman Administration and a Republican
controlled Congress. In March of 1947, President Truman issued an executive order
establishing a federal loyalty oath program, requiring all federal employees to sign
an oath that they did not belong to any subversive organizations as identified by the
U.S. Attorney General. Coming on the heels of the UPWA's resistance to signing
the Hatch Act of 1939, which prohibited public employees from engaging in political
activities, the loyalty oath program would decimate union membership. The unions'
refusal to sign provisions ofthe Hatch Act had already denied them federal
protections of the right to collective bargaining, and they had struggled to maintain
recognition by employers throughout the early 1940s. Following affirmation of the
Hatch Act by the Supreme Court in a challenge brought by the UPWA, UOPWA and
UPWA unions had only recently agreed to its provisions as the loyalty program was
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created. 93 Now, as the UPWA's leaders and members refused to sign loyalty oaths,
or found themselves under investigation for suspected disloyalty, a wave of
dismissals and resignations increasingly crippled the union's ability to represent
federal workers. By the end of 1947, the impact of the loyalty program, coupled
with raids by the AFL, found the UPWA considering the advantages of forming a
separate union of federal employees outside of the UPWA.94 Compounding the
difficulties of the UPWA and the UOPWA, the Republican-controlled Congress
overrode President Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, requiring all
union officers to sign an oath specifically denying membership in or affiliation with
the Communist Party and banning strikes by federal employees. 9s Once again,
UPWA leaders refused to comply, were stripped of representation protection by the
National Labor Relations Board, and found many companies and social agencies
now refusing to recognize the union's right to represent employees and voiding
contracts.96
The social work unions of the UPWA came under particular attack in New
York. Following passage of the federal Taft-Hartley Act, the New York state
legislature passed legislation forbidding public employees from going on strike.
Adding to the anti-union legislation, newspapers in New York City had attacked the
UPWA for alleged communism and blamed its permissive policies for encouraging a
rise in relief rolls in the city during 1946 and 1947. As newspapers published attacks
on the morals and lack ofwork incentives among recipients, the UPWA responded
with the distribution of thousands of leaflets describing the facts of poverty in the
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city and sponsored demonstrations of support for maintaining and expanding relief
benefits. While the union struggled with the city's Welfare Department to win a new
contract, a rival organization, the Civil Service Forum, organized to condemn the
leadership of the UPWA and woo away UPWA members disturbed by charges of
communist control of the union. 97
Besieged within the CIO, and under attack by federal investigators, the
unions representing social workers received their final blow during the 1948 and
1949 national conventions of the CIO. As delegates to the 1948 CIO national
convention gathered in Portland, Oregon, anti-Communist forces within the CIO,
now under the leadership Walter Reuther, held sufficient power to call for the
expUlsion of the left-led unions. Challenging CIO president Phil Murray, who had
been reluctant to act upon the anti-Communist resolutions of previous conventions,
Reuther warned, "You [Murray] are not going to be tolerated forever in this program
of deliberate planned madness of destroying the American labor movement and
sabotaging the basic policies of the CIO.,,98 Following Reuther's challenge, Murray
now moved to the right, acknowledging communist domination of some unions.
Murray now authorized the CIO's Executive Board to investigate unions suspected
not specifically of communist influence but ofmisuse of union funds and negligence
in carrying out union responsibilities. In authorizing the investigations, Murray cited
the UOPWA as an example of such negligence, complaining the union had wasted
funds and the time of the CIO Executive Board with complaints of raiding by other
CIO unions. 99
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By the time of the 1949 CIO national convention in Cleveland, unions
accused of communist-domination such as the UOPWA and the UPWA were
struggling for survival in the face ofrapidly declining membership as a result of state
and federal anti-Communist investigations and internal raids by CIO and AFL rival
unions. Now isolated within the labor movement, the unions were helpless to
prevent their impending expulsions from the CIO. Delegates to the convention now
passed resolutions barring members of the Communist Party from membership on
the CIO's Executive Board and authorized the Executive Board to expel any affiliate
union deemed by the Board to be acting in support of the program: of the Communist
Party. The Convention then expelled the United Electrical and Radio Workers of
America, which had boycotted the convention, and the Farm Equipment Workers
Union on charges of Communist domination. Following the expUlsion, UOPWA
president James Durkin proclaimed, "1 don't know what the hell will happen next,"
and the UOPWA director of organization characterized the situation as "a bloody
mess.,,100
The answer to Durkin's lament came the day after the 1949 convention
closed. The CIO Executive Board ordered expulsion hearings on the UOPWA, the
UPWA, and eight other unions accused of Communist-domination. Beginning
hearings in January, 1950, the Executive Board acted quickly, expelling all ten
unions on February 15, 1950. 101 In the final reports of the expUlsions, the Executive
Board determined that the UOPWA " ...followed and continue to follow exactly,
without deviation, the program of the Communist Party ...Never in the history of the
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UOPWA has any policy ever been adopted which in any way runs counter to the
policies ofthe Communist Party or to the interests of the Soviet Union ...,,102 In a

similar fashion, the Executive Board concluded that the UPWA had also followed
the Communist Party line in the post-war period. Cognizant that the UPWA
primarily consisted of federal employees, the Board took pains to note in its report
that it " ...wishes to make crystal clear that its condemnation of that [UPWA]
leadership, and of the union, does not necessarily reflect a condemnation of each
individual member ...the jobs ofmany ofwhose members would be endangered by a
fallacious translation ofthe Committee's findings as to the union leadership into a
condemnation of each of its individual members.,,103 In its efforts to separate the
loyalty ofthe UPWA's general membership from its leaders, the report specifically
focused on the alleged Communist Party affiliation ofUPWA President Abram
Flaxer and the union's secretary-treasurer, Eleanor Nelson. 104
Expelled by the CIO, the UOPWA and the UPWA were now a mere
semblance of their fonner selves. UOPWA membership, estimated in 1946 to be
nearly 45,000, had dropped to only 12,000 by the time of their expulsion. The
UPWA suffered similar devastating losses in membership, shrinking from a peak of
nearly 80,000 members in 1947 to less than 2,500 by 1952. 105 Stripped ofelO
affiliation for alleged communist-domination, the unions were now attacked with
fury by state and local anti-Communist and subversive activities committees. Purges
of union members in public relief and welfare agencies occurred throughout the
country in rapid succession during 1949 and 1950, including Detroit, Los Angeles,
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New York City, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Washington State. t06 In
Detroit, the city's mayor accused the UPWA locals ofharboring some 150 members
of the Communist Party, and the city's Loyalty Commission launched a probe into
city employee loyalty.t07 In Los Angeles, county and city loyalty oath requirements
were used to investigate and purge UPWA members from public relief agencies and
other city and county agencies. lOS In New York City, where the now remaining
1,500 members of the UPWA made it the largest of the national union's locals
representing social workers, a particularly bitter assault upon the union was
unleashed by the city's Department of Welfare. Between 1947 and 1950, successive
commissioners of the Department of Welfare attacked the UPWA as being
dominated by communists. In 1949, Welfare Department commissioner Raymond
Hilliard announced his detennination to " ...chase the Communists out of the
Department" and began a concerted campaign to break the union's hold over
department collective bargaining agreements. 109 Using such tactics as photographing
union members seen participating in demonstrations or protests over relief policies,
Hilliard subsequently dismissed union activists on charges of inefficiency and
insubordination. Upon the UPWA's expulsion from the CIO, Hilliard refused to
recognize the union and continued to purge the department ofUPWA members. By
March, 1951 nearly 200 UPWA members had been fired by the Department of
Welfare. IIO As the attacks on UPWA continued nationwide, the union finally
disbanded in 1953 with a membership of only 2,500, now replaced by a new union in
the CIO, the Government and Civic Employees Organizing Committee. I II
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SSEU locals in the UOPWA did not fare any better than those in the UPWA.
SSEU membership, now concentrated in the Jewish social service agencies of New
York and Los Angeles, were also challenged by rival unions, and most agencies
refused to recognize SSEU bargaining rights or representation of employees. I 12 In a
desperate attempt to maintain their membership, the UOPWA joined with three other
unions expelled by the CIO to merge with the left-led and independent Distributive
Workers Union, now renamed the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers
Union of America (DPOWA). In the resulting merger, former UOPWA president
J ames Durkin was named DPOWA secretary-treasurer. Claiming a membership of
less than 8,000 at its founding convention, the DPOWA absorbed the few remaining
members of the New York and Los Angeles SSEU locals, now numbering only
hundreds. 113 Attacked by other unions and public officials as a communist
dominated union, the DPOWA subsequently purged their leadership in 1953,
e~pelling

the last of the mostly Communist Party member social workers still in the

union. 114
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CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSIONS

In the long run I think we represented what social work professed and
also feared, social workers who weren't afraid to stand up for the
people, the unemployed and the exploited. The rank and file was a
lesson to social work that doing that was dangerous. People lost their
jobs, we were called Communists and sometimes hauled offto jail. It
scared them and I think they really gave up on it after that in a very
basic way. I'm not saying that we were the golden age or anything
like that, but look at what we've got now. That's the saddest thing.
Not what happened to me and others, but what happened to social
("Sarah," 1982)
work. 1
The expulsions of the UOPWA and the UPWA from the CIO marked the
final demise of the rank and file movement in social work. During the turbulent
years between 1946 and the unions' expulsions from the CIO in 1950, it also marked
a drawing back of the AASW from its brief flirtations with the unions during World
War II. As charges of comnlunist domination enveloped the unions representing
social workers, the mainstream of the profession withdrew its associations with the
rank and file unions. In the JCTU's final appearance at the 1950 NCSW, JCTU
sessions drew few numbers and were challenged by a new organization, the
Community and Social Agency Employees, which had replaced the SSEU in most of
New York City's private Jewish social serve agencies. 2 Following the CIO
expulsions of the UOPWA and UPWA, the Executive Committee of the NCSW now
refused to recognize the JCTU, citing the union expulsions and denying the JCTU a
presence at the 1951 NCSW. 3 As purges of public relief workers occurred
throughout the country, and federal and state subversive activities committees
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questioned the loyalty of social work trade unionists, the response of the AASW was
intensely circumspect. In a special issue on civil rights published in 1948 by the
AASW's official publication, Social Work Journal, the politically cautious nature of
the profession was clearly expressed:
While this issue of the Social Work Journal has been in preparation
the House Un-American Activities Committee has been
investigating· Communist infiltration into key governmental
positions. There is undeniable evidence that such infiltration has
occurred. There is undeniable evidence, also, that communist
political philosophy and practice are irreconcilable with
democratic constitutional govemment. 4
While the AASW would express concerns over the tactics of the HUAC and loyalty
oath programs, its 1949 policy statement on civil rights restricted AASW activities or
public statements in defense of civil rights violations to only members of the
organization. 5 By 1951, the AASW's willingness to even oppose cuts in social
welfare services was also almost non-existent as it refrained from comment on the
firing ofNew Deal social worker Jane Hoey from the federal department of Health,
Education and Welfare by the Eisenhower administration. Fired after protesting
proposed cuts in federal social welfare programs, Hoey sought the assistance of the
AASW. The AASW chose to demur, stating the AASW could not take action on any
situation that involved " ... a particular person.,,6 The AASW became even more
silent in its consideration of the merits of social workers' involvement in the labor
movement. Following the expUlsions of the rank and file unions, the few articles
that addressed social work participation in the labor movement published in Social
Work Journal would question the ethical conflicts that arose between a profession
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and participation in trade union activities. Typical of such sentiments, one article in
1948 stated, "Unionism's endeavor to organize professional personnel by appeals to
worker solidarity, when professionals regard themselves as a group set above the
common herd, has been a tactic as self-defeating as it has been persistent.,,7 Indeed,
the profession's tum from involvement in labor organizations was such that by 1954,
the Social Work Yearbook would have only this to say: "The union movement in
social work, which arose from the conditions ofthe depression of the 1930s, has
been limited in extent and influence and is apparently confined to a few metropolitan
areas."g
The profession's relative silence during the anti-Communist hysteria of the
late 1940s and the 1950s was of little comfort to its victims. As the internal cold war
of the 1950s continued to investigate organizations and individuals considered
subversive, many social workers who were prominent in the rank and file movement
faced blacklists, subpoenas, and even jail. Some rank and file activists, such as
Bertha Reynolds, Bronislaus Zukas, Max Bogner, and others all suffered from
informal blacklists that followed them for years. Others would lose their jobs as
their previous association with the rank and file movement and the progressive
causes it espoused became the subject of loyalty investigations. Jacob Fisher, one
time editor of Social Work Today and early rank and file union leader, was
suspended from his job in the Social Security Administration in 1954 after being
labeled a "security risk.,,9 Unable to find ajob in social work after his suspension,
Fisher joined the staff of a consulting firm until his retirement. With the exception
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of Bertha Reynolds and a few other social workers, Fisher recalls that he was ignored
in his plight by the mainstream profession. to Meyer Schreiber, a member of several
organizations deemed subversive by the government, was labeled a "national
security risk" following an investigation by the Federal Bureau QfInvestigation
(FBI) of his background while an employee of the U.S. Children's Bureau in 1964.
Schreiber recalls that the profession participated in providing information on him to
the FBI:
An inquiry [by the FBI] was made of the Columbia University
School of Social Work, where I had graduated in February 1949. I
was amazed at the ease with which information was given about
me. In 1991, I wrote three letters to the school's dean and asked
about the school's policy of giving out information to any source
about graduates; no reply was received. Similarly I wrote to the
Council on Social Work Education and did not receive a
reply...The National Association of Social Workers was part of the
investigation. A special FBI unit investigated the Chicago chapter
and combed the chapter's records to learn if I had been involved in
whatever the FBI defined as subversive activities in Chicago. 1I

Margaret Wheeler, who lost her job as a social worker in Washington after being
called before the HUAC in its investigation ofthe UPWA and refusing to answer
committee questions, remembers:
The professional association shunned me when I was going
through the HUAC persecution. They refused to come to my side
or even offer advice. They wanted to stay as far away from
communists as possible. They didn't know if I was a communist
or not. All they cared about was that the committee said I was.
Most of them were cowards, nearly all of them. 12
Abram Flaxer, former president of the UPWA, was cited for contempt by the U.S.
Congress after his refusal to answer questions of his affiliation with the Communist
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Party before the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security. Subsequently
tried and convicted, Flaxer's conviction was eventually overturned by the Supreme

Court in 1958. 13 Flaxer recalls, "1 was an absolute anathema to the leaders in social
work. They would have never dreamed of saying anything in my defense. I didn't
expect them to and they sure never did.,,14
The legacy that the rank and file movement has left for the profession of
social work is, as can be expected, a mixed one. Perhaps like no other rebellion
within the history of the profession's ranks, the movement best exemplifies the
dualistic conflicts that have divided the profession since its inception. The historic
tensions within the profession over the nature of its professional identity versus its
relationship to labor unions and other forms of organization, and its debates over the
merits of social reform versus the advisability of a technique-based practice, are well
informed by a study of the rank and file movement. For members ofthe rank and
file movement, affiliation and identity with organized labor and the social and
political causes promoted by the union movement were not seen as an inherent
conflict with their identity as social workers. Rather, many saw a clear identification
with 'the workers movement, merged with the skills and specialized knowledge of the
profession, as essential to the development of a truly democratic occupation fully
imbued with the values of social and economic justice. The debates of today within
the profession over the balance between social reform activity and the performance
of direct clinical services have almost studiously avoided the synthesis of these two
as attempted by the rank and file. It is, perhaps, because of this avoidance that the
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debate within the profession over its proper role and function so often has reduced
itself to tired dogmas devoid of any possible meaningful dialogue.
The unions of the rank and file movement also demonstrated to many social
workers that participation in trade unions was of immediate and long-lasting benefit.

Rank and file unions were the first to establish standards of working conditions,
salaries, and benefits in public and private agencies that were guaranteed through
collective bargaining contracts. While the original unions created by social workers
were destroyed in the hysteria ofMcCarthyism and the Cold War, their impact on
both the private and public sector have continued today, although considerably
muted in terms of political content or social work identity. During the 1980s and
1990s, while overall union membership has declined in the United States, it has
grown within the public sector. IS As of 1993, nearly 25 percent of the over 400,000
social workers in the labor force were members of unions, mostly concentrated in the
public sector in the AFL-CIO's Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. 16 These
unions have been highly successful in efforts to maintain or increase member salaries
and benefits and have contributed to public agency improvement of standards of
services to their clients. Equally important, as Milton Tambor points out,
progressive social work ideas and organizations have been sustained largely within
the context of the trade union movement. 17 Whether in the actual workings of the
unions or in the identification ofthe union movement and its historic concerns with
the needs of poor and working people as expressed in the pages of progressive social
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work journals such as the Journal ofSociology and Social Welfare and the Journal

ofProgressive Human Services, the labor movement continues to represent social
works' most outward expressions and fonns of struggle for social and economic
justice.
At the same time as the movement historically points out for our profession
directions for progressive political action, the experiences of the movement have also
served to mitigate against such progressive perspectives and actions. Lessons
regarding the limits of social reform, and the power of the state to contain and even
destroy such efforts, were not lost on the profession as the rank and file unions were
destroyed. As the political repression of McCarthyism and the Cold War targeted
social work unions, the profession stood largely aside, content to consolidate its
professional organization and reorient its ranks to the relative safety of technique,
bureaucracy, and political moderation. While temporarily shaken from its
professional complacency by the radical social work movement of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the profession today continues to be wary of asking too much or going
too far for its clients. Indeed, the politics of fear as engendered in the times of the
rank and file movement, are powerful modifiers of both individual and
organizational behavior. It is perhaps too easy for the profession to lose sight of the
positive lessons and victories of the rank and file movement, for the lessons of
failure have been extreme. It has also been perhaps too easy for the profession to
forget the contributions ofthose social workers who most suffered from their
willingness to struggle for the rights of poor, unemployed and working people. Few
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of those who were victims of blacklists and congressional inquisitions are
remembered today, and fewer still are honored for their courage and struggle.
In these senses, a fuller explication of the history of the rank and file
movement, its meaning within the historical context of the profession's development
and the insights that the movement provides regarding the optimum form and
function of the profession remain largely unexplored. In this regard, further
examination of the movement's attempts to integrate social work practice theory and
technique with politically liberatory theory and its practice is called for. In addition,
further study into the actual internal workings of the social work trade unions is
needed. Such study would further explain how the unions successfully reached out
to social workers, established strategies and tactics for collective bargaining, and
linked themselves with the broader industrial workers movement. Information on
the role of women and minorities in the rank and file movement is nearly non
existent. Given that the unions representing the rank and file held higher proportions
of women and minorities than most other CIO unions of the time,explicating these
important histories would help to fill a gap in both social work and labor history.
Finally, it is clear that deeper examination of the relationship of the rank and file
movement to the Communist Party and the political lines of the party is necessary.
This need is particularly salient, as the charges of communist-domination that helped
lead to the movement's ultimate destruction have continually and consistently been
attributed to the few historical accounts of the movement as the reasons for its
downfall and questionable relevance to the field today. In this regard, the tendency
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of these accounts has been to accept the accusation of communist-domination made
by the movement's accusers as evidence of such domination. Such incomplete logic
has only served to further marginalize the historical relevance of the rank and file
movement to the profession and dampen scholarly inquiry into that history. The
historical record of the relationship of the movement to the Communist Party and the
party's relative influence in the unions is far from complete, and that nascent history
has been flawed by the lack of an incorporation of a comprehensive examination of
the terms of inquiry regarding association, influence, and domination. Indeed, the
continuing politics of anti-communism are still well represented within our
profession's history of the movement, and until this condition is rectified, a
comprehensive historical record of the rank and file will not be achieved.
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Notes to Chapter 7

1. Interview by author with "Sarah," February 12, 1982. "Sarah" requested
anonymity in her interview. A rank and file activist and union official in the
mid-west, Sarah was one of a handful of social workers sentenced to prison for
her refusal to cooperate with anti-Communist investigations in the 1950s.
Despite receiving support from some of her fonner colleagues, Sarah recalled
that she was abandoned and shunned by most. Following her release from
prison, Sarah left the field and later retired in Seattle, Washington.
2. Alexander, Organizing the professional social worker, p. 201.

3. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
4. "Opinion," Social Work Journal (October 1948), p. 139.
5. Leighninger, Social work: Searchfor identity, p. 193.

6. Ibid.
7. Herbert Northrup, "Collective bargaining by professional societies," Social Work
Journal (October 1948), p. 168.
8. Quoted in Alexander, Organizing the professional social worker, p. 206.
9. Jacob Fisher, Security risk (Sarasota, FL: Piney Branch Press, 1986).
10. Ibid.

11. Meyer Schreiber, "Labeling a social worker a national security risk: A memoir,"
Social Work 40(5) (1995), p. 659.
12. Interview by author with Margaret Wheeler, September 19, 1979.
13. Beck, Contempt ofCongress, p. 234.
14. Interview by author with Abram Flaxer, August 16, 1980.
15. Milton Tambor, "Unions," in Richard Edwards (Ed.), Encyclopedia ofSocia I
Work, 19th edition [CD-Rom Version] (Washington, D.C.: NASW Press, 1995),
no page number.
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Appendix: Historical Research Method
For the purposes of this study, the author employed what has generally been
termed the historical-comparative research method. l Finding its roots in the work of
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx, the historical-comparative method,
while containing within its rubric a broad array of approaches and specific
techniques, places analytic emphasis on the understanding of an historical period or
event within both the overarching flow of history and the specific social and cultural
context of the historic situation under study. In this fashion, historical-comparative
research seeks to identify not only the objective facts of a historical period but to
interpret the meaning of these facts within the cultural-historical context and their
application for current social problems and discourse. 2
Two primary strategies were used in the collection of data: archival and oral
history technique. Both strategies share a common feature of reliance upon primary
sources as the target of data collection and subsequent analysis. While both
strategies share a search for original sources, these sources differ in form and
content. The former relies upon written primary sources of information (e.g., letters,
diaries, official documents), while the latter relies upon the spoken word (oral
recollections and memories) of persons who participated in the period ofhistory
under study. 3
While the uses and relative strengths and weaknesses of these and other
strategies employed in this study are discussed in more detail below, it is important
to make an observation on the shared implications of archival and oral history
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method within an historical-comparative approach. Both methods of data collection
share a common strength of providing the researcher direct access to the past; that is,
the researcher's interpretations of history are based on materials o/the time under

study and hold the strongest potential for classification and verification. 4 As opposed
to substantive reliance on secondary information sources, in which the researcher is
faced with disentangling another author's interpretation of historical data, the
researcher using primary data sources can base analyses and interpretations upon the
actual words and records of the actors in the historical narrative. However, the
strength of this direct connection with the past paradoxically reveals its weakness:
the records of the past, be they written or oral, are at best fragmentary and limited by
the context of their production. Primary sources reflect history in the making, not
history as product. The use of primary data is bound by the intended or unintended
distortions of their creators, the acts of their caretakers (be it archivists or the
memory of the actor), and the physical and intellectual corrosives of time. S
Accordingly, the comparison and triangulation ofmUltiple data sources took on
heightened priority in this historical study.
Use of Archives
Generally speaking, archives refer to organized collections ofwritten
documents pertaining to particular individuals, organizations, social movements or
other historical events. 6 Such collections can be contained in formal archive
facilities organized and maintained by universities, unions, governmental
institutions, or other organizations and commonly consist of materials such as letters,
301

diaries, minutes of meetings, unpublished manuscripts, internal organizational
documents, and other forms ofwritten records. Formal archives are usually
available for use by the general public and researchers, although certain restrictions
on the availability and use of documents may be imposed based on the physical
condition of the documents or the nature of the subject (e.g., access to classified
government documents or proprietary documents ofbusinesses). A closely related
source of materials includes documents in the personal possession of individuals
(either the subject ofinquiry or family members) and from whom permission must
be sought for inspection and conditions for use arranged.
In developing an archival search strategy, the author compiled a master list of
names of individuals, organizations and social movements relevant to the rank and
file movement in order to identify selection of archives and facilitate the subsequent
identification and review of other relevant collections. The development of this
master list was accomplished through a standard literature review (e.g., periodical
indexes, dissertation abstracts, biographical indexes). Sources derived from this
master list were then used to cross-check with archive collections throughout the
United States.
The author conducted an extensive literature review that encompassed
published primary source materials, secondary source publications, "fugitive"
(unpublished) materials, and personal correspondence with participants in the rank
and file movement. These references were categorized and cross-referenced across
four major categories: (1) references directly concerned with the rank and file
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movement; (2) references more generally pertaining to the historical development of
the social work profession during the time under study; (3) references pertaining to
the general labor movement of the time; and (4) references related to radical
movements and organizations ofthe time (e.g., the Communist Party and the
unemployed workers movement).

Archival Techniques Employed
Three primary strategies were employed in the archival research: chronology,
networks and cohorts, and backstage perspectives and processes.' The use of.

chronology refers to the organization ofmaterials into a timeline based on dates and
events identified through the initial literature review. In addition to providing a basic
temporal record of events, chronological organization allowed the author to identify
changing roles or patterns of behavior by individuals and organizations to compare
these chronologies in order to identify points of convergence or divergence. Equally
important, the development and review of a chronology allowed the author to more
easily identify gaps in the timeline that required further investigation to complete the
documentary record.
Archival materials were also used to identify social networks of individual
actors, institutions and organizations involved in the rank and file movement. By
tracing the origins and routes of formal and informal communications (e.g., letters,
memos, reports, meeting attendance records) the author developed a relatively dense
matrix of individual and group linkages, influential relationships, and patterns or
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individual and group participation and membership; all of which assisted the author
in the construction and interpretation of the historical materal. 8
The third major strategy employed involved the discovery and analysis of
underlying backstage motives of historical actors (individuals or organizations) and
the validity of their publicly expressed values, behaviors or beliefs. 9 Based on
Goffman'slO work on the differing nature of the private and public presentations of
self (front stage vs. backstage), this strategy sought to identify points of divergence
or convergence between these public and private motives and behaviors. This
process of analysis involved the comparison of documents or materials prepared for
public consumption (e.g., reports, speeches, pamphlets) with documents intended by
the actor to be private or limited in circulation (e.g., letters, diaries, notes) in order to
ascertain the overt and covert motivations and intentions oforganizations and
individuals. 11

Use of oral/written history methodology
Oral history interviews with participants in the rank and file movement were
another important source of data for the proposed study. It should be noted that a
variant ofthe oral history interview, the use of correspondence and written interview
schedules with subjects, is also germane to this study, and the general steps engaged
in by the researcher to collect the data correspond with the oral history technique.
Martin argues that oral history techniques are warranted or in fact desirable when
several conditions face the researcher, including the lack of written documentary
evidence, the need to supplement or verify existing documentary evidence, and the
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desire to capture participants' sense of the meaning of an historical event or era. 12 In
these senses, oral history interviews allow the researcher to directly communicate
with participants of the event or subject ofinquiry to confirm or disconfinn
previously published records of"fact", to explore details of events not previously
known or understood, and to incorporate the recollected motives, feelings, and
beliefs of interviewees into their analysis. Given the incomplete nature of archival
data, the use ofthese interviews, oral and written, were essential to this study.
The collection and incorporation of such data served to more fully complete
the documentary record, and of equal import, exposed the author to the felt reality of
the participants. Such exposures, be they through archival or oral history method,
speak to the interpretive nature of historical research; that is, history is the product of
both the documentary past and the personal interests, convictions, and assumptions
of the researcher. 13
Following the guidelines of Martin, the author used the following general
steps in the collection of oral and written histories: 14
1. Definition ofthe selected topics to be discussed with the interviewee(s).
2. Identification ofthe interview participants. This step involved the identification

of and implementation of a sampling strategy to obtain interview subjects.
3. Interviewing/data collection.
4. Transcribing and editing taped interviews. Interviews were transcribed into

written narratives, providing margin space for notes, annotations and comments
in analysis.
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5. Analysis and interpretation ofthe data. This final step engaged the author in the
coding, classification and verification oftranscript narrative. The data collected
were compared and evaluated against other documentary evidence and
interpreted within the context ofthe emerging historical narrative.
In regard to the interview subjects, many were leaders of the national rank and file
movement (including members of the National Coordinating Committee and major
trade unions representing social workers). In addition, the author interviewed "rank
and file" members engaged in local organizing and activity, as well as key members
of the Communist Party who were closely affiliated with the organizational efforts of
the movement.
A purposive sampling method was used in the identification of interview
subjects and entailed two strategies. The first strategy involved the identification and
location of specific key surviving authorities in the rank and file movement through a
review of the literature and documentary evidence. The second strategy involved a
snowball approach to identifying and locating participants. This approach to
sampling required the author to identify initial interview subjects who in turn
identified additional subjects for the author. 15 While this sample cannot be said to be
representative, it is important to note that the subjects contacted included a range of
key union leaders and activists in various sections of the country.

Analytic and interpretive issues of the methodological strategies
Archival and oral/written interview method share a number of common
strengths and weaknesses, particularly in relation to the validity and reliability of
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data obtained and the resulting interpretive issues/dilemmas inherent in historical
research. Martin notes that within the context of oral history research, validity
" ...defines the degree of confonnity between the reports of the event and the event
itself, as recorded by other primary sources ..." and that reliability refers to the extent
to which collected infonnation is consistent internally; that is, " ...does it tell the
same story about the same event on a number of different occasions?,,16 In a similar
discussion concerning archival research, Hill notes that researchers must pay close
attention to the dynamics of "sedimentation" - the cumulative social and physical
aspects by which documentation is included or excluded from collections, physically
deteriorates or is destroyed over time, or is altered or fabricated. I7
These issues of data reliability, validity and sedimentation pose numerous
analytic and interpretive dilemmas for the researcher, as the ability to control the
evidence is temporally beyond the reach of the researcher. In other words, the
evidences of history, be they written documents or spoken reminiscences, are created
and maintained by individuals (living or dead) other than the researcher, and the
decisions of worth or unworthiness they place on the historical knowledge in their
possession is solely theirs.
The practical implications of this iterative process presented a number of challenges
to data reliability and validity and the subsequent historical interpretations ofthe
author. Infonnation, be it written or oral, can be subject to conscious or unconscious
distortion or fabrication by their creators. Similarly, the social context and
personal/ideological assumptions and biases of the author may have led to distorted
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intetpretation of the data. I8 To deal with these threats, the historical method of this
research required a constant sifting and resifting of the evidentiary sands through the
process of verification of data through triangulation with multiple primary sources,
comparison of findings and intetpretations with secondary analyses conducted by
other researchers, and the search for and falsification of alternative
hypotheses/intetpretations. 19
Such methodological and intetpretive dilemmas are not unique to historical
research and are in fact shared by the physical and other social sciences. The
phenomena of history occur in the same universe as the other sciences, and, hence,
are subject to the same material conditions. But unlike many other scientific fields
of inquiry, the variables of history cannot be manipulated and replicated in a closed
system; rather, the chain of causality is open for the intetpreter to utilize the insights
of study and reflection to argue the merits of a particular intetpretation. And
ultimately, it is the audience to which the intetpretation of history is given that must
judge its usefulness, logic and validity.
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